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The climate crisis is the greatest threat confronting humanity today. Its devastating 
implications for peace and security, human rights, health and ecological sustain- 
ability are already being felt across the planet. Every day, millions of people all over 
the world are witnessing the destruction of their homes and livelihoods. For them, 
the climate crisis manifests itself as desertification and crop failure, soil salinity 
and water scarcity, floods and deadly heat waves. It has compounded hunger and 
poverty and, as a result, exacerbated conflict and displacement. 
In many ways, the climate crisis is a crisis of global justice: Although industri-
alised countries such as Germany have contributed to today’s global warming far 
more than their counterparts in the Global South, the latter will bear the brunt of its 
harshest consequences. Within the Global South, in turn, it is the most vulnerable 
groups that suffer most: those dependent on natural resources for their subsistence 
and livelihoods; those with least ability to protect themselves or adapt  – women, 
children, Indigenous people and other marginalised populations. As a result, the 
climate crisis acts as a multiplier of existing injustices, with a tendency to amplify 
conflicts, and to further undermine fundamental human rights such as the right to 
food, water, shelter, education, and health; the right to dignity, and to life itself.
Already today, the climate crisis is causing immeasurable damage to homelands, 
community structures, and cultural heritage, threatening traditions and ways of life 
that are thousands of years old. According to the Platform on Disaster Displacement, 
an estimated 25 to 30 million people were displaced by climate-related disasters 
every year between 2008 and 2017.
Currently, there are more internally displaced people as a result of environmental 
disasters than of violence and conflict. It is challenging, if not impossible, to pre-
dict with any great precision how many people will be forced out of their homes in 
the context of the climate crisis. The World Bank estimates that 140 million people 
will be displaced by 2050 in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and South America alone. 
However, one thing is certain: We need to gather more data and support research 
on climate-induced displacement, and thereby close the gaps in our knowledge as 
much as possible  – otherwise, just policies will be even more difficult to design than 
they are at present. It is time to treat the topic with the seriousness it merits and 
to make it a key priority for governments around the world. It is a globally shared 
responsibility to drastically limit the harmful effects of human activity on the global 
climate, and to respond to the unfolding humanitarian crises that result from it.
Berlin, November 2020
















Amidst the upheaval caused by the ongoing global health crisis, much of what we 
thought we knew about policymaking has been called into question. Above all, 
the assumption that growth-oriented societies cannot be radically altered in short 
spans of time has been rendered demonstrably false. For all the misery wrought 
by the devastating spread of Covid-19, the rapidity and radical extent of societal 
response has been a powerful lesson in the capacity and willingness of humans to 
change behaviour. 
It is, of course, too early to talk about positives. If anything, a more anxious 
world of tighter borders, in which states subject citizens and foreigners to ever-
harsher forms of surveillance, could be taking shape. And yet, in political terms, 
the pandemic has managed what scores of avowedly progressive politicians have 
proven incapable of doing for most of the previous decade. It has exposed the emp-
tiness of flag-waiving populism and, alongside the terrible killing of George Floyd 
in Minneapolis, drawn attention to social and racial inequality and injustice. 
What does this mean for policy-relevant research on climate change and migra-
tion? The events of 2020 have reminded us that new scenarios and information can 
spur individuals, groups and institutions to view and act differently on matters of 
longstanding concern. Indeed, the Black Lives Matter protests suggest the presenta-
tion of old information in new ways can be sufficient to trigger reconsideration of 
age-old systemic cruelties. Scholarship and journalism targeting the mainstream, 
it follows, need not concede the centre ground to outmoded ideas that appear 
immovable for no reason other than their prior hegemony. Now is a time to propose 
alternative ways of understanding and legislating to address issues that have been 
ignored or narrowly framed in the past; to advance new modes of thinking (and 
unthinking), particularly those that emerge from the experiences and advocacy of 
individuals, groups, organisations and social movements located at the peripheries. 
The writings compiled in this volume provide fresh perspectives on the subject 
of climate justice and mobility by leading scholars, experts, activists and journalists 
across a range of formats and genres. Its geographic and thematic scope is broad, 
with coverage of Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean across a range of 
scales and topics spanning health and socio-economic development to law and pol-
itics. In methodological terms, the approaches deployed encompass anthropolog-
ical observation, legal analysis, sociological inquiry and journalistic investigation. 
Scholarly jargon has been avoided, but the overall terminological framing 
requires two brief comments. Firstly, the term «mobility» is preferred over widely 
used alternatives, a choice that seeks to disassociate our object of study from 














































crucial, and the question of «climate refugees» is addressed at length in the pages 
that follow (Kent and Behrman). But so too are many other scenarios of climate-in-
duced movement and sedentariness not recognised by law or policy. Mobility  –  a 
capacious concept encapsulating all types of migration and immobility  – allows for 
consideration of diverse phenomena within a single analytical framework. 
Secondly, the title makes reference to climate «justice» (rather than climate 
change). This is indicative of an ethical commitment to life, livelihoods and strug-
gles against inequality. Lest this normative orientation be construed as idealistic, it 
is worth making the point that public investment in welfare should not be assumed 
to be more expensive than mantras that prioritise productivity and efficiency. As 
will be seen in the pages that follow, justice is neither a luxurious extravagance 
nor a question of morality. Rather, it is a rational response to the challenges of cli-
mate-induced mobility. If we have learnt one thing of relevance to climate change 
in 2020, it is that when it comes to the health and wellbeing of mobile and immo-
bile humanity beyond our own households, tribes, nations and borders, we are all 
stakeholders.
«Climate refugees» 
How did migration  – a basic fact of human history  – come to be viewed as a pathol-
ogy that threatens the security and integrity of nation-states? A fulsome answer to 
this question is beyond the scope of this introduction. Suffice it to say, the instincts 
and ideas that drive migration policies in Europe stem predominantly from 
narrowly defined concerns about «security», «terrorism», and dubiously conceived 
threats to Western culture («the European way of life»).1 That such concerns are not 
necessarily rational is apparent from the disproportionate anxiety over numbers, 
welfare burdens, and the supposed criminal threats presented by mobile popula-
tions from Asia and Africa. From Hungary to the United Kingdom, democratic elec-
tions and referenda can be won and lost on the basis of race-based majoritarian 
fears of demographic change («The Great [white] Replacement»).2
Having entered popular consciousness independently of global heating, migra-
tion discourse rarely makes explicit reference to climate change. However, with 
growing awareness among electorates about the impending threat of environmen-
tal catastrophe and species extinction, the ecological crisis is becoming increas-
ingly enmeshed with alarmism over immigration. This is particularly evident in the 
realm of policymaking, where the convergence of these issues can be traced back 
1 In 2019, «Protecting the European way of life» was made the responsibility of the EU's most 
senior migration official, EU Commission Vice President Margaritis Schinas. 
2 For an interesting discussion of this idea and its origins, see Polakow-Suransky, S., and Widlman, 
S. (2019, March 18), «The Inspiration for Terrorism in New Zealand Came from France», Foreign 
Policy , available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/16/the-inspiration-for-terrorism-in-
new-zealand-came-from-france-christchurch-brenton-tarrant-renaud-camus-jean-raspail- 














to the early 1990s, when American strategists were assessing threats to Western 
security in a post-Cold War world.3
It is no coincidence that the legal rights of climate refugees within the interna-
tional order remain underdeveloped (see Kent and Behrman, this volume). Invo-
cations of this category can obfuscate the complex, multidimensional relationship 
between human motion and ecosystems, serving as a vehicle for climate-reduc-
tionism that downplays the role of political and social inequalities that shape and 
direct mobility and immobility (see Fröhlich, this volume).4 As can be seen in some 
of the cruder recent attempts to quantify and/or inappropriately foreground the role 
of environmental factors in generating the Syrian uprising and subsequent refugee 
«crisis» in Europe, attempts to link climate change with conflict can be motivated 
by calls for securitisation of borders rather than protective rights for migrants. 
«Adaptation» and «resilience»
«Adaptation», a widely used term in policy documents since the 2010s, offers a 
more hopeful, optimistic outlook than the alarmist, pessimistic discourses of envi-
ronmental apocalypse. It focuses on the livelihoods of migrants and increasingly 
accepts the inevitability of mobility as an economic strategy that will ensure their 
survival under worsening climate change.5 It is also more attuned to what histo-
rians of migration are at pains to emphasise: Environmental migration is neither 
new, nor necessarily born of crisis (see Gaibazzi, this volume). Part of traditional 
livelihood strategies, it has been stigmatised by colonial and post-colonial states, 
which have criminalised the mobility of pastoralists and tribes in a bid to modern-
ise agriculture and promote private property.6
That being said, this volume treats with suspicion policy articulations of «adap-
tation» that put a dangerously laissez-faire, fatalistic emphasis on «disaster prepar-
edness» that gives up on prevention and mitigation while refusing to countenance 
resource redistribution. When invoked alongside calls for «resilience», the unwar-
ranted optimism of such calls for adaptation serves as an ideological justification 
for leaving «surplus humanity» to its own fate as climate change intensifies. Ha- 
ving risen to prominence in a world rocked by three decades of economic deregu-
lation across a range of policy fields, its language of survival narrows life to coping 
3 Kaplan, R. (1994), «The Coming Anarchy», The Atlantic , available at: www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/1994/02/the-coming-anarchy/304670 (accessed 23 September 2020).
4 A 2019 special issue of the journal Mobilities (vol. 14, nr. 3) conceptualising climate migration 
as «mobility in the anthropocene» contains several extensive critiques.
5 Warner, K. (2012), «Human Migration and Displacement in the Context of Adaptation to Cli-
mate Change: The Cancun Adaptation Framework and Potential for Future Action», Environ-
ment and Planning C 30(6), 1061–77.
6 Fahrenhorst, B. (2019, November 26–27), «Forced Migration As a Result of the Collapse of the 
Traditional Climate-resilient Rural Livelihoods in African Drylands», workshop paper pre-
sented at «Climate Justice and Migration: Mobility, Development and Displacement in the 















































and/or barely subsisting, with responsibility for provision of resources, funds and 
support foisted on affected individuals and groups.7
In many respects, «the resilient subject» is no less of an abstraction than the 
trope of the climate refugee. Both are products of an imagination than cannot 
envisage a world order of mobility other than the current regime. Where the climate 
refugee terrifies the West with the prospect of turning up on its doorstep, the resil-
ient subject remains «emplaced», bearing responsibility for his/her own continued 
existence at the planetary peripheries. In doing so, he/she absolves the consciences, 
treasuries and taxpayers in affluent, carbon-intensive societies, regions and social 
classes of any obligations that might stem from feelings of common humanity, or 
indeed a sense of justice stemming from the fact that their need to be «resilient» is 
rarely a result of their own lifestyles and activities.8
Like many pessimists who warn of impending socio-political breakdown, opti-
mistic proponents of «resilience» cannot imagine a world order in which resources 
and power are distributed differently to the one that has produced ecological crisis. 
Rarely, if ever, do they make reference to the political economy of unequal land 
distribution. Framing climate-induced mobility in Malthusian terms, resilience 
serves as an emblem of the status quo's post-apocalyptic survival. (It is the migrant 
who must «adapt», not the system that displaces him/her.) And just as climate- 
reductionist alarmism makes no mention of the complex, manifold factors that 
cause and drive resource-conflict and displacement, those who assess the conse-
quences of mobility through adaptation flatten them into a single dimension: the 
economy. As at least one contribution to this volume (McMichael) argues, the idea 
of «adaptation» is too often deployed narrowly, in a way that does not encompass 
health and wellbeing. 
At its most sordid, climate-change «adaptation» promoted by government, in- 
ternational agencies and market-obsessed organisations can be synonymous with 
strategies that prioritise profits rather than people. As such, it functions as a kind 
of green, anticipatory «disaster capitalism», which can have perverse impacts on 
mobility, for instance by driving up land prices in urban areas to the extent that 
relocation to cities becomes unaffordable (see Sauer's essay on Palau, this volume), 
or negatively affecting the livelihoods of rural populations, for instance by promot-
ing new kinds of export-oriented farming in coastal areas that undermines tradi-
tional modes of fishing (see Anwar and Sur, this volume).
Climate justice: Broadening the framework
The existential threat confronting tiny populations of Pacific Islands such as 
Kiribati and Tuvalu represents one of the most direct, visible, and dramatic types 
of climate-induced migration. Many such populations, whose carbon emissions 
7 Diprose, K. (2014), «Resilience Is Futile: The Cultivation of Resilience Is Not an Answer to Aus- 
terity and Poverty», Soundings 58, 44–56.
8 Evans, B., and Reid, J. (2013), Dangerously Exposed: The Life and Death of the Resilient Sub-














are negligible, have already incurred extensive loss and damages due to extreme 
weather events. Understandably, the grim prospect of their submergence beneath 
the sea has ensured that the plight of small island states figures prominently in 
political and media discourse about the far-reaching migratory implications of 
climate change. Several of the best-researched territories have effectively become 
«poster children» of campaigns for mitigation and/or planned relocation. 
Without detracting from the very real prospect of their disappearance under 
water in coming decades, Natalie Sauer's report in this volume on the less studied 
island of Palau sheds light on the complex nature of lived experience in such set-
tings, which is more internally varied and mediated by socio-economic difference 
than generally assumed. Far from a generalised portrayal of desperation to escape, 
we encounter individuals and communities still wedded to staying put, some of 
whom are still arriving as immigrants. Of those who do wish to emigrate, many 
seek to relocate internally rather than internationally, in accordance with dis-
tinct capacities and social networks. Pathways are shaped and mediated by social 
class, gentrification, and disputatious property relations as much as by extreme 
«natural» events such as hurricanes  – if not more than.
Broadening the temporal scope of what we understand as climate-induced 
mobility to encompass slow-onset forms of displacement is essential for a compre-
hensive, justice-based international response. Currently, the plights of those whose 
woes accrue over lesser velocities  – for instance, as a result of coastal erosion that 
forces migration in small, incremental steps  – are accorded little attention. As 
Harms' investigation in this volume on marginality in the Bengal Delta shows, dis-
placement can begin with moving to a different part of one's own land in the first 
instance, and continue to unfold over several years before causing actual reloca-
tion. The consequences for individuals for slow displacements such as these can 
be equally if not more devastating than temporary trauma resulting from disasters, 
because land lost to the sea can never be regained and is rarely compensated. 
Development and urbanisation 
The difficulty of disentangling environmental factors from the multiple drivers of 
internal displacement and rural-to-urban migration is often acute. It makes little 
sense, for instance, to devise policy to combat climate-induced migration without 
addressing the larger question of its relationship with economic development. 
Agricultural modernisation and urbanisation present two particularly important 
factors that already shape the mobility of populations in the Global South. Given 
the colossal scale of historic and contemporary dislocation caused by resource 
extraction, land acquisitions by corporations and governments, and infrastructure 
projects such as economic corridors in rural areas,9 policies that seek to «emplace» 
9 This latest bid to attack migration's «root cause» is not unprecedented. For an early critique, 
see Thorburn, J. (1996), «Root Cause Approaches to Forced Migration: Part of a Comprehensive 














































migrants by engaging them in farming or targeting «root causes» seem wishful (see 
Gaibazzi, this volume).10 As for those who seek to migrate voluntarily, they have 
been ushered towards cities by the economic system itself at breakneck speed since 
at least the 1980s. 
A more sensible approach to attempting to discourage migration through de- 
velopment would be to consider what some rural and Indigenous communities 
have been demanding through their own representatives and leaders on the world 
stage and at the local level for several decades (see bin Rashid, de Sousa, this 
volume): land redistribution, the retention (or adoption) of peasant identity, and 
livelihood strategies based on sustainable farming and attachment to place. Here- 
in lies the difference between the top-down «comprehensive approach» to restrict-
ing mobility through tried, tested and failed models of development on the one 
hand, and on the other a climate justice-based empowerment of rural populations 
that acknowledges their right to live in dignity on the land they steward. Unlike the 
former, the latter recognises the sovereignty, traditions, knowledge and cosmolo-
gies of the peasantry as being central to the sustainability of a global food system 
upon which we all depend.
Not that everyone in the Global South wants to be a farmer, of course. Empow-
ering those who wish to stay put cannot be an exercise in social engineering or 
coercive de-urbanisation based on reified notions of the peasantry.11 Climate-in-
duced migration in the Global South is equally a question of governance in cit-
ies which are likely to be on the frontlines when extreme weather events result in 
massive displacement. Where nation-states tend towards border fortification to 
protect abstract and territorial space from outsiders, localities, neighbourhoods 
and cities are sites of struggle for climate and mobility justice in which public 
participation, grassroots initiatives, inclusive provisioning and mobilisation can 
provide the basis of solidarity that counters xenophobia and racism.12
Yet cities lack the political power, autonomy and resources of nation-states. In 
cities, as in rural domains, there is no easy way to separate the suffering caused 
by global warming from the workings of a system that has normalised displace-
ment, disenfranchisement and precarity among the poor, many of whom are 
rural migrants living at the urban-rural interface in peripheral zones of cities 
where public service provision is minimal or absent. Part of the problem stems 
from the unplanned nature of Asian and African cities, where the bulk of rural-
to-urban migration results in informal settlement, both in mega cities and more 
recent, spontaneously formed urban conglomerations, which receive less funding 
10 See bin Rashid, this volume, and Sassen, S. (2014), Expulsions (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press).
11 For a discussion, see Edelman, M. (2013), «What Is a Peasant? What Are Peasantaries?», a brief-
ing paper on issues of definition (New York, NY: Hunter College, Graduate Centre), available 
at: www.ohchr.org/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/wgpleasants/edelman.pdf (accessed 1 Sep-
tember 2020).
12 Turhan, E., and Armeiero, M. (2019), «Of (Not) Being Neighbors: Cities, Citizens and Climate 














than their larger, more powerful metropolitan counterparts. The other part of the 
problem is that planning itself  – in so far as it does exist  – is subordinate to power- 
ful agendas and regimes of urban development that, like their rural equivalents, 
systematically uproot the poor, whose residences and economic activities are 
routinely displaced and destroyed to make way for gentrified housing enclaves, 
infrastructure and commercial buildings. In South Asia, the poor are equally, if 
not more likely, to face ruin by bulldozers than weather events. Those who evade 
eviction cannot escape the negative health consequences of global heating, which, 
when combined with dirty industry, road traffic, slash-and-burn agriculture 
and construction, results in dwindling access to water, suffocating levels of atmos-
pheric toxicity and alarming increases in temperature in densely populated areas 
(see Anwar and Sur, this volume). 
Many of the worst affected by these increasingly difficult conditions in cities 
are migrant workers from rural areas who have effectively moved into zones of 
climate risk (see McMichael, this volume). This underlines the importance of 
understanding climate-induced mobility as part of a broader ecology of motion, in 
which those who flee disasters are just one of the many constituencies affected 
by climate change. Others include those who might otherwise migrate but have be- 
come trapped (involuntarily immobile) or suspended by other contextual factors 
in zones of climate risk. The contribution by Taylor and Cupido to this volume, for 
instance, considers a curious case of «displacement in place» (or «dis-placement») 
in South Africa, where economically devastated farming communities in the 
Northern Cape have entered a condition of dependency on state disbursements 
that makes migration to cities unlikely. The authors use the term «refugee camp» in 
a non-legal, sociological sense to refer to the dwellings of this population, whose 
locality has been dramatically diminished, resulting in downward social mobility 
and severe mental and physical health risks.13
Care work, climate work: Towards a new realism
Germany is leading calls for global warming to be taken seriously at the highest 
echelons of world power, using its chairmanship of the United Nations Security 
Council to push for urgent attention to the impacts of climate change on peace and 
security. Foreign Minister Heiko Maas commissioned a comprehensive report  – 
to be published in 2022  – on climate security risks at the second Berlin Climate 
and Security Conference in 2019. Its objective to identify concrete policy solutions 
that will enhance the capacity of states to deal with climate-induced disasters, for 
instance by creating early warning mechanisms, is laudable and welcomed as an 
important point of departure for research and policy. 
13 For a useful scholarly discussion of «displacement in place», see Lubkemann, S. (2008), «Invol-















































For the report to yield significant improvements in climate and mobility 
governance, however, it must endeavour to be a starting point for discussions on 
climate change that go beyond security, taking on board the concerns of civil so- 
ciety and the many constituencies that represent the populations which stand to 
lose most from global heating: organisations such as the International Organiza-
tion for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), which can and must cooperate to create better mechanisms of response 
to deal with the migratory fallouts of global warming.14 This volume makes a case 
for legislation and funding to target specific groups and problems relating to 
climate-induced mobility, with the caveat that additional forms and layers of 
support for displaced persons must supplement and build upon  – not replace  – 
existing rights and protections (see Kent and Behrman, this volume). 
At the same time, policymaking must stretch its framework of concern to address 
the myriad ways in which individuals and groups move and stay put in relation to 
changing ecologies. Doing so entails loosening the imaginative grip of tropes and 
archetypes that result in a disproportionate focus of attention and resources upon 
a handful of displacement situations, and neglect of many others. What we need is 
a comprehensive raft of policies and reforms across a range of spheres and scales  – 
policies that take shape from listening to a wider array of experts and voices. Some 
of those closest to the ground will want to change the very basis of discussion to 
talk about issues that go beyond extreme weather, pointing out that it makes little 
sense to make arrangements for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
without addressing the incongruities of a system that displaces millions without 
help from «nature» (see bin Rashid, de Sousa, this volume). 
Faced with the threat of climate change, policymaking has responded with fear 
of climate refugees and/or callous complacency about their resilience to adapt to 
appalling scenarios. At their most cynical, such perspectives breed an ugly, selfish 
survivalism that prioritises stockpiling to preserve environmental privilege  – the 
geopolitical equivalent of hoarding toilet paper during a pandemic. Which brings 
us back, full circle, to lessons of the ongoing health crisis. 
As noted in the conversation between three young activists from Asia, Africa 
and the Caribbean engaged in bringing about environmental change (see Sauer, 
this volume), care work is climate work and must be acknowledged as such.15 
Part of this recognition consists of ensuring that care systems are robust and fit 
for purpose. Equally, however, a change in cultural perception must occur, as 
feminists have been saying for some time. Quite apart from esteeming care work 
for its nobility and spiritual value, care is emerging as a core tenet of a new, post- 
pandemic realism that understands the role of justice and welfare as essential lines 
14 Lakeman, S. (2019, November 26–27), «UNHCR and IOM: Mandates and Cooperation in Re- 
lation to Environmental Displacement», workshop paper presented at «Climate Justice and 
Migration: Mobility, Development and Displacement in the Global South», a collaboration 
between Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung and Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient, Berlin.
15 For a broader discussion of climate work as care work featuring Naomi Klein, see: https://lives-














of defence against the ravages of ecological instability. Care, justice, and coopera-
tion are not utopian delusions. They are the basis of human survival in the Anthro-
pocene, an era in which chauvinistic posturing, cynical isolationism and brash 
boasts of control that promise to put autochthonous populations «first» are being 
swept away by the increasingly undeniable realities of interdependency between 
and among humans and other species, and the terrifying limits of our grip over 
nature.














A springbok's carcass on a sheep and game farm near Strydenburg, 
a small town in the semi-arid Karoo region of Northern Cape, 























































AVIDAN KENT AND SIMON BEHRMAN
Mind the gap:  
Addressing the plight of climate 
refugees in international law
The often gradual and diffuse nature of climate change can obscure many of its 
more devastating effects. But for those forced from their homes as a result of sea-
level rise, desertification or increased and more severe extreme weather events, the 
effects of climate change are already causing acute trauma. From the thousands 
who lost their homes during the Australian bush fires in the summer of 2019/2020, 
to the tens of thousands of Pacific Islanders whose habitable land is dramatically 
shrinking every year, to the hundreds of thousands being forced to migrate annu-
ally as a result of desertification in North Africa and Central America, the effects 
are not merely speculation about what may occur in the future. 
The relative speed with which climate change is forcing increasing numbers of 
people to seek a life elsewhere has so far not been met with a matching urgency in 
devising just alternatives for them. Indeed, the legal constraints on cross-border 
movement appear to be hardening almost everywhere. Yet, the picture is not as 
bleak as it may at first appear. Behind the headlines, and often in piecemeal fash-
ion, legal concepts and pathways are being developed. These are sporadic and often 
inadequate, but nonetheless they represent steps forward, at least in terms of recog-
nising that the problem exists. In this chapter, we shine a light on just a few of these 
developments and suggest ways in which they can be built upon to produce more 
effective protections and remedies for climate refugees.
A note on terminology
Before commencing, we would like to make a brief clarification regarding the ter-
minology used here. Few terms have been as hotly debated as «climate refugees». 
Definitions of each of its components  – «climate» and «refugees»  – have been exten-
sively contested, and a myriad of alternatives are being used by academics, civil 














































on any definition: There are even those who object to any distinction between dif-
ferent types of refugees/migrants, regardless of the cause of movement.1 
We advocate in favour of the term «climate refugees».2 The reader should be 
aware, however, that our choice is controversial and that other terms  – including 
«climate-induced migration», «environmental displacement» or even the obscure/
watered-down «disaster displacement»  – are often preferred. In brief, our view is 
that the prefix «climate» (as opposed to, say, «environmental», «disaster», etc.) en- 
ables a focus on the specific causes and features of climate change. In particular, 
there is now a substantial body of scientific evidence that not only demonstrates 
climate change is man-made, but also identifies the guilty parties. In the context 
of this discussion, this is important in identifying who is responsible for mitigating 
the effects on people displaced as a result, and for putting in place the necessary 
protection regime. 
The choice of the term «refugee» is particularly contentious, and we have chosen 
it after careful deliberation. Opposition to its use in the context of climate change 
comes largely from refugee lawyers who argue (correctly) that the main instrument 
of international refugee law does not apply in the absence of persecution. This lim-
itation is discussed in detail below. However, in essence we argue that the narrow 
definition found in the 1951 Refugee Convention, which defines as a «refugee» only 
someone who cannot return to their home countries due to a well-founded fear 
of persecution «for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particu-
lar social group or political opinion»,3 should not monopolise our understanding 
of the term «refugee»; that indeed alternative understandings of this term exist 
(including in international law4); and that a 70-year-old legal definition should not 
stop the development of this term, especially in the context of new challenges, such 
as the effects of climate change. 
Moreover, the term «refugee» carries with it a power and a set of associations, 
beyond that of a single legal definition, which makes it an appropriate one to apply 
to people forced to leave their homes. It suggests that people who have been forced 
to abandon their homes and seek refuge are distinct from those who make a more 
or less free choice, as is common with migrants in general. It also strongly implies a 
need for protection, which links back to our central argument about responsibility, 
1 See, for example, UK Government (2011), Foresight: Migration and Global Environmental 
Change , final project report (London: Government Office for Science), p. 11, available at: https:// 
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/ 
287717/11-1116-migration-and-global-environmental-change.pdf.
2 For a much more detailed exposition of our argument, see Kent, A., and Behrman, S. (2018), 
Facilitating the Resettlement and Rights of Climate Refugees: An Argument for Developing Exist-
ing Principles and Practices (Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge), Chapter 2.
3 Article 1(A)2, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137.
4 See, for example, UNRWA's definition of «Palestinian Refugees» (available at: www.unrwa.org/
palestine-refugees); the Fourth Geneva Convention's treatment of the term «war refugees»; the 
African Union's 1967 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 






















































in both legal and moral terms, for granting access across borders and providing the 
necessary financial support to enable those affected to rebuild their lives. 
Although some object that «refugee» implies «victims» or other negative con-
notations, our response is twofold. First, the images created of all types of migrants 
have been degraded in the public consciousness in recent years. Second, it is pos-
sible to resist that negativity better by referring to «refugees» rather than alterna-
tives such as «migrants» and «displaced persons». Historically, refugees were both 
active and heroic figures  – think of those who escaped 19th century despotisms in 
Europe, or the mid-20th century dictatorships. The root meaning of the word5  – 
of people seeking asylum  – suggests active subjects in a way that is absent in the 
widely used descriptor «displaced». 
In short, we believe that «climate refugee» captures many of the defining ele-
ments of the phenomenon  – certainly better than the alternatives  – and enables us 
to better identify the needs of people who are forced from their homes, and who is 
responsible for addressing their plight. Yet, whatever nomenclature one may choose 
to describe this phenomenon, it does not change three fundamental facts. 
First, those having to migrate due to climate change are not defined as «refu-
gees» under the 1951 Refugee Convention, and therefore do not enjoy the protec-
tions that come with this legal status. We elaborate more on this point in the second 
part of this chapter (see «Mitigation and adaptation»).
Second, climate change is a driver for migration, even if it can be, on many 
occasions, difficult to distinguish from other causes of migration.6 The issue of cli-
mate refugees must therefore be addressed primarily7 within the wider political 
and scientific context of climate change. 
Third, and most importantly, those having to leave their homes due to the 
effects of climate change are vulnerable; they require protection, which interna-
tional law does not currently fully provide. This third element  – the gaps in the 
regulations and the failure of international law to protecting climate refugees  – is 
the focus of this chapter.
5 The term «refugee» is derived from the French verb se réfugier , which means to seek shelter 
from danger; it was first applied to persecuted French Protestants, who fled to England and the 
Netherlands in the 16th and 17th centuries.
6 See the discussion on causality in the section «The double problem of causality» below.
7 This is not to say that this topic should not be addressed in other forums (e.g. human rights 
frameworks) as well. The argument here is that climate change debates and negotiations must 
view climate-induced migration as part and parcel of the wider climate context and as a phe-














































Defining the «legal hole»
What kind of protection should the law provide for climate refugees? There are 
three types of laws, or three objectives that the law must achieve in order to provide 
a comprehensive solution to the plight of climate refugees:8
 (1) The law should provide protection for climate refugees' most fundamental rights.
 (2) The law must facilitate adaptation and mitigation policies that will reduce 
(or even eliminate) the risks that are faced by climate refugees. 
 (3) The law should enable access to remedies for refugees, as well as for other rele-
vant entities (e.g. refugees' host states).
The following review addresses these three categories. The vulnerability of climate 
refugees in each situation is discussed, as well as the relevant legal framework that 
is available to them. The reader will notice that our classification is not rigid, and 
that different elements related to protection, mitigation and remedies indeed often 
overlap. 
Protection
Protecting rights under international law 
The vulnerability of migrants and refugees has been acknowledged by the interna-
tional community on numerous occasions, including in the context of climate-in-
duced migration.9 A Discussion Paper drafted by the Mary Robinson Foundation 
identified how the act of climate migration might interfere with the enjoyment of 
fundamental rights, such as the right to culture, work, water, food, housing, access 
to land, self-determination, freedom of movement and, in the more extreme cases, 
also the rights to life, liberty and freedom from torture.10 The UN Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) added to this list 
other rights, including to sanitation, social security, education, the prohibition of 
collective expulsion, personal integrity, family unity and effective legal status.11
Certain groups and individuals have demanded protection of these rights 
under different international fora. In an (unsuccessful) petition made by Inuit 
8 Our categories are based on  – but slightly different from  – Kälin and Schrepfer's categories 
(mitigation, adaptation and protection); see Kälin, W., and Schrepfer, N. (2012), «Protecting 
People Crossing Borders in the Context of Climate Change Normative Gaps and Possible 
Approaches» (UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Research Series), available at: www.unhcr.
org/4f33f1729.pdf.
9 See inter alia the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, the two Global Compacts, 
the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and more.
10 Mary Robinson Foundation (2016, September 30), «Human Rights, Migration and Displacement 
Related to the Adverse Impact of Climate Change», discussion paper, available at: www.ohchr.
org/Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/EM2016/HumanRightsMigrationDisplacement.pdf.
11 OHCHR (2018, June 18–July 6), Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 























































communities to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the petitioners 
complained that the actions of polluting states (the United States in this case) were 
leading to climatic changes in the Arctic region. It was claimed that these changes 
were affecting these communities' ability to sustain their traditional ways of life, 
interfering with their ability to enjoy their rights to culture, a healthy environment, 
property (including intellectual property), health, life and more.12
In a different petition (pending at the time of writing) that was submitted by 
a group of children/teenagers (including the well-known activist Greta Thunberg) 
under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, it has been argued that climate 
change is creating «mass migrations»,13 and that certain islands «could become 
uninhabitable within decades».14 The petitioners argue with respect to their right 
to culture that rising sea levels will eventually «decimate indigenous cultures, 
including those of the indigenous petitioners […]».15 With respect to the right to life, 
the petitioners state that «increasingly hot temperatures are threatening their 
thousand-year-old subsistence traditions, which are intimately connected to their 
livelihoods and wellbeing».16
In another (pending) communication submitted to the UN Human Rights 
Committee by communities from the Torres Strait Islands, it has been claimed that 
climate change is «causing regular flooding of land and homes, damaging impor-
tant cultural sites located on the edges of islands», and is predicted to result in the 
«total submergence of ancestral homelands».17 The Islanders therefore claim that 
Australia's inaction on climate change is interfering with their rights to culture and 
life, as well as their right to be «free from arbitrary interference with privacy, family 
and home».18
In yet another (unsuccessful) communication submitted to the Human Rights 
Committee, a national of the Republic of Kiribati (Mr Ioane Teitiota) has claimed 
that, by returning him to that country, the state of New Zealand has violated his 
right to life. Life in Kiribati, it was claimed, 
12 See review of the petitioners' claims in «Petition to the Inter American Commission on Human 
Rights Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and 
Omissions of the United States» (2005), pp. 74–95. The full text of the petition along with 
responses from the IACHR can be found at http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/petition-
to-the-inter-american-commission-on-human-rights-seeking-relief-from-violations-resulting-
from-global-warming-caused-by-acts-and-omissions-of-the-united-states.
13 Communication to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, in the Case of Chiara Sacchi et al. 
(2019), available at: https://childrenvsclimatecrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/2019.09. 
23-CRC-communication-Sacchi-et-al-v.-Argentina-et-al.pdf.
14 Ibid., p. 2.
15 Ibid., pp. 6, 43.
16 Ibid.
17 Although the Communication itself is not publicly available, the NGO that is supporting this 

















































«has become increasingly unstable and precarious due to sea-level rise 
caused by global warming. Fresh water has become scarce because of salt-
water contamination and overcrowding on Tarawa [the island in the archi-
pelago where the Teitiota family is from]. Attempts to combat sea-level 
rise have largely been ineffective. Inhabitable land on Tarawa has eroded, 
resulting in a housing crisis and land disputes that have caused numerous 
fatalities. Kiribati has thus become an untenable and violent environment 
for the author and his family.»19
There is no doubt that a significant body of international law is available for the 
protection of these basic human rights. Treaties such as the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights cover most of the rights mentioned above. Other «core» 
human rights treaties,20 as well as a long list of regional human rights treaties and 
domestic laws, are adding more layers of protection. Arguably, certain human 
rights are protected, also under customary international law, and therefore enjoy 
universal coverage.21
The relevance of this body of human rights laws to migrants and refugees, and 
the need to enforce them, was recently recognised by the international community 
through the conclusion of two UN Global Compacts, both of which have defined 
human rights as a foundational principle.22 The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly 
and Regular Migration states that it is 
«based on international human rights law and upholds the principles 
of non-regression and non-discrimination. By implementing the Global 
Compact, we ensure effective respect for and protection and fulfilment 
of the human rights of all migrants, regardless of their migration status, 
across all stages of the migration cycle. We also reaffirm the commitment 
to eliminate all forms of discrimination, including racism, xenophobia and 
intolerance, against migrants and their families.»23
On the face of it, the commitment to  – and the coverage of  – human rights laws 
seems both impressive and useful. A closer observation, however, reveals that cer-
tain problems nevertheless exist. It is useful to discuss the legal situation in two 
19 UN Human Rights Committee, «Views Adopted by the Committee under Article 5 (4) of the 
Optional Protocol», concerning Communication No. 2728/2016 (2020), para. 2.1.
20 For example, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrim-
ination; Convention on the Rights of the Child; Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
21 De Schutter, O. (2019), International Human Rights Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press), p. 59.
22 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, para. 15f.; the Global Compact on 
Refugees, para. 5.






















































scenarios/contexts: the event of internal displacement (i.e. where refugees are not 
required to cross borders, but simply migrate to other regions within their home 
country), and the event of cross-border migration (i.e. where the refugee will have 
to cross a border in her search for shelter). 
Protecting internally displaced persons (IDPs)
In the case of internal displacement, the legal situation is fairly clear: The above-
mentioned body of human rights laws applies, and in most cases it is binding on 
states. States have reiterated their commitment to this body of law on numerous 
occasions, including in the more specific context of migration, refugees24 as well as 
climate change.25
Soft-law-based solutions have also enforced the protection of those internally 
displaced due to climate change. The most notable document in this respect is the 
UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (UNGP),26 which in some cases 
have been incorporated into binding legal instruments,27 or have been proven use-
ful for states in different ways.28 The UNGP require the protection of a comprehen-
sive list of rights, including protection from discrimination, arbitrary displacement, 
rights to life, dignity, liberty and more. 
Although the legal framework discussed above is certainly comprehensive, cer-
tain challenges still exist. To begin with, the fact that international human rights 
law instructs states to follow certain standards does not mean that in practice they 
do.29 A line of reports and studies indicate that the presence of human rights laws 
does not necessarily mean respect for human rights also in practice,30 and that 
24 See, for example, the New York Declaration, para. 5 (see note 9).
25 See preamble to the Paris Agreement (2015).
26 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 22 July 1998, ADM 1.1,PRL 12.1, PR00/98/109.
27 For example, the African Union Kampala Convention states that the Parties are «[r]ecognising 
the inherent rights of internally displaced persons as provided for […] in the United Nations 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement […]». See the preamble to African Union Con-
vention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa («Kampala 
Convention»), 23 October 2009. See also a review of studies on the implementation of the 
Guiding Principles in national legislations in Kälin et al. (see note 29 below).
28 Simon Russell explains that the UNGP has been used «as inspiration for the development of 
national laws or policies […] durable solutions frameworks […] have been most successful in 
forging international agreement on and conformity to the meaning of who is an ‹IDP›»; Russell, 
S. (2018), «The Operational Relevance of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement» , 
International Journal of Refugee Law , 30(2), 307–08.
29 Kälin and Williams note in the context of the protection of IDPs: «[A] recurring theme is the 
gap between law and practice. The legislation of many of the countries surveyed in this volume 
contains important provisions for IDPs  – in some cases specifying them as a separate cate-
gory and in others focusing on the universality of human rights for all citizens  – but in practice 
these rights are rarely fully realized, especially for IDPs»; Kälin, W., and Williams, R. (2010), 
«Introduction», in Kälin, W. et al. (eds.), Incorporating the Guiding Principles on Internal Dis-
placement into Domestic Law: Issues and Challenges , p. 6 (Washington, DC: American Society 
of International Law and Brookings), available at: www.refworld.org/pdfid/4b6c164e2.pdf.














































compliance with international human rights law leaves much to be desired.31 
Indeed, of the three petitions to international human rights courts mentioned 
above, one was dismissed without even a full hearing (Inuits), another failed based 
on contentious grounds (Teitiota)32 while the third (Chiara Sacchi et al.) is still 
pending. Also, the implementation of the UNGP specifically has been far from easy 
and remains a challenge in many areas of the world.33
Moreover, it is important to note that certain human rights require the invest-
ment of resources, especially where population displacement is permanent and the 
state is under obligations to provide benefits such as adequate housing and access 
to services. Where resources are less available, the delivery of rights becomes more 
challenging. We elaborate more on this point below in our discussion on adaptation 
rules. 
Protecting cross-border migration
The case of cross-border migration presents further difficulties. Although it is clear 
that many human rights protections still apply, this body of law does not grant indi-
viduals the right to cross a border, nor to legally remain within host countries' terri-
tories. The right to enter another state (and to remain there legally) is secured under 
international law through a line of regional (e.g. the EU treaties) and bilateral (e.g. 
US-Marshall Islands Compact of Free Association34) agreements that grant rights 
of entry/migration to nationals of the relevant member states. These agreements 
are naturally limited in coverage and are relevant only for the «lucky few» who are 
living in relevant states. 
International refugee law and its limitations
Another, more limited right to cross a border is available through international ref-
ugee law. Refugee treaties (notably the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and the 1967 
31 See, for example, Human Rights Watch's annual World Report , or Amnesty International's 
annual The State of the World's Human Rights reports.
32 Elsewhere, we give a detailed critique of this judgment: Behrman, S., and Kent, A. (forthcom-
ing), «Prospects for Protection in Light of the Human Rights Committee's Decision in Teitiota v 
New Zealand», Polish Migration Review .
33 Kälin describes the impact of the UNGP as a glass «half full and, at the same time, half empty». 
Kälin, W. (2018), «Consolidating the Normative Framework for IDPs», International Journal 
of Refugee Law 30(2), 314. See more critical comments on the state of implementation of the 
UNGP in Orchard, P. (2018), «Implementing the Guiding Principles at the Domestic Level», 
Forced Migration Review , 59, 11. This author (critically) mentions 30 laws and policies that 
explicitly mention the UNGP. For a useful overview of IDP law more generally and its gaps in 
relation to climate change displacement, see Koser, K. (2011), «Climate Change and Internal 
Displacement: Challenges to the Normative Framework», in Piguet, E. et al. (eds.), Migration 
and Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and UNESCO).






















































Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees35) provide those who are recognised as 
«refugees» with the right to enter other states and legally reside there. Importantly, 
the right to be considered a «refugee» is not applicable to all those seeking refuge. 
The Refugee Convention defines as a «refugee» only those who cannot return to 
their home countries due to a well-founded fear of persecution «for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion».36 
There is little doubt that, according to these criteria, climate refugees are not «ref-
ugees»: The effects of climate change are not persecutory in the generally accepted 
meaning of the word.37 The Refugee Convention's definition was designed in the 
immediate post-Second World War period, and it understandably conceptualised 
refugees in light of the horrors and circumstances of that time. Unfortunately, 
although this definition was amended in certain, very limited respects under the 
1967 Protocol and has been expanded jurisprudentially, it is a very long way from 
being able to accommodate more modern phenomena such as climate change.38 
The Refugee Convention still has an important part to play in providing protection 
to people fleeing direct persecution for their political or religious beliefs, or other 
personal characteristics  – sadly these cases are still numerous. For that reason, we 
do not believe that the Convention should be reopened for amendment, much less 
dispensed with; rather, a category of «climate refugee» should be created elsewhere, 
either through a new treaty, or more likely by establishing some kind of protection 
mechanism via an existing human rights or environmental law framework.
Non-refoulement as an imperfect solution
Another relevant legal route for those having to cross a border is the principle of 
non-refoulement, which has its roots in international refugee law but has since 
been significantly expanded as a universal principle via multiple human rights 
35 United Nations (1951, July 28), Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, treaty series, 
vol. 189, p. 137; United Nations (1967, January 31), Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
treaty series, vol. 606, p. 267.
36 Refugee Convention, ibid., Art 1(A)2.
37 It should be noted, however, that the New Zealand Supreme Court  – in an earlier iteration of 
the Human Rights Committee case mentioned above  – left open the possibility that climate 
change could be a contributory factor that opens the door to refugee status under the Refugee 
Convention, although they did not go into any detail as to how this might occur. Ioane Teitiota 
v the Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment [2015] NZSC 107, 
at para. 13.
38 The 1967 Protocol simply removed the strict temporal and geographic limitations of the 1951 
Convention by making it applicable to refugee-producing events outside of Europe after 1951. 
Case law around the world has been used to extend protections to certain types of persecution, 
such as those based on gender or sexuality. However, the focus on persecution appears to be 
a boundary, beyond which the Convention cannot be stretched. It should be noted, though, 
that regional agreements such as the 1969 Organisation for African Unity Refugee Convention 
and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration do extend the refugee convention beyond «persecution» 














































treaties and cases.39 In a nutshell, the principle of non-refoulement forbids sending 
people back to any place  – including their home countries  – where they face the 
threat of serious harm. Whereas the Refugee Convention forbids only the return 
of those qualifying as «refugees» (and thus less relevant for this chapter), under 
human rights law this principle is much broader and applies to anyone threatened 
by death, torture or other forms of inhumane treatment.40 The UN Human Rights 
Committee has explained in the context of the Right to Life (Art. 6 ICCPR (Right to 
Life)) that:41
«The duty to respect and ensure the right to life requires States parties to 
refrain from deporting, extraditing or otherwise transferring individuals to 
countries in which there are substantial grounds for believing that a real 
risk exists that their right to life under article 6 of the Covenant would be 
violated. Such a risk must be personal in nature and cannot derive merely 
from the general conditions in the receiving State, except in the most 
extreme cases.» 
Many authors have made the link between the principle of non-refoulement and 
the obligation to refrain from the deportation of climate refugees.42 These authors 
argue that the risks in returning to areas that can no longer sustain life (due to the 
impacts of climate change) justify the prohibition on the deportation of climate 
refugees: «The threat in this case comes from the environment, not from the home 
state's policies, but the effect on the victim is the same.»43 The UN Human Rights 
Committee has recently confirmed this line of argument. The Committee elab-
orated that the right to life must not be understood in a restrictive manner, and 
that it «extends to reasonably foreseeable threats and life-threatening situations 
39 See, for example, Kolmannskog, V. (2008), «Climates of Displacement», Nordisk Tidsskrift for 
Menneskerettigheter 26, 302, 312.
40 UNHCR, «Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obli-
gations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol», 
available at: www.unhcr.org/4d9486929.pdf, see paragraphs following note 34 with respect to 
specific HR treaties, and text below the section above «International refugee law and its limita-
tions» with respect to HR law, which is based on customary international law.
41 Human Rights Committee, «General Comment No. 36 (2018) on Article 6 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the Right to Life» (30 October), CCPR/C/GC/36, 
para. 30.
42 See, for example, Kolmannskog (see note 39); Docherty, B., and Giannini, T. (2009), «Confront-
ing a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a Convention on Climate Change Refugees», Harv Envtl L Rev 
33, 349, 377; Scott, M. (2014), «Natural Disasters, Climate Change and Non-refoulement: What 
Scope for Resisting Expulsion under Articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights?», International Journal of Refugee Law 26(3), 404; Poon, J. (2018), «Drawing upon Inter-
national Refugee Law: The Precautionary Approach to Protecting Climate Change-displaced 
Persons», in Behrman, S., and Kent, A. (eds.), «Climate Refugees»: Beyond the Legal Impasse? 
(Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge).






















































that can result in loss of life»,44 including threats that result from climate-related 
environmental degradation.45
It should be noted, however, that certain limitations nevertheless exist. To 
begin with, as stated in the Committee's quotation above, the threat must be «be 
personal in nature and cannot derive merely from the general conditions in the 
receiving State». The case of climate refugees is hardly ever «personal in nature», 
and, by definition, it will almost always derive «from the general conditions in 
the receiving State». Furthermore, as pointed out by others, the risk to the person 
returning to his/her state must be immediate.46 This requirement is reasonable in 
the context of «ordinary» asylum cases, such as where the person is facing threats 
related to loss of freedom, violence, etc. The slow-onset nature of many of the risks 
associated with climate change, however, will fail most attempts to rely on rules 
such as non-refoulement (or Art. 6 ICCPR), as the threats from events such as rising 
sea levels are not (yet) immediate. 
These two sets of difficulties (the «immediate» and «personal» nature of the 
threat) have featured heavily in the Teitiota case discussed above. The Human 
Rights Committee ruled in 2019 that the claimant did not demonstrate that the risk 
was «personal» in any way, or different from other residents of Kiribati.47 The Com-
mittee further decided that the slow effect of climate change (notably the fact that 
life, even if harder, is still sustainable on these islands) implies that the threat is not 
imminent, but will materialise only in the not-so-near future (if ever at all).48 This 
decision is certainly important, as climate-related events were, at last, recognised 
as a justifying cause for prohibiting the deportation of persons back to areas that 
have been dramatically affected by climate change. Yet, it demonstrates the limits 
of the principle of non-refoulement and the difficulty that will stand in the way of 
climate refugees, should they attempt to rely on this principle in the future. 
The potential statelessness of climate refugees 
Another legal matter that concerns cross-border migration is related to the poten-
tial statelessness of climate refugees. This possibility can exist only where all avail- 
able adaptation efforts fail;49 entire island nations, such as low-lying Kiribati, Tuvalu, 
the Maldives and the Marshall Islands, will sink under the ocean and effectively 
disappear. Where the state no longer exists, its (now exiled) citizens may, arguably, 
be regarded as «stateless». The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless 
44 UN Human Rights Committee, para. 9.4 (see note 19).
45 Ibid., 9.5.
46 McAdam, J., and Limon, M. (2015), Human Rights, Climate Change and Cross-Border Displace-
ment: The Role of the International Human Rights Community in Contributing to Effective and 
Just Solutions (Geneva: Universal Rights Group), p. 16.
47 UN Human Rights Committee, para. 9.7 (see note 19).
48 Ibid., paras. 9.10–9.12.
49 Some argue that at least in some cases, engineering solutions will prevent the complete sinking 
of nation islands; see, for example, Esteban, M. et al. (2019), «Adaptation to Sea Level Rise on 














































Persons defines «stateless person» as one «who is not considered as a national by 
any State under the operation of its law».50 The novelty of this situation  – the lack 
of a precedence, where a state simply physically disappeared  – raises certain ques-
tions that are, for the time being, open.51
To begin with, the definition of «any State» is important, especially as it is not 
clear whether once submerged under water, a state can still be legally regarded as 
a «state». According to international law,52 a «state» requires elements such as a 
defined territory, a permanent population, a government and a capacity to enter 
into relations with other states. Should a state submerge in its entirety under water, 
each of these elements will be questioned. 
For example, can sinking states simply build artificial islands in order to main-
tain their claim to a territory? Can perhaps the online, virtual presence of a state 
be considered a sufficient form of territorial existence? And what kind of a «govern-
ment» can a state have where its «citizens» are scattered around the world, effec-
tively (and permanently) living under the rule of other governments ? It is doubtful 
whether climate refugees themselves would prefer such an arrangement, in which 
they are subjected simultaneously to two governments (and two sets of rules). More-
over, certain basic cultural and social rights centred around the right of self-deter-
mination will be heavily compromised by living on the territory of other states.53
And what kind of relations may other governments have with submerged island 
nations? Cooperation on issues ranging from trade to extraditions, investment, 
environmental protection and many others will all become irrelevant. Potential 
exceptions could be issues such as the exploitation of marine resources,54 but there 
is no doubt that the range of issues requiring international relations will be lim-
ited. It is true that certain unique examples of «non-existing states» with (limited) 
international relations exist: The Sovereign Order of Malta is often mentioned in 
this respect, having entered into diplomatic relations with more than 100 states 
and securing a permanent observer status at the United Nations. This example, 
however, is both unique and misleading. The Order of Malta is effectively acting 
today as a religious humanitarian organisation, not as a functioning state with 
50 United Nations (1954, September 28), Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 
treaty series, vol. 360, p. 117.
51 The International Law Commission is currently examining certain issues concerning the rise 
of sea levels, including the question of statehood. United Nations (2019), Report of the Interna-
tional Law Commission , UN Doc A/73/10, p. 329, available at: https://undocs.org/en/A/74/10. 
In addition, for a particularly interesting analysis of the novel issues thrown up by disappear-
ing states, see Burkett, M. (2011), «The Nation Ex-Situ: On Climate Change, Deterritorialized 
Nationhood and the Post-climate Era», Climate Law 2(3), 345.
52 The accepted definition of a «state» is found in Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on 
the Rights and Duties of States.
53 See, for example, Wewerinke-Singh, M. (2018), «Climate Migrants» Right to Enjoy Their Culture', 
in Behrman, S., and Kent, A. (eds.), «Climate Refugees» : Beyond the Legal Impasse? (Abingdon-on- 
Thames: Routledge).
54 Sharon, O. (2019), «Tides of Climate Change: Protecting the Natural Wealth Rights of Disap-






















































aspirations to rule its subjects and protect their interests. The inescapable reality is 
that the «sinking states» scenario is entirely novel, and international law does not 
currently possess any easy answers. 
In short, there is a strong possibility that, unless certain political arrangements 
can be made (see below), the citizens of submerged island nations will become 
«stateless», because their states will cease to exist as «states» in any meaningful sense.
Certain international rules provide protection for stateless persons, notably 
the 1954 Convention and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.55 
These conventions secure certain rights for stateless persons, inter alia their rights 
to religion, access to courts, travel documents, treatment similar to that granted to 
other foreign nationals on a variety of matters (e.g. right to work, housing, educa-
tion, movement) and more. There are nevertheless significant limitations to these 
conventions. To begin with, membership in these conventions is far from univer-
sal. The 1961 Convention has 75 parties, and the 1954 Convention has 94 parties, 
that is, even after many decades, fewer than half of all states have signed up to 
them. Secondly, the 1954 Convention does not require states to grant a nationality 
for stateless persons, and the 1961 Convention only requires this in very specific 
circumstances involving children born on the territory of the state or where one of 
their parents already has citizenship in that state.
Certain solutions for preventing the statelessness of those residing on sink-
ing island nations have been proposed. Interesting possibilities include a territory 
transfer with another state (including the full secession of sovereignty over said 
territory), different forms of unification with other states or, simplest of all, the 
mere acquisition of the nationality of a third state.56 These solutions, however, are 
all dependent on the political will of relevant countries, and it remains to be seen 
whether they will be implemented when (and if) the time comes. 
Supplementary soft-law guidelines 
The protection rules discussed above are the most significant parts in the legal 
jigsaw currently available for climate refugees. These rules are supplemented 
by a long list of mostly soft-law-based recommendations, guidelines and other 
non-binding documents that are aimed at the protection of climate refugees. These 
soft-law documents often protect only specific aspects that are related to the pro-
cess of migration. For example, the Migrants in Countries in Crisis principles and 
guidelines from 2016 are designed to protect those ending up in unsafe environ-
ments, whether it be a conflict or a natural disaster. Another example is the Inter-
national Law Commission's Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event 
55 United Nations (1961, August 30), Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, treaty series, 
vol. 989, p. 175.
56 These possibilities were identified by Park, S. (2011), Climate Change and the Risk of State-















































of Disasters from 2016, which provide useful instructions on international cooper-
ation and assistance. 
Perhaps the most important soft-law-based supplementary guideline is the 
Nansen Initiative's Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in 
the Context of Disasters and Climate Change (the Nansen Protection Agenda). The 
Nansen Protection Agenda is especially useful in the context of climate-induced, 
cross-border displacement. This document includes a compilation of best practices 
and guiding principles that states can learn from and apply in their own jurisdic-
tions. For example, it proposes criteria that governments could use for defining 
who are «cross-border disaster-displaced persons»,57 as well as best practices for 
those individuals' admission and stay in their host countries.58 Other useful prac-
tices include the protection of human rights, non-return (an adapted version of the 
principle of non-refoulement, discussed above) and the long-term stay of refugees, 
where necessary.59
Mitigation and adaptation 
Mitigating climate-induced migration 
The most important international framework for mitigation and adaptation efforts 
is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its 
related decisions and agreements. This Convention is very likely climate refugees' 
only hope for mitigating the rise in emission levels and providing states with an 
opportunity to adapt to climate change. 
The mitigation of climate change is in many ways the ideal solution  – it will 
effectively remove the cause for migration (or at least reduce it where a mix of causes 
exist) and consequently also the need for protection. Entering a discussion on the 
UNFCCC and this framework's success in mitigating climate change is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, it must be said that current rules on climate 
mitigation (notably the Paris Agreement's nationally determined contributions) are 
insufficient and not expected to succeed in reaching the emission reduction targets 
set by the international community.60 As it is questionable whether the political will 
to adopt more ambitious climate mitigation rules will be found in the near future, 
perhaps one should not expect the «mitigation» of the problem (the reader is asked 
to excuse our pessimism in this respect). In addition, we may already be at, or very 
57 The Nansen Initiative (2015), Agenda for the Protection of Cross-border Displaced Persons in the 
Context of Disasters and Climate Change , p. 22, available at: https://nanseninitiative.org/wp- 
content/uploads/2015/02/PROTECTION-AGENDA-VOLUME-1.pdf. It should be noted that on 
completion of the agenda, the Nansen Initiative transformed itself into a permanent organ-
isation, known as the Platform for Disaster Displacement (PDD), carrying out research and 
producing policy proposals around these issues. In particular, the PDD played a leading role 
in the negotiations on the Global Compacts mentioned above, and it continues to work closely 
with UN agencies and others to push forward the policy agenda.
58 Nansen Agenda, ibid., p. 26.
59 Nansen Agenda, ibid., pp. 28–29.






















































near to, certain «tipping points», whereby some effects of climate change are no 
longer possible to control. More practically, rules on adaptation as well as «loss and 
damage» may prove more useful in the context of this analysis.
Adaptation, loss and damage, and finance 
The most significant development to date in the context of loss and damage is the 
establishment of a UNFCCC-led, cross-institutional Task Force on Displacement. 
The Task Force submitted an initial report with several recommendations. These 
recommendations were endorsed in 2018 by the UNFCCC member states, and the 
Task Force's mandate was extended until 2021. Its report includes recommenda-
tions on important elements, including improved institutional coordination and 
coherence, and broader public participation. Importantly, the report calls on states 
to «[c]onsider the formulation of national and subnational legislation, policies, and 
strategies, as appropriate, that recognize the importance of integrated approaches 
to avert, minimize, and address displacement related to adverse impacts of climate 
change and issues around human mobility».61
Crucially, the Task Force is also addressing the matter of finance. As stated 
above, the effective protection of refugees' rights involves the significant allocation 
of resources. Effective adaptation to large-scale climate migration requires the pro-
vision of public services, humanitarian assistance as well as the protection of rights 
to shelter, education, health, etc. Some clue as to the financial scale of this effort 
can be learnt from Germany's own experience in hosting an influx of migrants in 
the years 2015–2016. The cost of processing and accommodating asylum seekers 
in Germany during this episode was estimated by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) at around €10,000 per application.62 Over-
all, Germany spent €16 billion on asylum seekers in 2015 alone,63 a sum which many 
nations may not be able to afford. Given that most climate refugees are expected to 
seek refuge in the Global South, the allocation of significant resources is expected 
to be a significant challenge. 
The Task Force indeed addressed this gap in finance in several ways. To begin 
with, it identified the existence of a «finance gap» as well as the fact that rele-
vant UNFCCC-related funds do not explicitly address climate-induced migration. 
The Task Force points out that the lack of explicit reference could make the 
61 UNFCCC (2018), Report of the Task Force on Displacement (New York, NY: UNFCCC), para. 33.
62 The estimated cost is for the first year of the application. OECD (2017), «Who Bears the Cost of 
Integrating Refugees?» Migration Policy Debates, available at: www.oecd.org/els/mig/migra-
tion-policy-debates-13.pdf (accessed 11 October 2011). It should, however, be noted that in the 
medium to longer term, there is much evidence that migrants/refugees produce a net economic 
benefit. See, for example, a succession of reports produced by Jonathan Wadsworth on the 
UK context for the London School of Economics' Centre for Economic Performance. Already 
there is evidence that the mass arrival of refugees in Germany in 2015 is creating economic 
dividends. See, for example, Dowling, S. (2019, June 20), «Germany Welcomed Refugees. Now 
It's Reaping the Economic Benefits», Al Jazeera , available at: www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/ 
germany-welcomed-refugees-reaping-economic-benefits-190617194147334.html.














































allocation of funds more complicated.64 This gap can have severe implications for 
states' ability to adapt to future climate-induced migration, as well as for the level 
of protection that they are able to provide refugees.
The Task Force further recommended that the «Parties and relevant organiza-
tions» will provide information on financial support that they provide for averting, 
minimising and addressing, climate-induced migration,65 and that the Executive 
Committee of the UNFCCC's Warsaw International Mechanism, «in collaboration 
with the Standing Committee on Finance and relevant organizations», will «facili-
tate mobilization of financial resources for developing country Parties to avert, min-
imize and address displacement related to the adverse effects of climate change».66 
These developments are certainly useful. Unfortunately, these are all still 
«recommendations», and no clear steps have so far been taken. Elsewhere, we have 
argued that the rather vague mandate of climate funds could in fact be useful: 
There is nothing there to exclude the finance of climate-induced migration adapta-
tion projects.67 We claimed that the resources necessary for hosting climate refu-
gees could be defined as «adaptation efforts» and that  – with the lack of any specific 
instructions on the matter  – states should at least attempt this route. Admittedly, 
the UNFCCC funds are not sufficient for supporting, say, the right to shelter for the 
many millions that are predicted to migrate due to climate change. This limitation 
should be acknowledged and ideally addressed through increased donations by 
those states that are not currently hosting climate refugees. Realistically (and in 
light of the Covid-19 financial crisis), it could be that the more urgent adaptation 
measures (e.g. humanitarian assistance to climate refugees) should be identified 
by the member states in order to facilitate access to environmental funds (e.g. the 
Green Climate Fund (GCF), the Global Environment Facility (GEF)).
Other authors have proposed different solutions with respect to the gap in 
finance, notably the establishment of a newly designated international fund.68 
We are not convinced, however, that a new fund is indeed the answer. The biggest 
hurdle is  – and always will be  – the lack of financial resources, and expecting ad- 
ditional climate-related donations just because a new fund is created is unrealistic. 
64 UNFCCC, Report of the Task Force , para. 23 (see note 61).
65 Ibid., para. 27.
66 Ibid., para. 27. See more relevant recommendations in the Report of the Task Force in para. 34, 
p. 28 para. (h), p. 31 para. (c), and more.
67 Kent and Behrman, pp. 108–17 (see note 2).
68 Biermann, F., and Boas, I. (2010), «Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance 
System to Protect Climate Refugees», Global Environmental Politics 10, 60; CRIDEAU (2013), 
Draft Convention on the International Status of Environmentally-Displaced Persons  (Third 
version), available at: https://cidce.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Draft-Convention-on-the- 
International-Status-on-environmentally-displaced-persons-third-version.pdf; Docherty, B., 
and Giannini, T. (2009), «A Proposal for a Convention on Climate Change Refugees», Harvard 
Environmental Law Review 33, 349; Hodgkinson, D., Burton, T., Young, L., and Anderson, H. 
(2009), «Copenhagen, Climate Change ‹Refugees› and the Need for a Global Agreement», Pub-






















































As stated above, existing funds (GCF, GEF) possess the required expertise; the 
question is, primarily, one of political will to increase the scale of donations. 
Supplementary soft-law guidelines 
Other relevant pieces of legislation that are useful for enabling adaptation to 
climate-induced migration include a variety of soft-law-based guidelines and reg-
ulations. The abovementioned Nansen Protection Agenda is one such example. 
The agenda provides useful practices and guidelines on «preparedness», including 
a recommendation to map communities (and areas) at risk, preparing future sce-
narios and plans for relocation, the establishment of education/training/accredita-
tion programmes for the facilitation of future migration and improved integration 
in host communities. 
Another key soft-law instrument in the context of adaptation is the Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. Although the Sendai principles are mostly 
vague, some of its defined «priorities» are highly relevant for adaptation. The four 
priorities are: «understanding disaster risk», «strengthening disaster risk govern-
ance to manage disaster risk», «investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience» 
and «enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to ‹Build Back 
Better› in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction». These priorities are each 
accompanied with a long list of specific key activities that provide concrete instruc- 
tions for states wishing to prepare for the event of climate-related disasters (includ-
ing consequential migration) and adapt to it. 
Access to remedies
The last element that international law will have to provide is access to reme-
dies. This part addresses the ability of those affected by climate-induced migra-
tion (mostly individuals and communities) to request a remedy from wrongdoers 
that either contributed to the push factors in migration (e.g. by polluting) or failed 
to protect refugees once they had to migrate (e.g. by not providing them with a 
safe haven). Until recently, not many have attempted to demand a remedy from 
responsible states. Recent years, however, have brought a barrage of climate- 
related litigation in both national and international tribunals. Affected individuals 
and communities are now trying their luck in courts, demanding effective reme-
dies from states. As reviewed below, certain obstacles are still standing in their way. 
The double problem of causality 
The most commonly requested remedy so far has been to reduce specific states' 
emission levels in order to slow the effects of climate change. In some cases, this 
request was fairly broad: For example, in the claim made under the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child mentioned above, the petitioners asked that the respond-














































the maximum extent of available resources».69 In other cases (e.g. Urgenda vs Neth-
erlands, Torres Strait Islanders vs Australia), far more specific reduction targets 
have been requested. In a few cases,70 claimants have also asked for a monetary 
remedy, mostly in the shape of the allocation of funds for adaptation purposes. 
The main obstacle standing in the way of these claimants' search for remedies 
is related to the double problem of causality.71 In essence, in order to get a remedy, 
claimants will have to demonstrate two almost impossible causal links: between 
a specific wrongdoer and the victim, and between climate change and the act of 
migration. 
The first barrier cannot be easily overcome. It is impossible to isolate the action 
of one country alone in the context of climate change and to attribute to this coun-
try results such as rising sea levels, melting permafrost or extreme weather events. 
The damage is the result of a «common pool» of greenhouse gasses in the atmos-
phere, and this cannot be directly linked to specific states' emissions. Certain 
creative solutions have been developed, including the establishment of a compen-
sation fund that would be based on large emitters' contributions,72 or a «pro-rata» 
attribution of partial responsibility based on a given country's portion of green-
house gasses emitted into the atmosphere.73 The Dutch Supreme Court has indeed 
accepted the latter possibility in its landmark Urgenda ruling of 2019, stating that 
«each country is responsible for its part and can therefore be called to account in 
this respect».74 This decision indeed offers a bit of hope on an obstacle that was con-
sidered until recently to be impassable. However, unless such ideas are developed 
and accepted more widely, the establishment of a causal link will remain «well-
nigh impossible, however sophisticated science has become».75
The second causality-related barrier involves the link between climate change 
and one's decision to migrate. Climate change is often not the only reason for migra-
tion, but one of many cumulative drivers that have led one to leave home. The Fore-
sight report famously stated that «migration is a multi-causal phenomenon and it is 
problematic to assign a proportion of the actual or predicted number of migrants as 
69 Communication to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, in the Case of Chiara Sacchi et al. , 
para. 329 (see note 13).
70 For example, the Inuit Petition to the Inter American Commission on Human Rights (see note 
12); the Communication submitted to the Human Rights Committee by communities from 
the Torres Strait islands (see note 19).
71 Viñuales, J. (2016), «A Human Rights Approach to Extraterritorial Environmental Protection? 
An Assessment», in Bhuta, N. (ed.), The Frontiers of Human Rights (Oxford and New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press), pp. 216–17.
72 Ibid., 217.
73 Kolmannskog, V. (2008), Future Floods of Refugees: A Comment on Climate Change, Conflict 
and Forced Migration (Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council), p. 31; Kent and Behrman, p. 93 (see 
note 2).
74 Urgenda vs Netherlands (Netherlands' Supreme Court, 20 December 2019), 5.7.5.























































moving as a direct result of environmental change».76 This assumption however, is 
only partly accurate. For example, where migration is caused by rising sea levels, it 
is often easy enough to isolate climate change as a major cause for migration. The 
other «drivers» (e.g. economic difficulties) are caused by climate change and hardly 
independent from it. Indeed, in the recent Teitiota case discussed above, the UN 
Human Rights Committee accepted that rising sea levels «can propel cross-border 
movement of individuals seeking protection from climate change-related harm».77 
In other cases, it could be that a lower threshold should be accepted: For example, 
where it is likely that climate change has played a significant role (even if not a 
clinically isolated role) in the decision to migrate, or where research shows that 
environmental conditions are unreasonably difficult in a certain area. Insisting on 
a clear, strict, causal link would ignore the impact that climate change is having 
on migration  – and even more so, it would ignore that some states are responsible 
for this reality. Also, existing refugee law does not insist that persecution must be 
the only reason for seeking asylum, just that it is a significant contributing factor. 
Indeed, it would be difficult to reduce any individual's decision to migrate to a sin-
gle causal reason; issues of economics and family intersect with persecution, gen-
eralised violence, etc. It is somewhat unfair, therefore, to insist on a more clear-cut 
or unitary push factor for climate refugees, so long as the effects of climate change 
can be shown to be significant. 
The limits of a non-refoulement remedy
Other requested remedies involve a declaration that those states deporting refu-
gees back to their (environmentally degraded) home countries are breaching fun-
damental human rights, notably the right to life. Such a declaration will effectively 
prohibit refugees' deportation. The main limits standing in the way of those asking 
for such a remedy (notably, the damage must be personal and immediate in nature) 
are discussed above. Although the requirement  – according to which the injury 
must be personal in nature  – is difficult to fulfil in the context of climate change, a 
small window of opportunity nevertheless exists. The UN Human Rights Commit-
tee stated in this respect that more general conditions (rather than an individual's 
plight) will be accepted, albeit only in «the most extreme cases, and that there is 
a high threshold for providing substantial grounds to establish that a real risk of 
irreparable harm exists».78 Although the Committee did not accept that the current 
situation in Kiribati is «extreme» enough to qualify for this exception, they were 
receptive to the possibility that in 10–15 years from now, it will be. 
One may only wonder, however, about the wisdom in such an approach, which 
grants the right to life only where all is effectively lost. This approach effectively 
forces the residents of environmentally degraded areas to wait until the very last 
76 UK Government Office for Science (2011), Migration and Global Environmental Change: Future 
Challenges and Opportunities , Foresight report, p. 11, available at: www.gov.uk/government/
publications/migration-and-global-environmental-change-future-challenges-and-opportunities.
77 UN Human Rights Committee, para. 9.11 (see note 19).














































moment and experience a slow, continuous degradation in the quality of their lives. 
These residents are forced to play the odds of their island's survival, leaving them 
at the mercy of the international community's will to act on climate change. These 
are odds that most would not choose in any other circumstances. 
Will the courts play politics?
Finally, it is inevitable that at least some courts will refrain from granting a remedy 
in areas that fall within the realm of political decision-making. Issues such as emis-
sion reductions are subject to international negotiations and involve economic and 
social consequences. It is understandable that at least some courts will be reluctant 
to intervene in such a process without a clear mandate. In January 2020, the US 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied a request to order the phasing out 
of fossil fuel emissions in the United States, stating that «the plaintiffs' case must 
be made to the political branches or to the electorate at large, the latter of which 
can change the composition of the political branches through the ballot box».79 The 
United Kingdom's High Court took a similar stand in 2018 when it refused to order 
the government to take preventive measures in the form of more ambitious emis-
sion reductions.80 The High Court stated that «this is an area where the executive 
has a wide discretion to assess the advantages and disadvantages of any particular 
course of action, not only domestically but as part of an evolving international dis-
cussion».81 It is true that examples to the contrary exist (notably the Dutch Supreme 
Court, as expressed in its recent Urgenda ruling, discussed above). However, such 
examples are limited in number and, for the time being, also in their influence. 
International tribunals may be even more reluctant to provide such remedies 
than national courts. International courts have traditionally walked a fine line 
between securing the rule of law and avoiding activism that might unsettle the 
international order. Moreover, in recent years, international courts have faced 
unprecedented challenges to their legitimacy,82 including head-on collisions with 
superpowers such as the United States, Russia and China. In short, it is likely that 
the current atmosphere will lead courts to become more timid, and consequently 
reluctant to grant remedies. 
Future pathways?
We would like to conclude this chapter with a few observations about the future of 
the international regulations on climate-induced migration. This chapter demon-
strated that, although a substantial body of law indeed exists, the gaps in the 
79 Juliana et al. vs the United States of America Case , 18-36082 (01/17/2020), 32.
80 Plan B Earth vs Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy  Case No: 
CO/16/2018 (20 July 2018). In 2019 the Court of Appeal refused the plaintiffs the right to appeal 
the High Court's decision, thus definitively shutting down this particular claim.
81 Ibid., para. 49.























































regulations of climate-induced migration are still significant. There is no doubt that 
some of these gaps are unlikely to be filled, at least not in a satisfactory manner or 
not in the immediate future. There is currently no easy solution for those wishing 
to cross a border in search of a new home; the protection of human rights law in 
many parts of the world is unsatisfactory, and the financial gap is unlikely to be 
easily addressed. A careful look, however, reveals some developments  – baby steps 
mostly, but nevertheless steps in the right direction.
Importantly, global policymaking is moving forward. This is not a given: Until 
201083 there was no international recognition of climate-induced migration under 
any international forum. Since 2015, however, we have seen substantive references 
in important documents such as the Paris Agreement, the New York Declaration for 
Refugees and Migrants, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migra-
tion, the Global Compact on Refugees and elsewhere. We have also seen the inter-
national endorsement of the Nansen Protection Agenda, the establishment of the 
UNFCCC Task Force, and other developments as well. 
Whether such developments will lead to meaningful results remains to be seen. 
Two interesting venues merit a closer look in this process. First, the work of the 
UNFCCC Task Force is located at the heart of the climate negotiations process; it 
may frame the discussion on climate-induced migration within this institution 
and influence the positions of the member states. Importantly, the Task Force has 
already indicated that it will not shy away from crucial topics, notably with respect 
to finance. 
A second important venue that will merit attention is the UN International Law 
Commission, which was mandated in 2018 to examine issues of sea-level rise in 
relation to international law. It identified three issues for further investigation  – two 
of which (the protection of vulnerable affected individuals and communities, and 
issues related to statehood) are highly relevant for climate refugees. Although the 
Commission's investigation will be limited to the effect of rising sea levels, there is 
no doubt that its conclusions will be relevant for climate refugees more broadly. At 
the time of writing, this investigation is at its early stages, and in-depth conclusions 
have yet to be made.
«Baby steps» are also visible in the context of remedies. The UN Human Rights 
Committee's acknowledgment that the impacts of climate change may jeopardise 
islanders' right to life is noteworthy. The decisions of national courts may also play 
an important role. The Dutch Supreme Court's Urgenda ruling is especially impor-
tant: Although it does not address directly the issue of climate-induced migration, 
it does provide solutions for some of the abovementioned legal problems. Notably, it 
provides a partial answer to the problem of causality, and it demonstrates an activ-
ist approach towards the development of the law. Whether other tribunals (includ-
ing international ones) will follow remains to be seen. As to whether this approach 
is democratically acceptable, this is a topic for a different essay.
83 The UNFCCC member states made their first ever reference to climate-induced migration in 
October 2010 during the decisions that followed COP 16 (Decision 1/CP.16, December 2010).


















«Care work, climate work» 
A DIALOGUE WITH DIZZANNE BILLY (TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO),  
OLADOSU ADENIKE (NIGERIA) AND JOYCE MELCAR TAN (PHILIPPINES)
From childhood, Dizzanne Billy, who is from Trinidad and Tobago, remembers 
the great gushing Caura River, which she and her family would gather around. The 
northern mountain ranges, at the foot of which she now lives, teemed with birds. 
«Now the river is just dry,» she says. Coastal erosion is among the biggest threats 
posed by global heating to the island. Since Trinidad and Tobago started to meas-
ure sea-level rise in the late 1990s, the ocean has surged from 1.6 mm per year to 
close to 3 mm per year in 2019.1 These days, when Billy drives down to the coast, 
she can see waves tugging at the land and coconut trees. Fishermen are particularly 
stressed, she explains, because the sea is taking away their infrastructure.
Oladosu Adenike, the ambassador of Fridays for Future in Nigeria, joins the 
conversation from a crackling line in Nigeria. She was brought up on a small set-
tlement of farmland to the west of the capital, Abuja, now covered with buildings. 
Although the country has always had to contend with droughts, often resulting in 
famines, increasing temperatures and rain variability since the 1980s have aggra-
vated an already precarious climate and fed into food insecurity and conflict. 
Joyce Melcar Tan grew up on one of the 7,641 islands that make up the Philip-
pines. Industrial developments, large-scale buildings and tourism have supplanted 
the pristine beaches and wooden houses of her childhood. When asked about the 
impacts of climate change on the Philippines, Tan lists coastal erosion and coral 
bleaching. More pronounced El Niños have also resulted in devastating droughts. 
But it is the typhoons she worries about most. The country is one of the most 
prone to tropical storms in the world, with 6 to 9 tropical storms on average mak-
ing landfall since 1970.2 In the past 40 years, their power has intensified by 50 per 
cent due to warming seas.3 «Years of long-term infrastructure development and 




erosion (accessed 31 July 2020).
2 Blanc, E., and Strobl, E. (2016), «Assessing the Impact of Typhoons on Rice Production in the 
Philippines», Journal of Applied Meteorology and Climatology 55 (4), 993–1007.
3 Mei, W., and Xie, S. (2016), «Intensification of Landfalling Typhoons over the Northwest Pacific 




























































































































economic planning are wiped out within minutes,» Tan says, «leaving people losing 
not only loved ones, but jobs, access to health services and the social fabric of their 
communities.» 
Tan currently works as an energy and climate lawyer for the environmental 
law charity Client Earth, while Adenike leads Earth Uprising and the African Youth 
Climate Hub. Billy reported on the Paris Agreement as a journalist and is now a 
communications officer at the climate journalism advocacy group Climate Tracker. 
What follows is the transcript of a conversation between them about how the 
climate crisis may shape the migratory trajectories of Nigerians, Trinidadians and 
Filipinos. Adenike, Billy and Tan examine the shortfalls of current policies and pro-
pose new ones to make life easier both for migrants and those who are left behind. 
The impact of global heating on women is also considered. All interviewees speak 
in a personal capacity.
N.S.: How has the climate crisis affected mobility? 
D.B.: Climate migration is relatively new to the Caribbean region, but it is going to 
get worse as we are being hit with more frequent and more intense tropical storms 
and hurricanes. We saw this in September 2017 with the first Category 5 hurricane 
that we experienced, Hurricane Irma, and then two weeks later, another Category 5 
hurricane, Hurricane Maria. Those two hurricanes, which were followed by weaker 
tropical storms, bashed islands like Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica and Puerto 
Rico. Even Haiti was affected. 
We found ourselves in a situation where the Caribbean Community Secretariat 
(CARICOM), which is the overall body representing Caribbean member states, had 
to come together to figure out how we would deal with displaced people. Along with 
Barbados, Jamaica and the Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago was one of the countries 
that really stood up to find a place for them. 
The government particularly focused on supporting Dominicans, both in terms 
of immediate relief and medium-term relocation. We sent out our defence force to 
aid the relief efforts in Dominica. And our coastal guard deployed three vessels 
carrying food, water, generators and a 21-member disaster relief team to assist the 
islanders. 
In terms of migration, the Caribbean also provided disaster-displaced persons 
a right of entry into the country. After Hurricane Maria, Trinidad and Tobago used 
CARICOM's free-movement agreement  – a 6-month visa-free state provision used 
to shelter displaced Dominicans. The prime minister quickly put into place poli-
cies to enable Dominicans to come to Trinidad and to allow their children to go 
to school and integrate in society. Many other Caribbean countries followed suit 
afterwards. It forced CARICOM to confront something that is going to just get worse 
and to confront the question of the movement of people. 
Right now, CARICOM, which is similar to the [European Union] for the Car-
ibbean, is supposed to have free movement of people  – but it's not as smooth as it 
should be. Dozens of Jamaicans, for example, have been denied entry or deported 
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over the past years for reasons that are often unclear.4 These cases have been 
brought to the Caribbean Court of Justice and some are still being dealt with (are 
currently under way  – this is based on Dizzanne's words and I did not manage to 
find evidence for this).5
In an ideal situation, it would be easy for people from Antigua or Guadeloupe 
to move to another Caribbean country if they are hit, but the current system is not 
in place for that [kind of] transition of people. 
O.A.: In Nigeria climate migration takes different forms. First you have people who 
have to leave their land within the country  – internally displaced persons (IDPs). 
If this fails to bring relief, they may leave the country, temporarily or permanently, 
to seek refuge. This is happening in the Lake Chad area in the north-eastern part 
of Nigeria. The Boko Haram insurgency and also drought and deforestation have 
displaced over 3.4 million people, including 2.4 million people within the coun-
try.6 People's livelihoods are lost in the process. […] Overall, the number of IDPs is 
alarming. 
J.M.T.: Migration in the Philippines is a very complex issue because historically 
we've had a lot of people moving, whether it be from rural to urban areas, or exter-
nally to other countries. The Philippines typically exports a lot of highly skilled 
health care workers, including to countries in East Asia, like Hong Kong and Japan, 
to the Middle East, and even to Europe and the United States.7 So it's hard to pin 
down a particular climate change impact as the cause of migration and mobility, 
because oftentimes the decision to move is a result of various factors. That said, 
events like droughts, coastal erosion and other phenomena do make it difficult for 
people to remain where they are and still be able to earn a living wage and support 
their family with enough access to health services, food and water.
When extreme weather events such as huge tropical cyclones strike, there is 
sudden forced migration. In such cases, as long as you can determine the link 
between the extreme weather event and climate change, then you can also say that 
that prompted the migration. Most of these would be internal displacement: move-
ment from the coastal area to the more inland areas, or to the urban centres, where 
there would be easier access to food, water and electricity.
4 CEEN TV (2014), «Jamaicans Denied Entry into Trinidad & Tobago», online video, available 
at: https://youtu.be/iA_IovNmy7E (accessed 31 July 2020) ; CEEN TV (2016), «12 Jamaicans 
Deported Renew Calls for a Re-examination of the CSME», online video, available at: https://
youtu.be/i4kUzpCxyLU (accessed 31 July 2020).
5 For a legal perspective on the Freedom of Movement Agreements of CARICOM, see Francis, 
A. (2019), Free Movement Agreements & Climate-Induced Migration: A Caribbean Case Study , 
Columbia Public Law Research Paper, available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3464594 (ac- 
cessed 31 July 2020).
6 UNHCR (n.d.), Nigeria Emergency , available at: www.unhcr.org/uk/nigeria-emergency.html 
(accessed 31 July 2020).
7 See Tan, E. (2006), «Labor Migration and the Philippine Labor Market», Journal of Immigrant & 




























































































































The other factor of where people would move to would also be the family that 
they have in other places. So if there's family that may be in another island or 
another region that the displaced community can move to, then that's where they 
would normally do so. 
There is a divide, I would say, between the more affluent members of the com-
munity and those that are more vulnerable, because the more vulnerable have 
fewer options about where they can move to. The less affluent would typically go to 
cities and be part of the informal economies there, which means that there's greater 
pressure on basic public services, but also a huge competition for low-skilled work.
In terms of external migration, where climate would be one of the factors, there 
is also a difference between the less privileged and the more privileged, [with] the 
more privileged usually using their [wealth] to send their kids to school, often for 
medical or nursing degrees, so that they can then go abroad and then earn a better 
wage that they can send back home. 
N.S.: What support is available to those making that leap? What kind of challenges 
do they face? 
J.M.T.: There are numerous challenges. And I think one of the reasons for that is 
because there is a huge difference between the support that is available versus the 
support that is required by the people that are moving[…] For ease, we can just call 
them migrants at the moment, even if their movements might be outside of their 
will and volition. 
In terms of the internal movement within the Philippines from rural to urban 
areas, one of the big challenges would be that the skill set of the migrants may not 
match with the available work that is in the urban area. So, for example, traditional 
agricultural families that may have been used to more manual labour, may have to 
work in a commercial centre or in a call centre  – an industry that is very big in the 
Philippines. 
The second one is access to safe housing, because as more and more people 
migrate to urban areas  – and in the Philippines, there is large rate of urbanisation  – 
the rent and housing costs rise and the corresponding space for each family unit 
becomes smaller. 
O.A.: Migrants have to start all over again. They have to look for connections, see 
how to rebuild their livelihoods and regain stability. Some may come out stronger, 
but many don't.
D.B.: One of the key issues is being accepted by the society one is moving into. To 
take the case of Venezuelan migrants in Trinidad and Tobago, for example, there's 
a lot of tension between both communities because of the perceived strain on the 
economy, job access and access to resources at large. 
People may be moving from a situation where they had a comfortable lifestyle. 
But as climate migrants they've lost everything and moved into this new country. 
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They have to start again, often depending on state access to funds and social goods 
to survive. It really changes people's quality of life in a dramatic way.
I think it would be good if we could create policies to smoothen the integration 
process, including financial buffers for people moving into the country, so that they 
can stabilise themselves and not have to worry about whether their children can go 
to school or whether they can get access to civilian resources. 
N.S.: What happens to those who have been left behind? And again, what kind of 
policies should be carried out to facilitate that situation? 
J.M.T: So in the Philippines, it has really depended on what kind of events have 
forced those who left to leave. So, for example, if it's a sudden-onset event like the 
tropical cyclone that hit the eastern seaboard of the Philippines, then those who 
were left behind because they had no option of leaving really needed access to elec-
tricity, basic health services and important psychosocial support because of all the 
death and devastation that they have seen at unprecedented levels. And then also, 
of course, access to clean water and food.
In the longer term, I would say that the policies that are needed to help those 
who are left behind are those which would allow the local communities to increase 
their resilience, because we know that a disaster is not necessarily a foregone con-
clusion whenever there's an extreme event, right? It's a result of a lot of exposure, of 
vulnerability and no coping capacity.
In the case of slow-onset events like prolonged droughts, I think policies would 
need to focus on systemic and long-term changes. So policies like providing liveli-
hood opportunities and skills training for those younger members of the family of 
farmers or fishermen who would like to find other ways to be able to support their 
families without needing to leave to go to the cities. Education is equally important. 
Another solution that can be controversial is sustainable tourism, because tour-
ism does bring a lot of development and also carbon emissions. At the same time, it 
is a way for the people who have remained in local communities to be able to build 
back and find a way to support themselves without having to leave. I think that Kate 
Raworth's «doughnut economics», whereby economic development is modelled on 
planetary boundaries and social foundations, is very important.
N.S.: In January, the UN Human Rights Committee ruled that refugees fleeing the 
effects of climate crisis could not be forced to return home by their adoptive countries. 
This judgement was made on the case of Ioane Teitiota, who applied for protection 
from New Zealand after claiming his life was at risk in his home country of Kiri-
bati  – the first country at risk of disappearing under rising sea levels. The ruling was 
in effect a landmark one, because it meant the UN recognised climate refugees after 
decades of academic debates on whether it's ever possible to single out climate and 
environmental factors as the cause of migration. What did you make of this ruling? 





























































































































J.M.T.: I think that that indeed was a very important decision because, as you said, 
it was a recognition by a UN body that there is this category of persons that stand 
to lose their homeland because of the impacts of climate change. [Another] key fea-
ture of that event was that the Committee said that there are 10 to 15 years in which 
the Republic of Kiribati  – with the help of the international community  – could still 
come up with ways to adapt to climate change, and so therefore, his life was not in 
imminent threat. 
And I think that one opens up a whole range of very important conversations, 
one of which is that, even if we stop all of the emitting activities at the moment, 
there is still a level of commitment to global warming that has already happened 
that we are stuck with. This underpins the global community's [urgent need to act] 
to [spare] people from small island nations from having to leave their homelands, 
and thereby their cultures, their families and their traditions. 
Secondly, the decision also shows us how the obligation of the global commu-
nity to act on climate change has never been more urgent  – so when we talk about 
the adaptive capacity of the small island states, it's not just up to them to respond 
to it, but there needs to be strong support internationally.
My third takeaway is that this decision has sparked a conversation on how most 
emissions that have been made so far have been coming from completely different 
regions in the world, such as Europe and North America  – the Global North. How-
ever, the earliest and most severe impacts of climate change, such as people having 
to leave their countries, are already being felt in the Global South in countries like 
the Philippines. Will this encourage people from the Philippines to file a climate 
migration lawsuit? I'm not sure, but I [do] think that it provides interesting oppor-
tunities to do that. 
Having said that, the Philippines Human Rights Commission is currently con-
ducting an inquiry about climate mitigation. It's encouraging to see that our own 
local Human Rights Commission has started investigating carbon meters and look-
ing into the question of whether or not they should be reporting what they are doing 
to mitigate their emissions. 
D.B.: I think it's definitely a step in the right direction. It's not something that I can 
say has been reflected in this region or locally. I see that climate litigation is hap-
pening more often, whether it be young people suing their governments or organi-
sations suing those responsible for what's happening. I think that it will eventually 
reach us, but for now it hasn't yet happened. 
N.S.: Do you find it helpful to talk about the specific ways that climate change affects 
women? For instance, do women's experiences of climate change differ from those of 
men? And if so, in what way?
J.M.T.: Yes, definitely. There are different impacts that women have to deal with, and 
a lot of it has to do with the traditional family structure in the Philippines  – and in 
many other countries  – whereby mothers are usually responsible for cooking. This 
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means having to access water to be able to cook with, but also water for domestic 
use in general. Because of lower levels of access to water or the increasing salinity 
of water from saltwater intrusion, women would then have to spend more hours of 
their day doing that. 
And that also affects the younger members of the household, because if there 
are opportunities for education, for example, these are traditionally given first to 
the male members because the female members are seen as being able to be more 
productive when helping with the housework.
In terms of the aftermath, for example, of a tropical cyclone, there is care work 
that would often devolve to the female members of the family. And so there is a 
disproportionate burden on females that is brought on by climate impacts.
D.B.: There's definitely that gender imbalance  – particularly with regards to access 
to resources. 
According to the [Food and Agricultural Organization], 43 per cent of the global 
agricultural labour force is made up of women.8 So, as hurricanes become more 
intense and droughts more frequent, we need to ask ourselves where this leaves 
women who depend on the land for their food security. Providing these women 
with the same resources as men can positively influence climate adaptation and 
sustainable development efforts. 
As Joyce pointed out, it ties back to the traditional roles that women still hold in 
many Caribbean countries. Women in the region often live in single-parent house-
holds, so when the land is impacted, this directly affects their ability to provide 
for their families. Also, this kind of imbalance in power dynamics between men 
and women determines who has rights to what and who has access to resources to 
recover from the impacts of climate change. 
Let's say a hurricane passes: It's much more likely that a man is able to bounce 
back than a woman who has kids and is on her own. And that, sadly, is a situation 
that affects many households in the Caribbean. 
O.A.: Women are often at the receiving end of [climate-related insecurity]. On 
April 2014, 276 schoolgirls were kidnapped from their dorms in Chibok, a city in 
northeastern Nigeria, by Boko Haram. Then in February 2018, they targeted the 
Dapchi school girls. 
As droughts become more frequent, so does early marriage. Some young 
women are being forced into marriage against their own will in a bid to survive, 
depriving them of their education. It cripples their opportunities to contribute to 
the local community. It drains them. 
Some of the people who give their daughters to early marriage depend on agri-
culture for subsistence. So when production is hit by flooding or drought, they will 
end up giving their daughters for marriage so that they can secure what is known 
8 FAO (n.d.), The Female Face of Farming , available at: www.fao.org/gender/resources/infographics/ 




























































































































as a «bride price»  – money or property that the groom offers to his wife-to-be as 
opposed to a dowry. 
Insecurity generated by climate change also makes sexual abuse of women 
more likely. We see Nigerian women engage in transactional sex for access to food. 
And, of course, the women kidnapped by terrorist also suffer sexual exploitation. It 
can be a point of no return for girls. In cases of drought, housewives have to walk 
longer distances to access cooking materials and water. 
N.S.: Could you cite examples of policies that could soften that blow on women?
D.B.: No  – and the reason I would say that is because it's something that has yet to 
take place. On the whole, gender in the Caribbean is only just starting to be taken 
seriously. Even outside of the climate change sector, gender mainstreaming in local 
policies is definitely lacking.
J.M.T.: One would be to allow the children of women to be cared for so that their 
mothers can either pursue educational or livelihood opportunities. Equipping local 
community officer clinics with breastfeeding stations could further help nursing 
mothers to contribute positively to the economy and bridge the gender gap. 
Another set of policies could deal with the immediate aftermath of a disaster, 
for example, where people are living in shelters. Something that was very, very stark 
in the Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan was that the toilets in these temporary 
shelters are usually shared by everyone. But certain women, depending on their 
religious affiliations, might be uncomfortable using the same toilets as men. And so 
that's something that has been brought up as an issue and something to be worked 
on in humanitarian circles  – that there be separate bathrooms for women and men 
for adaptation in the immediate aftermath of extreme weather events.
N.S.: You both touched upon care. And it's interesting  – Naomi Klein, along with 
many activists, is currently trying to make the point that care is climate work due to 
its low carbon footprint, but also due to its central role in helping populations adapt 
to the different environment that we're facing. Do you think that, in the wake of the 
pandemic, care work is valued more? 
D.B.: Yes, for sure. We are now seeing more appreciation for social work and front-
line workers. In general, children don't grow up hearing their parents encourage 
them to become nurses or customer service representatives  – but these jobs were 
definitely seen as essential during the pandemic. When disasters hit, these are also 
the jobs that will be essential to deal with the impact of a hurricane or other climate 
disasters. 
J.M.T.: Yes, I think care work has been emphasised by the pandemic as a very cru-
cial part of any society. But the pandemic has also highlighted a lot of systemic 
issues with regard to access to basic health care services. [Questions such as] who, 
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among the population, are part of the essential workers, and how exposed are they 
as a result of their situation? 
[As far as the health services are concerned], it is true that they are less carbon- 
emitting and could contribute to a greener economy. But then the pandemic has 
also shown us that a lot of plastic pollution can be generated from all of the pre-
cautions that you have to take with the personal protective equipment that has to 
be disposed of every day. So we do need to find a way to manage that if we are to 
assure ourselves that we will recover from the pandemic in a green way. 
Care work also needs a lot of energy infrastructure, especially when it's not in 
the context of care homes, but in hospitals. We need to really transform our energy 
infrastructure so that it's based more on renewable energy rather than fossil fuel-
based energy. 
N.S.: What message would you like to convey, above all, to the policymakers who 
might be reading this, whether it be on the subject of a pandemic or climate migration? 
J.M.T.: So I would say that the urgency to act on climate change and really respond 
to it  – as the crisis that it is  – has only been highlighted by the pandemic. And 
governments across the world have this opportunity right now to ensure that any 
money that they use towards economic recovery does respect people and the planet 
and is not disproportionately geared towards just economic recovery.
In terms of climate migration and migrants, there should be a continued rec- 
ognition of this category of persons who are rendered vulnerable because of climate 
impacts, which may be in geographically remote places where a lot of the big 
decision-makers are. But that only highlights the global level of this problem and 
also the requirement that we act as an international community and really coop-
erate to address it.
Finally, there has been this decades-long debate about whether or not climate 
refugees can be protected under the Refugee Convention. What I would like to see 
right now is recognition of a need for this category of persons without being tied to 
the traditional definitions of the 50-year-old Convention that we have. We need to 
protect this emerging class of persons, and one way to do so  – without them having 
to leave their homelands  – is for us to mitigate our emissions where we are, and 






























































































































HASHIM BIN RASHID 
Resisting rural dispossession and 
displacement: Peasant pathways 
to climate justice 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change1 has issued stark warnings about 
the impacts of climate change on global agriculture, as well as the impacts of global 
agriculture on climate change. This is reflective of a growing recognition that the 
organisation of food systems is a critical dimension of our response to the climate 
emergency. Conversely, there is little recognition of the importance of mobility  – of 
people and food itself  – within the food system. The ongoing Covid-19 pandemic 
has illustrated this importance in dramatic fashion through two sets of distressing 
scenes. The first involves Indian migrant labourers without access to food return-
ing to their villages from cities. The second is the destruction of crops by those 
who work the land in the face of collapsing demand in cities. Both underscore the 
extreme inequalities and incongruities that underpin the mobility (and immobility) 
of food and people in our food system  – injustices that severely undermine policy 
responses to the climate emergency already underway in the Global South. 
This chapter argues that responses to climate change cannot be separated from 
the historical and contemporary struggles of rural social movements to reshape 
a global food system that systematically displaces millions of rural dwellers from 
the countryside in the name of growth-led economic development. Rural social 
movements in the Global South have challenged the ongoing dispossession of rural 
populations and accompanying destruction of nature under existing development 
models, questioning the necessity of «rural-urban transition», which underpinned 
national and transnational development policies for much of the 20th century. These 
movements identify existing dominant models of development to be the root cause 
of agrarian distress, rural displacement and ecological damage in the countryside. 
Outlining their critiques, this chapter explores the counter-visions of national and 
transnational rural social movements in order to map a peasant pathway to climate 
justice. In particular, I focus on how these movements have asserted the right to 
land, not just for the peasantries who till it, but also for those dispossessed by prior 






















































waves of development. That is to say, my focus is on their advocacy for the rights of 
rural and/or urban dwellers to remain and/or become peasants. 
The first section of this chapter («Rural dispossession, displacement and mobil-
ity») looks at the historical relationship between agricultural development, rural 
dispossession and the production of precarious migrant labour. The second sec-
tion («Voices from below: How rural social movements respond to rural disposses-
sion») examines case studies of rural social movements from Brazil, South Africa 
and Indonesia to show how they have contested this long history of dispossession 
by asserting the right to land, as well as the right to rehabilitate nature through 
peasant agroecology. This allows us to see how the right to stay put  – articulated 
as the right to become and/or remain a peasant  – is mobilised in discourse and 
political practice to enact economic and ecological justice. In the third section 
(«Transnational peasant visions: Advocating food sovereignty for agrarian and cli-
mate justice»), we shall see how the practices and visions of rural social movements 
are articulated in transnational spaces through the peasant movement La Via 
Campesina. In particular, we shall examine the concept of «food sovereignty» as a 
counter-vision for climate justice that addresses the dispossession of rural peoples 
and the destruction of nature together, with important implications for mobility 
justice. In the conclusion, I reflect on how listening to rural social movements can 
help us think about questions of climate justice and mobility through understand-
ing the right to remain and/or become peasants. 
Rural dispossession, displacement and mobility
For centuries, agricultural production has been connected to mobility through 
rural dispossession, with displaced rural populations providing labour to large 
farm holdings, as well as industrial and service sectors of the Global South and 
North. For instance, North America till the late 19th century continued to rely on 
slavery and indentured labour, which forcibly moved millions from Africa across 
the Atlantic Ocean, and now relies on underpaid, «illegal» migrant workers from 
Mexico to pick grapes and tomatoes in California fields. Since the late 19th century, 
Australia has been reliant on seasonal migrant labour from the Pacific Islands, such 
as Papua New Guinea. 
These dynamics of dispossession and displacement have been informed by 
a belief that the transformation of peasant populations into industrial workers is 
inevitable. Both global and national policies have been designed to accelerate the 
dispossession of rural populations through the conversion of agricultural land into 
urban and industrial land, the mechanisation of farming and the accelerated con-
version of rural populations into workers in a range of national and transnational 
industries.2















































In parallel to the development of commercial agriculture, the expansion of 
«extractivism» in what the climate justice movement calls «sacrifice zones» has 
exacerbated the difficulties faced by rural populations. Sacrifice zones are known 
as places that «don't count and therefore can be poisoned, drained, or otherwise 
destroyed».3 Rural populations that dwell within them are forced to choose between 
moving away or staying put as the natural world around them disappears through 
mining, chemical poisoning, soil depletion, urbanisation and/or the industrialisa-
tion of land from which they derive their sustenance. This concept has been used 
to describe the experiences of rural communities in a range of contexts, including 
the United States, the Niger Delta and Rajasthan in India. The last of these examples 
is particularly good for illustrating these dynamics. Over the course of the 20th 
century, rural Rajasthan found itself stripped of its natural resources, as forests 
were chopped down and commercial farming began to expand. The land lost its 
fertility due to over-farming through non-native practices, and, more recently, the 
Thar Desert began to engulf agricultural lands through human-induced climate 
change. It became impossible for rural populations to reproduce themselves via 
subsistence on their land or find gainful employment within their region, which 
forced them to find employment elsewhere. Hundreds of thousands of men from 
the region migrate for employment in the service and industrial sectors in the high-
growth region of Gujarat, where the average cycle of back-breaking work before 
their bodies give up is around a decade. The same men then migrate back to their 
home village in Rajasthan, where survival and coping strategies are almost wholly 
reliant on the next generation of men completing the same torturous cycle.4 The 
lockdowns during the Covid-19 pandemic have provided a glimpse into the sheer 
scale of these populations, with tens of millions of migrant workers migrating back 
to their home villages on foot in India, as well as the mass forced returns to various 
South Asian states as work dried up in the Gulf. 
The combined effect of commercial agriculture and extractivism has been to 
dramatically reduce the peasantry, a process referred to by social scientists as 
«depeasantisation».5 Its extent can be gleaned from the basic fact that, in 1950, 
only around 16 per cent of the population of the Global South was living in urban 
areas; by the turn of the 20th century, almost half of the world's population and 41 
per cent of the population of the Global South lived in urban areas.6 Hundreds 
of millions who once had direct access to land and means of subsistence in rural 
areas have now become largely concentrated in urban locations.
Among rural social movements across the Global South, migration resulting in 
depeasantisation is viewed as a consequence of decades of socially and ecologically 
3 Klein, N. (2014), This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs the Climate (New York, NY: Simon & 
Schuster), p. 169.
4 Jain. P., and Sharma, A. (2019), «Super-exploitation of Adivasi Migrant Workers: The Political 
Economy of Migration from Southern Rajasthan to Gujarat», Journal of Interdisciplinary Eco-
nomics 31(1), 63–99.






















































destructive development policies that have led to the rapid deterioration of the abil-
ity of small peasants and landless workers to be able to live and reproduce within 
the agrarian economy. With roots that stretch back to the late colonial period, the 
opposition to such policies in Brazil, South Africa and many other countries man-
ifests itself today in campaigns for the right to stay put as well as movements call-
ing for land redistribution and/or reform. Moreover, many rural social movements 
have been proposing alternatives to the dominant model of agricultural produc-
tion, which remains highly reliant on practices that are devastating the soil, water 
and environment, and which produce high levels of greenhouse gases in the atmos-
phere. In the next section, I examine some of the responses from rural social move-
ments in the Global South to the ongoing dispossession of rural peoples. 
Voices from below:  
How rural social movements respond to rural dispossession
Responding to agrarian distress and rural dispossession in Asia, Africa and the 
Americas, rural social movements have opposed the dispossession of rural peo-
ples, thereby providing powerful counter-visions of climate justice. In this section, 
I examine three rural social movements and their visions: the Landless Workers' 
Movement (MST) in Brazil, the Landless People's Movement (LPM) in South Africa 
and the Indonesian Peasant Union (SPI) in Indonesia. Each of the movements in 
question view land, livelihood and mobility as fundamentally related to each other 
and climate justice.
The right to become peasants: The MST in Brazil and the dignity of rural life
The MST of Brazil, a movement with more than three million members, most of 
whom have participated in land occupations, has challenged the dispossession of 
rural peoples through assertion of the «right to become peasants», thereby provid-
ing an alternative vision of climate and mobility justice from below. 
The Brazilian context is a particularly harsh example of how the expansion of 
modern agricultural practices can bring agrarian and ecological devastation. The 
modernisation of agriculture in the late 1960s under the military junta led to 28 
million rural workers and peasants being expelled from the countryside to cities.7 
This, in turn, created an employment crisis in Brazilian cities, as the ratio of rural 
to urban residents was massively transformed within a short span of three dec-
ades. Since the 1980s, Latin American agriculture, especially in Mexico and Brazil, 
began to be transformed by market and trade liberalisation, the specialisation of 
production and domination of the world food system by agribusiness.8 The neg-
ative ecological impact of agribusiness in Brazil has been widely catalogued, with 
7 Vergara-Camus, L. (2009), «The MST and the EZLN's Struggle for Land: New Forms of Peasant 
Rebellions», Journal of Agrarian Change 9(3), 365–91, available at: https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/ 
13021.














































the most recent and obvious example being the fires that blazed across the Amazon 
rainforest in 2019. 
It is in the context of these recent waves of mass dispossession and ecologi-
cal destruction in the countryside and the ensuing employment crisis in the rural 
and urban economies that the MST emerged in Brazil. Its success lay in providing 
an exit strategy to peasants and rural workers caught in the devastation caused 
by expanding agrobusiness, leaving them to confront the choice between social 
marginalisation in cities and land occupation.9 The movement emerged in the 
1960s, when it began to gain support among land-poor peasants, landless peas-
ants and rural workers who had prior experience with «subsistence agriculture and 
non-monetized relations of production».10 It was subsequently joined by landless 
rural workers and even urban dwellers.11
The MST's objective is to create «a space for subsistence» by gaining access to 
land and cultivating it for self-consumption.12 The Agrarian Programme of the MST 
strongly opposes Brazilian agribusiness while holding it responsible for climate 
change.13 It also asserts the right to reverse the historic dispossession of peasants 
under agricultural modernisation by rejecting the precarious life in Brazil's fave-
las and undertaking land occupations as a mechanism to become peasants. Once 
the occupations are completed, the MST fiercely defends their new agrarian settle-
ments against continued attempts from the Brazilian state and agribusiness to dis-
possess them. This means that the MST's approach to climate justice and mobility 
is constituted by a complex articulation of the right to move or stay put predicated 
upon ideas of autonomy, dignity and self-determination. In asserting these rights, 
the MST challenges the basic premise of modernisation theory, which assumed 
the inevitability of the transformation of peasants into urban workers through dis-
possession. Its priorities compel us to think beyond narrow interpretations of the 
climate crisis as producing migration of a particular form  – from ecologically dis-
tressed rural environments in the Global South to the «developed» world. 
Connecting land and labour: The LPM in South Africa 
As in Brazil, the demand in South Africa for land constitutes a desire to reverse 
patterns of dispossession and precarious mobility, which are often direct contin-
uations of the colonial period. In South Africa, dispossession and historical pat-
terns of migration have not been accidental outcomes of a developmental process. 
Rather, they have been planned strategically by colonial rulers and the post- 
colonial state through the creation of «labour reserve colonies». The latter involved 
the large-scale alienation of land to colonial settlers. The dispossession of land for 
9 Ibid., p. 371.
10 Ibid., p. 379.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 MST (2014, February), «Agrarian Programme of the MST», Sixth National MST Congress, avail- 






















































white settler agriculture provided a mobile and cheap labour force for large farms 
and plantations, as well as the mining industry.14
These patterns of mobility have continued in the post-colonial period, whereby 
South Africa continues to attract dispossessed migrant labour in the urban, agrar-
ian and mining sectors from within and outside the country. It is in this context that 
the debate around land becomes crucial. Immediately after the end of apartheid, 
the National Land Committee was formed in 1990 to articulate a way to reverse 
the colonial landgrabs that had been the root of racial, economic and ecological 
injustice in the country. The continued legacy of these processes became visible in 
the run-up to the 2002 FIFA World Cup, when tens of thousands of land occupants 
began to be dispossessed for infrastructure and beautification.15 This revival of the 
land question coincided with the emergence of the LPM in 2001 and bottom-up 
land reforms in Zimbabwe. 
With the African National Congress showing little interest in addressing the 
land question, it was left to social movements to articulate the demand for land 
reform, as well as continue land occupations on the ground. One of the founding 
documents of these movements  – the Landless People's Charter, signed in August 
2001 in Durban  – states: «We are the people who have borne the brunt of coloni-
alism and neocolonialism, of the invasions of our land by the wealthy countries of 
the world, of the theft of our natural resources, and of the forced extraction of our 
labour by the colonists.»16
By connecting land and labour, the charter shows how the movements that 
make up the LPM in South Africa view a connection between dispossession, forced 
migration and exploited labour. Whereas developmental agencies are often happy 
to see migration as an issue of economic choice, South African social movements 
see the questions of land and migration in relation to racial, agrarian and ecologi-
cal justice. The LPM has acquired a growing list of allies  – churches, development 
agencies, iNGOs and the Brazilian MST  – with whom it articulates a global struggle 
against landlessness.17
Where land has been occupied or reclaimed and/or given to peasants by the 
state in South Africa, it has been returned in a poor ecological condition.18 The 
LPM recognises the ecological devastation of land that transpires with commercial 
agriculture and the need to restore its ecological health. This is why, in 2018, the 
LPM was signatory to a joint letter to South African President Matamela Ramaphosa 
to call a special parliamentary session on the climate crisis to recognise the link 
14 Bernstein, H. (2005), «Rural Land and Land Conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa», in Moyo, S., and 
Yeros, P. (eds.), Reclaiming the Land: The Resurgence of Rural Movements in Africa, Asia and 
Latin America , p. 69 (London: Zed Books).
15 Sinhongonyane, M.F. (2005), «Land Occupations in South Africa», in Moyo, S., and Yeros, P. (eds.), 
Reclaiming the Land: The Resurgence of Rural Movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America , 
p. 142 (London: Zed Books).
16 Ibid., p. 156.
17 Ibid.














































between «drought, water inequality and the need for a food sovereignty system».19 
Climate justice in South Africa, according to this perspective, requires addressing 
the legacy of colonialism and post-colonial dispossession through redistributing 
and rehabilitating the land. 
Indonesian peasant movements' challenge to the plantation economy 
In Indonesia, patterns of mobility and resistance were shaped for over a century 
during the colonial period by the deliberate population of its outer islands to pro-
vide cheap, controllable labour for plantations.20 When the Sukarno government, 
supported by movements such as the Indonesian Peasants' Front (BTI),21 began to 
improve the conditions of rural populations in the plantations through land reform, 
US-backed General Suharto seized power and undertook a series of massacres that 
decimated peasant movements in Indonesia.22 The Suharto regime gave the plan-
tation economy new life by continuing the colonial project of transmigration to the 
outer islands  – a policy designed to ensure the plantations received a continuous 
supply of migrant labour.23
For more than three decades, Suharto's authoritarian regime continued 
expanding oil palm plantations through the forced dispossession of small land-
holders,24 which is a policy that has continued alongside the well-documented 
cutting and burning of the country's vast tropical forests. By 2015, out of a total of 
7.3 million hectares of oil palm plantations in the archipelago, 5.1 million hectares 
were owned by 29 large oil palm tycoons. The current Indonesian regime plans to 
expand these plantations by another 20 million hectares through the further dis-
possession of smallholders and forest destruction.25
Since the end of formal authoritarianism, rural social movements in Indonesia 
have tackled the question of plantations head on through land occupations, and 
have broken away from the contract farming model through the adoption of «peas-
ant agroecology». Although its success has been contested  – and it remains a mode 
of agrarian production very much in the process of being refined  – the adoption of 
«peasant agroecology» has the potential to disrupt centuries of ecological destruc-
tion and socio-economic dispossession.
The Federation of Indonesian Peasant Unions (FSPI) emerged amidst an erup-
tion of land occupations all over Indonesia in 1998, when thousands of landless 
19 «Open Letter to President Ramaphosa on Climate Change», available at: www.markswilling.
co.za/2018/11/open-letter-to-president-ramaphosa-on-climate-change.
20 This was regulated under the Coolie Ordinance Acts of 1880.
21 Masalam, H. (2017), «Our Crops Speak: Small and Landless Peasant Resistance to Agro-extrac-
tive Dispossession in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia», in Kapoor, D. (ed.), Against Colonization 
and Rural Dispossession: Local Resistance in South and East Asia, the Pacific and Africa , p. 107 
(London: Zed Books).
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p. 100.
24 Aditjondro, G.A. (2001), «Suharto's Fire: Suharto Cronies Control an ASEAN-wide Oil Palm 
Industry with Appalling Environmental Record», Inside Indonesia , 65 (January–March).





















































peoples began to occupy state and plantation lands.26 The movements began to 
replace oil palm, rubber, cocoa, coffee, teak and pine plantations with small-scale 
farms growing smallholder crops such as coffee, rice, cassava, banana, rubber, 
mahogany, avocado and clove.27 In the same period, the nascent movement was 
able to organise significant protests and push the government to pass agrarian 
reform28  – an important step towards formal recognition of the land occupations.29 
The SPI has not only continued to occupy and resist dispossession, its members 
have engaged in reclaiming ecologically devastated lands through agroecological 
production. One case study involves a group of plantation workers who reclaimed 
an abandoned industrial area in Casiavera and replaced it with small-scale agri- 
culture.30 These former plantation workers rejected precarious and mobile plan-
tation life to become smallholder peasants. Soon they were joined by another 
200 families, which included former street vendors and construction workers in 
Sumatra's cities, oil palm plantation workers and even nannies who returned from 
Malaysia.31 The SPI supported the newly formed peasant community of Casiavera 
to reclaim the land's fertility and biodiversity through agroecological agriculture by 
inviting them to attend SPI agroecological schools.32
This case shows that dispossession and occupation are core issues around 
which the discourse and practice of rural social movements are organised. In the 
Indonesian context, reclaiming the land is supplemented by an objective to restore 
its ecological balance and counter the domination of agrobusiness. Moreover, the 
SPI has opposed projects to privatise almost 96,000 hectares of rainforest under the 
REDD+ carbon trading scheme, where it has argued that such schemes consolidate 
the ongoing corporate control over territory and expand profits.33 Having opposed 
both deforestation and the dispossession of peasants, the SPI  – like other rural 
social movements such as the MST and the LPM  – increasingly views land reform 
and peasant agroecology as integral to climate and mobility justice.
26 Afifi, S., Fauzi, N., Hart, G., Ntsebeza, L., Peluso, N. (2005), «Redefining Agrarian Power: Resurgent 
Agrarian Movements in West Java, Indonesia», working paper in Recent Work series, p. 4 
(Berkeley, CA: Center for Southeast Asia Studies, University of California, Berkeley).
27 Gilbert, D.E. (2019), «Labourers Become ‹Peasants›: Agroecological Politics in a Sumatran 
Plantation Zone», Journal of Peasant Studies 47(5),1030–51.
28 Known as the People's Consultative Assembly Decree No. IX/2001 or TAP MPR No. IX/2001.
29 Afifi et al. (2005), «Redefining Agrarian Power», p. 20 (see note 26).
30 Gilbert (2019), «Labourers Become ‹Peasants›», p. 1 (see note 27).
31 Ibid., p. 3.
32 Ibid., p. 4.
33 La Via Campesina (2018), «La Via Campesina in Action for Climate Justice», Ecology Volume 
44.6 (Berlin: Heinrich Boll Stiftung), pp. 18–19, available at: www.boell.de/sites/default/files/
radical_realism_for_climate_justice_volume_44_6_1.pdf.






























































Transnational peasant visions:  
Advocating food sovereignty for agrarian and climate justice 
The MST, the LPM and the SPI are each part of a transnational peasant organisa-
tion, La Via Campesina (LVC), which brings agrarian reform and peasant agroeco-
logy together as essential components of its advocacy of «food sovereignty». With 
more than 130 peasant and small-farmer organisations from more than 90 coun-
tries, many consider the LVC to be «the most important social movement in the 
world»34 for its ability to set «innovative agendas for political and social policies» in 
addition to developing a «new relationship between the [Global] North and [Global] 
South» through «peasant movement to peasant movement» cooperation.35 The 
LVC has been recognised as a leading member of the anti-globalisation movement 
for its role in protests against the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas as well as for its role in the World Social Forum process. 
Though it is known for its scathing critiques of World Bank land policies, its most 
important achievement has arguably been its establishment of the novel concept 
of food sovereignty, which it has brought into common usage.36
A product of the bold ecological vision37 of peasant organisations in Latin 
America during the 1980s, the LVC was formed in the presence of 70 peasant lead-
ers in Mons, Belgium, in May 1993. It quickly asserted itself at the heart of world-
wide opposition to globalisation, articulating a strong grassroots vision of social 
and climate justice based on the experience of its member movements, which span 
from South-East Asia to North America. The importance of the LVC movements at 
the national level  – discussed in the cases of Brazil, South Africa and Indonesia  – 
was now combined with an unprecedented ability to provide novel concepts in the 
transnational arena. These found support across a range of developmental actors, 
including national governments, iNGOs and parts of UN bodies, such as the Food 
and Agricultural Organization (FAO). Developed at its second international confer-
ence in Tlaxcala, Mexico, in April 1996, the concept of food sovereignty made its 
way into public debate as a counter-position to the dominant «food security» dis-
course during the first World Food Summit in 1996.38 Martinez-Torres and Rosset 
note that «[d]ominant neoliberal viewpoints see food and farming as about little 
more than producing interchangeable products for trade. In contrast, food sov-
ereignty argues that food and farming are about […] inclusive local and national 
34 Martinez-Torres, M.E., and Rosset, P. (2010), «La Vía Campesina: The Birth and Evolution of a 
Transnational Social Movement», Journal of Peasant Studies , 150.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., p. 151.
37 For example, the 1990 Declaration of Quito states: «We do not own nature […] it is not a com-
modity […] we believe this meaning of humanity and of the environment is not only valid 
for our communities of Indo-American people. We believe this form of life is an option and 
a light for the people of the world oppressed by a system which dominates people and the 
environment.»





















































development, for addressing poverty and hunger, preserving rural life, economies 
and environments, and for managing national resources in a sustainable way.»39
Food sovereignty as a concept asserts «the right to farm as an act of social 
stewardship of the land and food redistribution against the destablising and exclu-
sionary impacts of the neoliberal model».40 The Declaration of Nyéléni from 2007 
states its opposition to «development projects/models and extractive industry that 
displace people and destroy our environments and natural heritage». Instead, it 
asserts that «the rights to use and manage our lands, territories, waters, seeds, live-
stock and biodiversity are in the hands of those of us who produce food».41 These 
assertions reflect a will to retain the right to remain/become peasants, to reshape 
the food system, and to address the ecological crisis at both the domestic and 
global levels. 
The concept of «peasant agroecology» was consolidated in the Declaration of 
the International Forum for Agroecology in Nyéléni, Mali, in 2015. Declaring itself 
in opposition to «the industrial food system [as] a key driver of the multiple crises of 
climate, food, the environment, public health and others,» it asserts that42
«[w]e must […] build our own local food systems that create new rural- 
urban links, based on truly agroecological production by peasants, arti-
sanal fishers, indigenous peoples, urban farmers. […] We see agroecology 
as the essential alternative to the industrial model, and as the means of 
transforming how we produce and consume food into something better for 
humanity and Mother Nature.»
It is these principles that shape the LVC's involvement in a number of transnational 
forums, including the United Nations, FAO, the Committee on World Food Security 
(CFS) and the Conference of the Parties (COP), as well as its rejection of the agendas 
of other transnational institutions such as the WTO, the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank. 
The LVC has been a vocal presence within and outside the COP, where it has 
pushed for a climate justice agenda that supports the adoption of peasant rights, 
food sovereignty and peasant agroecology. In doing so, it has called into question 
dominant thinking on the climate question, most of which revolves around osten-
sibly technological solutions: agrofuels, geoengineering, SMART agriculture, GM 
crops, carbon trading and so on. In strong language, it has described these as false 
39 Ibid., p. 160.
40 Michael, P. (2006), «Peasant Prospects in the Neoliberal Age», New Political Economy , 11(3), 414.
41 It goes on: «Food sovereignty prioritises local and national economies and markets and 
empowers peasant and family farmer-driven agriculture, artisanal  – fishing, pastoralist-led 
grazing, and food production, distribution and consumption based on environmental, social 
and economic sustainability. Food sovereignty promotes transparent trade that guarantees 
just income to all peoples and the rights of consumers to control their food and nutrition.» 
La Via Campesina (2007), «Declaration of Nyeleni», available at: https://viacampesina.org/en/
declaration-of-nyi.














































solutions that constitute «crimes against humanity».43 It produces a wide array of 
literature for both its members and the public in preparation for climate summits, 
advocating the «replacement of industrialised agriculture and animal production 
by small-scale sustainable agriculture».44 An LVC press releases at the COP 22 in 
Bonn, Germany, makes clear that its solution to the climate crisis involves fun-
damental transformation of the global food system: «Our call for system change 
is urgent because the damage is growing. Commons, including land, forests and 
water, must be protected and restored to the people.»45
The LVC's advocacy of food sovereignty and agroecology won a crucial victory 
in 2018 when, after decades of protests and lobbying, it secured the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas (UNDROP). 
Moreover, the LVC has successfully operated within the civil society mechanism 
as part of the CFS, where it has pushed for negotiations on guidelines pertain-
ing to land tenure, the right to adequate food, small-scale fisheries' food systems, 
nutrition and agroecology. These engagements are often highly contested and 
politicised, with negotiations taking place between national governments, inter-
national development agencies, the private sectors, civil society and social move-
ments. The LVC remains critical of ongoing processes at the UN, including the UN 
Secretary-General handing control of the next World Food Summit to the head of 
the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, Agnes Kalibata.46 Current discussions 
in the LVC Public Policy collective  – in which the author is involved as a repre- 
sentative from LVC South Asia  – include proposals to host an alternative world 
food summit that centres on rural social movements and their allies rather than 
global agribusiness, which it holds responsible for rural dispossession and the 
ecological crisis in global agriculture. 
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that climate justice cannot be separated from the historical 
and contemporary struggles of rural populations for food sovereignty. It has aimed 
to share some principles on how rural social movements from the Global South are 
offering concrete visions and practices for a peasant pathway to climate justice. For 
rural social movements, this course requires building an ecologically sustainable 
43 LVC (2016), «Via Campesina at COP 22: False Solutions to Climate Change May Constitute 
Crimes against Humanity», available at: https://viacampesina.org/en/via-campesina-at-cop-22- 
false-solutions-to-the-climate-crisis-may-constitute-crimes-against-humanity.
44 LVC (2009), «Sustainable Scale Sustainable Farmers Are Cooling Down the Earth», Via Campesina 
Views, Paper 5, available at: https://viacampesina.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2015/ 
12/EN-paper5.pdf.
45 LVC (2017), «La Via Campesina Responds to COP 23 Calling for Peasant Agroecology», available 
at: https://viacampesina.org/en/via-campesina-responds-cop23-calling-peasant-agroecology.
46 LVC (2020), «Via Campesina Denounces UN Envoy for UN Food Systems Summit for Dimin-























































food system that protects rural populations from dispossession and provides the 
opportunity for mobile labouring populations to become rural producers. In con-
crete terms, this means rural social movements articulate the right to remain/
become peasants as integral to climate justice, in that they assert the right of rural 
populations not to be displaced, as well as the right of vulnerable labouring popula-
tions to be able to find a way of reasserting their dignity and sovereignty by occupy-
ing land and cultivating it through the developing practice of peasant agroecology. 
Rural social movements assert their right to be more than passive recipients of 
policy solutions in the midst of economic, ecological and climate change-related 
distress, and to actively solve the global economic and ecological crises by assert-
ing the right to become stewards of the land and food. As we have seen in case 
studies of the MST in Brazil, the LPM in South Africa and the SPI in Indonesia, 
rural social movements in the Global South insist on their right to land, the rights 
of nature, and the right to stay put, and they believe these rights are fundamentally 
linked. Climate justice for vulnerable rural populations does not merely involve the 
recognition of new legal categories such as «climate refugees». It requires policies 
that address the continued legacy of the colonial and contemporary dispossession 
of peoples and the continued destruction of rural environments. 
Rural social movements are under attack in almost all countries of the Global 
South. The MST, the SPI and the LPM operate under authoritarian regimes. Their 
cooperation in La Via Campesina provides much-needed solidarity and contributes 
to the creation of a collective idea of rural development designed by movements 
rather than policymaking elites. Important victories, such as UNDROP, are increas-
ingly under threat in a political atmosphere where pro-industry authoritarian gov-
ernments that deny climate change have taken power across the world. Global 
agribusiness has found itself empowered in relation to rural social movements, and 
the Paris Agreement has been weakened. Within this context, the amplification of 
rural voices in the transnational sphere is more important than ever. These voices, 
which seek to overturn a century and a half of developmental theory and practice 
designed to displace rural populations, must figure prominently in the policies that 














































NAUSHEEN H. ANWAR AND MALINI SUR
Climate change, urban futures, 
and the gendering of cities in 
South Asia
Introduction 
Comprised of the nation-states of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, India, 
Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, South Asia is home to an estimated 1.5 billion 
people. This region accommodates a large portion of the world's poor and margin-
alised populations, an increasing share of which live in urban areas. Between 2001 
and 2011 South Asia's urban population grew by 130 million and is projected to 
reach 250 million by 2030.1 South Asia is also anticipated to be one of the regions 
worst affected by climate change; its cities are under serious threat from rising air 
pollution and sea levels, increasing incidences of extreme weather events such as 
floods, cyclones and storm surges, in addition to the irregularity of the monsoons 
and intense heat waves. Many cities in this region are located on floodplains, in 
dry areas or on coasts where severe floods have led to the destruction of homes, 
the loss of livelihoods and the loss of life. The prediction of the Intergovernmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2007 that freshwater shortages in South 
Asia would be compounded by flooding (from rivers, flash floods and sea surges) 
has proven to be accurate.2 Furthermore, more than 800 million people in South 
Asia presently live in communities projected to become zones with extremely 
high temperatures that will cause increased damage, especially under the region's 
carbon-intensive energy regimes.3
1 Ellis, P., and Roberts, M. (2016), Leveraging Urbanization in South Asia: Managing Spatial 
Transformation for Prosperity and Liveability (Washington, DC: World Bank).
2 IPCC (2007), Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report (New York, NY: IPCC).
3 Muthukumara, M., Bandyopadhyay, S., Chonabayashi, S., Markandya, A., and Mosier, T. (2018), 
South Asia's Hotspots: Impacts of Temperature and Precipitation Changes on Living Standards 





















































If it was once possible to write about future rural and urban areas as distinct 
sites of struggle and lived experience, today South Asian cities can no longer be 
viewed as isolated zones protected from the vagaries of nature and climate change. 
For instance, in the past, the plight of farmers who braved droughts and floods  – 
and even lost their lives to weather-related events  – hardly impacted city dwell-
ers, except for price rises in food and other related commodities. Such scenarios, 
in which the rural world suffered in relative isolation, contrast sharply with the 
impact of events such as Cyclone Ampan, which devastated large parts of eastern 
India and Bangladesh in 16–19 May 2020. Not only did it wash away crops, cattle 
and embankments in remote rural regions, Ampan also caused devastation in the 
city of Kolkata, where high winds and floods damaged infrastructure: The city's air-
port was flooded and electricity poles, trees and settlements in urban slums were 
razed to the ground. The disastrous effects of this cyclonic event were particularly 
severe on the urban poor, especially those with inadequate and insecure housing. 
The long-term impacts of such extreme weather events  – along with the fallout 
of ill-planned developmental projects for mitigating climate change  – are particu-
larly evident in regions such as the Indus Delta in Pakistan, and Khulna and the 
Sundarbans in Bangladesh  – ecologically fragile zones from which the rural and 
landless poor are displaced, effectively driven into insecure urban settlements in 
South Asian cities. Of course, cyclonic events and flooding are by no means unique 
or exceptional to these cities. Globally, city dwellers have been living and coping 
with extreme weather events linked to climate change for many years. What we 
propose to show in this chapter, however, is how the impact of such occurrences 
exposes the foundational and structural flaws of our cities, thereby raising urgent 
questions and policy issues related to class and gender inequality. 
Examining the relationship between climate change and urbanisation, we 
show how climate change risks in urban South Asia disproportionately affect the 
livelihoods, health and wellbeing of the poor, especially women; how they entrench 
displacement and precarity; and how extreme heat, water scarcity, pollution and 
dust impact their lives, health and livelihoods. As we propose to show, issues of 
climate change mitigation and adaptation are compounded by the fact that provi-
sions for essential services such as clean water and clean air are far below regional 
thresholds and do not meet general social welfare criteria. For instance, although 
cities may factor in climate change, it is imperative that a broader understanding of 
the interface between climate and development priorities across policy and govern-
ance at all levels be developed to reduce the ill-effects of climate change in urban 
areas.4 Even as South Asian cities are transforming into global cities, the urban 
poor remain confined to settlements that lack access to basic housing, water and 
electricity supplies. Despite providing avenues of employment for large numbers of 
the rural and urban poor, South Asia's construction boom is not ameliorating the 
conditions in which most are forced to live and earn their livelihoods. In fact, for 
4 Khosla, R., and Bhardwaj, A. (2019), «Urbanization in the Time of Climate Change: Examining 














































the migrant poor, who lack political voice in cities, real estate development disrupts 
social networks while heightening exposure to emerging climate risks and financial 
precariousness, thereby generating conditions of injustice and exclusion.5
Climate change, urbanisation and displacement 
Today, most South Asian cities are struggling with the pressures of population 
growth on land, housing, infrastructure and basic services, alongside climate 
change impacts that include fast-rising temperatures, volatile precipitation levels 
and flooding. Seasonal high temperatures  – concurrent with either summer-
time or with dry or rainy seasons  – continue to break annual records in localised 
manifestations of global heating. The combination of extreme heat with extreme 
humidity is becoming more severe in South Asian cities, and this presents unique 
health risks. Much of South Asia's urbanisation is reflected in the older slums in 
cities as well as the emerging informal settlements,6 in which nearly 130 million 
South Asians reside.7 Informal settlements are also spreading out to the periph-
eries of cities. Indeed, amidst the massive urban transformation in South Asia, 
it is now evident that the majority of the expansion is taking place beyond mu- 
nicipal boundaries.8 Agrarian hinterlands and so-called urban peripheries have 
witnessed the most dramatic changes.9
Urban and rural/agrarian entanglements are shaping the contested politics 
of land, real estate and infrastructure to produce a «highly unequal and tense 
socio-political landscape of access, inclusion and displacement».10 Within this 
urban-rural landscape, pastoralists, indigenous groups and agriculturalists are 
willingly, or through coercion, giving up their land and/or their livelihoods; the 
bonds of kinship and social relations that underpin their communities are being 
eroded.11 As Gururani and Dasgupta note:
5 Chu, E., and Michael, K. (2018), «Recognition in Urban Climate Justice: Marginality and Exclu-
sion of Migrants in Indian Cities», Environment and Urbanization 31(1), 139–56.
6 Not all informal settlements are slums and nor are they necessarily «informal». Context matters 
but broadly speaking, informal settlements arise out of informalised processes of land acqui-
sition, e.g. incomplete property rights, self-help construction. For a substantive discussion on 
the tricky matters of defining slums and informal settlements and relevance to policy, see Gil-
bert, A. (2007, December), «The Return of the Slum: Does Language Matter?», International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research 31(4), 697–713.
7 Ellis and Roberts (2016), Leveraging Urbanization (see note 1).
8 Ibid.
9 Anwar, N.H. (2018), «Receding Rurality, Booming Periphery», Economic & Political Weekly 
53(12), 46–54; Gururani, S., and Dasgupta, R. (2018), «Frontier Urbanism: Urbanisation beyond 
Cities in South Asia», Economic and Political Weekly 53(12), 41–45.
10 Gururani and Dasgupta (2018), «Frontier Urbanism», 42.
11 Anwar (2018), «Receding Rurality» (see note 9); Gururani and Dasgupta (2018), «Frontier 





















































«[…] these frontiers are made up of dispossessed peasants, displaced mi- 
grants, and poor tenants, who battle for space with new middle- and upper-
class housing enclaves, shopping malls, office towers, and infrastructure 
corridors. They must share these frontiers with flexible state functionaries, 
local intermediaries and landlords, rent extractors and land speculators, 
petty entrepreneurs and real estate agents. Many are caught in the middle 
of rapidly-changing livelihoods and aspirations, between value extraction 
and appropriation.»12
In urban Pakistan, the combination of a high-density population and a heavily built 
environment; the extensive use of asphalt and concrete in construction; and the 
lack of green space all create an urban heat island effect that can add as much as 
12° C to average recorded temperatures.13 In June 2015, temperatures in Karachi  – 
where an estimated 12.4 million people (62 per cent of the city's population) live in 
informal settlements  – rose to 44.8° C, resulting in more than 1,000 deaths being 
recorded in 10 days.14 Prior to the heatwave, increased demand for energy had 
triggered prolonged power outages; the rise in temperature placed further pressure 
on already limited public water supplies. The effects were particularly pronounced 
in high-density areas, where narrow lanes and congested built environments cur-
tailed wind circulation. Just as heatwaves have become a prominent source of 
vulnerability in South Asian cities affected by climate change, so too has water 
scarcity. Coupled with other climate-related factors such as extreme heat, unsea-
sonal rains and urban flooding, its impact is particularly harmful. 
Dhaka, a city of 17 million people, exemplifies the acute challenges of urban-
isation and water scarcity, as these intersect with climate change impacts. Nearly 
one-third of Dhaka's residents confront what has been described as «climate apart-
heid».15 The elite navigate the city by avoiding slums and informal settlements, 
which is where: the vast majority of Dhaka's poor and marginalised groups reside, 
infrastructure services are generally lacking and safe drinking water remains 
inaccessible. Inequality and lack of affordable housing force the urban poor to live 
in informal spaces that are likely to be more vulnerable to climate change haz-
ards such as flash floods, thus increasing their exposure to flooding. With homes 
destroyed and livelihoods compromised due to flooding, marginalised communi-
ties have less ability to cope with, and recover from, the damage caused by such 
displacement.16
12 Gururani and Dasgupta (2018), «Frontier Urbanism», 43.
13 Anwar, N., Amin, S., Cross, J., Friedrich, D., Khandekar, A., Morelle, …Nastiti, A. (2020, July 2), 
«Heat and Covid-19 in the Off-Grid City», Somatosphere .
14 Ebrahim, Z.T. (2019, July 26), «Is Karachi Ready to Fight the Next Big Heatwave?» Dawn .
15 Sultana, F. (2020, June 24), «Political Ecology 1: From Margins to Center», Progress in Human 
Geography , https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132520936751.
16 Sultana, F. (2010), «Living in Hazardous Waterscapes: Gendered Vulnerabilities and Experi-














































However, displacement is a multifaceted dynamic in South Asian cities. It in- 
cludes not only forced displacement due to land conflicts and/or climate change 
risks, but also development-induced displacement. Indeed, urban development 
causes the displacement of millions of people worldwide every year, and the 
proportion of displaced urban residents is rapidly growing.17 In 2018 alone, 
approximately 70.8 million people were forcibly displaced in this manner.18 If the 
uprooting of people from their land and homes through development is at times 
highly visible (e.g. forced evictions), less visible manifestations include develop-
ment policies that undermine livelihoods.19 «Gentrification», «slum clearance», 
«slum evictions» and so forth are all terms indicating the involuntary movement 
of people from their homes due to development. Such forms of land-based dis-
placement may interact in complex and violent ways with social and economic 
outcomes of development that exacerbate risks and vulnerability for the urban 
poor in a changing climate. For instance, assessments of the outcomes of forced 
displacement and resettlement to accommodate development show that resettle-
ment policies create new vulnerabilities among resettled populations, particularly 
among the poor.20 Resettled populations are often pushed to the rural-urban mar-
gins where social marginalisation, reduced access to infrastructure and unstable 
employment combine to generate uncertainties. In fact, planned resettlement to 
accommodate development has been associated with adverse health outcomes, 
including food insecurity.21
In cities such as Lahore,22 Karachi,23 Delhi24 and Colombo,25 the experience 
of displacement and the resultant resettlement and homelessness have defined the 
process of habitation for the vast majority of the poor. In recent decades, urban 
17 Cernea, M.M. (2008), «Compensation and Benefit Sharing: Why Resettlement Policies and 
Practices Must Be Reformed», Water Science and Engineering 1(1), 89–120.
18 UNHCR (2019), Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018 , available at: www.unhcr.org/
globaltrends2018.
19 Penz, P., Drydyk, J., and Bose, P.S. (2011), Displacement by Development: Ethics, Rights and 
Responsibilities (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press).
20 Cernea, M.M. (1997), «The Risks and Reconstruction Model for Resettling Displaced Popula-
tions», World Development 25(10),1569–87.
21 Ibid., 1997.
22 Abeyasekara, A., Maqsood, A., Perera, I., Sajjad, F., and Spencer, J. (2020), «Discipline in Sri 
Lanka Punish in Pakistan: Neoliberalism, Governance, and Housing Compared», Journal of the 
British Academy 7(s2), 215–44.
23 Anwar, N.H. (2018, August 21), «The State Wants to Make Karachi a ‹World-class› City. But 
What's the Cost?», Dawn ; Hasan, A., Maher, M., Ahmed, N., and Qayyum, F. (2018), Karachi 
Eviction 2018: A Brutal and Shameful Act in the Name of Law , vol. 1 (Karachi: Urban Resource 
Centre).
24 Bhan, G. (2009), «This Is No Longer the City I Once Knew. Evictions, the Urban Poor and the 
Right to the City in Millennial Delhi», Environment and Urbanization 21(1), 127–42; Dupont, 
V.D. (2008), «Slum Demolitions in Delhi Since the 1990s: An Appraisal», Economic and Political 
Weekly , 79–87.
25 Abeyasekara et al. (2020), «Discipline in Sri Lanka» (see note 22); Amarasuriya, H., and Spencer, 
J. (2015), «With That, Discipline Will Also Come to Them: The Politics of the Urban Poor in 





















































development plans that include mega-infrastructure projects, tourism and city 
beautification have entailed heavy costs in terms of the demolition of slums and 
informal settlements. Such plans have been enacted without solving critical issues 
relating to adequate shelter for the urban poor. In Delhi, preparations for the 2010 
Commonwealth Games provided an opportunity for urban authorities to «clean 
up» the city, transform its land use and reshape the urban landscape;26 nearly 
200,000 people were forcibly evicted as a result.27 In Karachi, the construction of 
the mega-infrastructure project Lyari Expressway led to the forced displacement 
of 77,000 families in 2002. Of those affected, only 30,000 were relocated to reset-
tlement colonies on the city's rural-urban margins, where they continue to strug-
gle with curtailed mobility and degraded infrastructure.28 For residents in Lyari 
Basti  – one of the resettlement colonies  – life after resettlement has meant greater 
vulnerability, especially in terms of access to infrastructure. One 70-year-old male 
resident summarised his experience two decades after resettlement as follows: 
«The Musharraf [government] gave us amenities [in 2003] before sending 
us here. It was agreed […] that for 7 years there would be no bills for water 
and electricity. But after 7 years passed, things gradually started getting 
worse. For example, street cleaning stopped. Sewerage lines started getting 
choked, and there was no one to maintain them. Piped water started com-
ing once a month, instead of once every week. Then once a month became 
once in six months, then once a year; now my street hasn't had piped water 
for the past 7 years.»29
Over the past two decades, Karachi's infrastructure and urban development 
projects have led to the displacement of well over 400,000 working-class and low- 
income households from the city's centre.30 Fewer than 33 per cent of the house-
holds forcibly evicted have received any form of resettlement or compensation.31 
Moreover, since 2018, a brutal wave of Supreme Court-backed anti-encroachment 
drives have led to the demolition of residential spaces and informal markets. 
This has not only made more people homeless but also eviscerated an estimated 
200,000 jobs.32 These are devastating consequences for the vast majority of Kara-
chi's poor residents, who rely on the informal economy for survival. 
26 Dupont (2008), «Slum Demolitions» (see note 24).
27 Habitat International Coalition (2011), «Planned Dispossession: Forced Evictions and the 
2010 Commonwealth Games», Fact-Finding Mission Report No. 14 (New Delhi: Housing and 
Land Rights Network).
28 Anjum, G., Anwar, N.H., Abdullah, A., Toheed, M., Arif, M., Macktoom, S., …Rizvi, K. (2021), 
Land, Governance, and the Gendered Politics of Displacement in Urban Pakistan , manu-



















































Similar dynamics are evident in Pakistan's capital city of Islamabad, where 
forced evictions have had a profound impact on certain populations, such as the 
Pashtun and Afghan migrant-refugees, who fled from state-sponsored wars that 
have devasted Afghanistan as well Pakistan's north-western region of Feder-
ally Administered Tribal Areas. Faced with no alternative housing, the migrant- 
refugees found shelter in Islamabad's informal settlements. In 2015, approximately 
20,000 people were displaced in a harrowing eviction operation that was carried 
out against Islamabad's largest informal settlement of I-11, where many of the 
migrant-refugees resided.33 These are people who have experienced the brutality 
of double-displacement: first due to war, and later due to the criminalisation of 
their ethnicity, as the state found it convenient to declare them «terrorists» as a 
means of justifying the evictions. 
Urban renewal and the making of global cities in South Asia are often accom-
panied by evictions. For instance, Colombo's development into a global city in- 
volved mass evictions and forced resettlements along the city's margins. These 
processes of dispossession were ideologically normalised, reflected in a shift in 
language and public attitudes towards housing. Observers noted a reversal in the 
way housing policies are framed and presented in Sri Lanka, where welfare provi-
sions for low-income urban residents have been reduced.34 In Indian cities such 
as Kolkata, informal settlements provide a certain flexibility for urban elites, who 
plan and govern space to their advantage. The legal ambiguity allows them to push 
slums, hawking and other visible signs of poverty beyond the borders of townships 
into nearby slums, where residents lack access to the infrastructure and services 
necessary to mitigate risk from weather events such as floods.35
Urban air pollution, dust and health 
South Asian cities face severe climate-related air pollution and carbon emissions. 
In Indian cities, the main emission sources for air pollution include vehicle exhaust, 
on-road resuspended dust, construction dust, industrial exhaust, and domestic 
cooking and heating. In addition, in cities such as Amritsar, Bhopal, Chandigarh, 
Coimbatore, Kanpur, Ludhiana and Pune, small- and medium-scale industries are 
major sources of emissions and industrial pollutants, which further contribute to 
particulate material PM 10 and PM 2.5.36 Air pollution causes ill health ranging 
from eyesight damage to serious cardiovascular, neurological and dermatological 
complications. People in cities do not experience the same conventional seasonal 
33 Turi, H. (2015, December), «They Razed Our Homes», Tanqeed , p. 10.
34 Abeyasekara et al. (2020), «Discipline in Sri Lanka» (see note 22).
35 Rumbach, A. (2017), «At the Roots of Urban Disasters: Planning and Uneven Geographies of 
Risk in Kolkata, India», Journal of Urban Affairs 39(6), 783–99.
36 Guttikunda, S.K., Nishadh, K.A., and Jawahar, P. (2019), «Air Pollution Knowledge Assessments 





















































transitions; the air drastically changes due to extreme heat or cold and pollution.37 
For people with pre-existing respiratory diseases, pollution can cause a life-threat-
ening deterioration of their baseline breathing capacity.38 Studies have also shown 
that higher temperatures and shifting precipitation patterns will worsen these 
trends, reducing living standards in communities across South Asia; more than 800 
million people at present live in locations projected to become dangerous, given the 
carbon-intensive climate scenario that seems set to continue.39
Today, it is evident that climate change is not only being driven by greenhouse 
gases such as carbon dioxide but also short-lived methane, tropospheric ozone 
and black carbon. Although they reside in the air for short durations of time, these 
pollutants do considerable damage to the human body. They also impact the 
economy and wellbeing in a wider sense. On account of the high concentration of 
black carbon in South Asia's densely populated cities, city dwellers' livelihoods are 
especially adversely impacted.40 For instance, the urban poor who work in the 
informal economy  – including on construction sites and in occupations that rely 
upon long hours of bicycling and walking  – risk exposure to dust and air pollution.41
With state efforts to make South Asian cities global, construction is an all- 
pervasive phenomenon of urban life. In India, the construction industry is a major 
contributor towards gross domestic product, employs 33 million people and impacts 
250 associated industries such as cement, coal and technology.42 Construction dust 
is one of the primary pollutants of Indian cities. It exacerbates air pollution and 
undermines the right to safe and secure housing of urban populations. 
Urban land development in Indian cities unfolds through a complex combina-
tion of legal and electoral politics. Governments have taken aggressive measures 
to transform cities in order to attract new capital investments.43 In Mumbai, 
urban renewal, which is based on the conversion of land, rarely protects the hous-
ing rights of the poor.44 At the margins of the city, legislative acts and political 
processes convert the land on which the poor reside into assets for the rich. State 
policies transform «low-cost» shelters into middle-class apartments, and real estate 
37 Sur, M. (2020), «Ambient Air: Kolkata's Bicycle Politics and Post-Carbon Futures», in Elinoff, 
E., and Vaughn, T. (eds.), Beyond Environmental Crisis in Asia (Pennsylvania, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press).
38 Mishra, M. (2019), «Poison in the Air: Declining Air Quality in India», Lung India  36(2) 
(Mar–Apr),160–61.
39 Muthukumara et al. (2018), South Asia's Hotspots (see note 3).
40 US Environmental Protection Agency (2012), Reducing Black Carbon Emissions in South Asia: 
Low Cost Opportunities (Washington, DC: Environmental Protection Agency).
41 Sur (2020), «Ambient Air» (see note 37).
42 Elinoff, E., Sur, M., and Yeoh, B. (2016), «Constructing Asia: An Introduction», City Special Fea-
ture 21(5), 580–86.
43 Sur, M. (2017), «The Blue Urban: Coloring and Constructing Kolkata», City 21(5), 597–606.
44 Bhan (2009), «This Is No Longer the City I Once Knew» (see note 24); Dupont (2008), «Slum 














































developers use state-sponsored subsidies designed for the urban poor to profit 
from the construction of apartments for the middle classes.45
In the city of Kolkata, informal urban practices of governance underline the 
troublingly distorted priorities of a political elite that fails to protect citizens from 
the harmful impacts of construction, yet rarely misses an opportunity to advance 
its own brand. The ruling party cleverly uses the colour blue to rebrand the city in 
order to advertise itself and attract investments. The colour's ubiquitous visibility 
normalises its policies: disruptive real estate development, selective dispossession 
and corruption.46 Despite the existence of such routine maintenance and repair 
of public infrastructure, the city administration does not ensure the regulation 
of construction dust, which infiltrates the lungs of construction workers and city 
dwellers. 
The construction boom across South Asian cities employs large numbers of 
rural to urban migrants in a never-ending cycle of urban expansion, but none of the 
projects consider the lives and health of the construction workers who are build-
ing these cities. Dust from construction sites severely damages their health, and 
cement dust poses an occupational hazard that causes respiratory, skin-related and 
haematological health problems. A recent study on construction workers in Indian 
cities confirms that their blood composition parameters are adversely affected; 
the cause is attributed to cement dust at work sites.47
Cities and rural-urban displacements
South Asia's coastal cities face an uncertain future given the rapid urban growth in 
low-elevation coastal zones. Global warming causes rises in sea levels, and these 
climatic changes lead to higher winds, heavier rainfall, stronger storm surges and 
increased coastal flooding.48 In Bangladesh, climate-induced changes are likely to 
displace 134 million people who today reside in zones that could become moderate 
or severely dangerous locations by 2050; this comprises more than 82 per cent of 
the country's population. In addition to the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the port city of 
Chittagong could become one such location.49 In the city of Dhaka, which is fac-
ing severe climate threats, scholars have shown how the focus of interventions has 
been to assess impacts rather than mitigate adaptability and change. For instance, 
climate change planning at the national level demonstrates that urban issues 
45 Jose, G. (2017), «Hawa khaana in Vasai Virar», City 21(5), 632–40.
46 Sur (2017), «The Blue Urban» (see note 37).
47 Farheen, A., Hazari, M.H., Khatoon, F., Sultana, F., and Qudsiya, S.M. (2017), «Hematological 
Parameters Are Acutely Affected by Cement Dust Exposure in Construction Workers», Annals 
of Medical Physiology 1(1), 31–35.
48 Fuchs, R., Conran, M., and Louis, E. (2011), «Climate Change and Asia's Coastal Urban Cities: 
Can They Meet the Challenge?», Environment and Urbanization 2(1) (Asia Issue), 13–28.





















































compete with coastal issues and agricultural production; in the process there is 
a complete lack of coordination among local governments.50
Displacement in South Asia due to the impacts of climate change in both rural 
and coastal regions that are zones of climate crisis impact urban futures. Severe 
weather-related events such as coastal and riverine flooding, droughts and water 
scarcity are forcing rural populations to migrate to urban centres. In 2010, more than 
20 million people were affected by unprecedented floods that inundated one-fifth 
of Pakistan, triggering mass migration to cities from rural areas.51 Approximately 
7  million people were rendered homeless with 1.8 million homes destroyed.52 
Many people did not go back to their hometowns and permanently settled in cities 
to make a living because of the destruction to their homes and farmlands. More-
over, in the southern region of Pakistan, the ongoing ecological devastation of 
the Indus Delta has led to the steady outflow of people moving from coastal areas 
towards urban centres such as Karachi as well as smaller cities in search of better 
livelihoods and shelter. A recent report on urban resilience in Pakistan details the 
plight of migrants from the Indus Delta in southern Pakistan. It states: 
«The Indus Delta is a coastal area comprising Kharo Chan and Keti Bunder 
in Thatta District of Sindh. Changes in the rural ecology and political econ-
omy of the Indus Delta region have curtailed livelihoods and led to waves 
of migration. For poor and landless farmers and fishermen of the Indus 
Delta region of Sindh, control of inland water bodies by influential peo-
ple, indebtedness to and dependence on landowners, sea-water intrusion 
and lack of fresh water, and susceptibility to climatic events have pushed 
people outward over the last three decades. They have mostly settled in 
fishing villages along the coast of Karachi  – Ibrahim Hyderi, Rehri Goth, 
and Lath Basti. […] When these migrants arrive in Karachi, there are other 
disentitlements that impinge upon their desire for a better life  – policing of 
access points to fishing, control of regulatory bodies and harbors by influ-
ential people, competition, and destructive fishing practices such as harm-
ful equipment and deep sea foreign trawlers. Older migrants from Thatta, 
Badin, and Sujawal were frustrated with failing municipal services and low 
earnings.»53
50 Araos, M., Ford, J., Berrang-Ford, L., Biesbroek, R., and Moser, S. (2017), «Climate Change Adap-
tation Planning for Global South Megacities: The Case of Dhaka», Journal of Environmental 
Policy & Planning 19(6), 682–96.
51 Rendon, R., and Thomas, A. (2010), Confronting Climate Displacement: Learning from Pakistan's 
Floods , Refugees International, available at: www.humanitarianlibrary.org/sites/default/files/ 
2013/05/ConfrontingClimateDisplacement.pdf.
52 Ibid.
53 Ashfaq, A. (2020, May), Understanding Urban Resilience: Migration, Displacement and Violence 














































In Bangladesh's low-lying coastal islands, forming part of a densely populated delta, 
rising waters, cyclones and floods are threatening communities. This is a region 
where climate adaptation strategies, combined with the dynamics of agrarian 
change, are displacing and dispossessing people who have historically depended 
on agricultural work to survive. In the climate-vulnerable southern district of rural 
Khulna, Kasia Paprocki has shown how the onset of shrimp farming as a climate 
adaptation strategy that seeks simultaneously to promote export production has 
reduced labour opportunities and triggered a process of de-peasantisation and 
migration towards urban centres. She argues:54
«As shrimp ponds take over land from rice and other crop production, the 
people who used to depend on agricultural work to survive and feed their 
families increasingly find themselves without a place in the rural econ-
omy. As the elderly proprietor of a tea stall commented to me, ‹shrimp has 
destroyed all of the farmers›, invoking the Bengali word dhongsho, mean-
ing literally ‹destroy›, ‹kill›, ‹waste›, or ‹ruin›. These dispossessed farmers 
migrate out of their villages to find work  – to Khulna city, Dhaka, and 
often Kolkata, in the neighbouring Indian state of West Bengal. Thus, the 
expansion of commercial shrimp cultivation has a significant impact on 
the transformation of labour relations throughout the region, as well as the 
survival of its inhabitants.»55
The Bangladesh case is particularly pertinent because it underscores the impor-
tance of understanding climate adaptation as a process wherein rural and urban 
futures are deeply interwoven, and where there are inherent risks for poor rural 
inhabitants who are often forced to bear the burden of climate mitigation strate-
gies. It also illustrates the potential links between climate-related issues and other 
kinds of conflict. The onslaught of saline water for shrimp farming and the enclo-
sure of what were formerly common resources led local communities to pursue 
justice through various forms of mobilisation. This, in turn, was met with a violent 
backlash from the state's military forces. The presence of battalions of the armed 
forces and occasional interventions by revolutionary extremists have combined to 
foster an atmosphere of fear and insecurity in this coastal zone.56 The potential for 
strife that could trigger further displacement remains considerable.
Cities, climates and gender 
Experiences of urban renewal, infrastructure development and displacement 
interact with climate change impacts in ways that are differentiated along lines of 
54 Paprocki, K. (2019), «All That Is Solid Melts into the Bay: Anticipatory Ruination and Climate 
Change Adaptation», Antipode 51(1), 295–315.
55 Ibid., 11.
56 Guha Thakurta, M., Hossain, H., and Sur, M. (2011), Freedom from Fear? Freedom from Want? 





















































gender57 and social class. This section concerns itself with the manner in which 
gender, in particular, shapes and reinforces power relations between and among 
different groups. Across South Asia, gender inequality, in combination with climate 
vulnerability, presents grave challenges to the wellbeing of the communities and 
ecosystems upon which they depend. As Farhana Sultana explains: 
«[the] [g]endered implications of climate change in South Asia are particu-
larly poignant as patriarchal norms, inequities, and inequalities often place 
women and men in differentiated positions in their abilities to respond to 
and cope with dramatic changes in socioecological relations but also fore-
ground the complex ways in which social power relations operate in com-
munal responses to adaptation strategies.»58
In many South Asian urban contexts, the driving forces of displacement, the lack 
of social safety nets, inaccessibility to safe water and weak government responses 
to disasters interact with climate change risks and hazards to produce highly un- 
equal urban landscapes in which poor women and men are increasingly being left 
behind. Water injustice in urban contexts is deeply marked by gender differences 
because women are primarily responsible for domestic responsibilities, which 
include fetching water for the family. Poor women who live in informal settlements 
face the double burden of climate change and patriarchy.59 For instance, gendered 
divisions of labour in patriarchal households mean water scarcity increases the 
physical workload for women as well as the emotional stress they undergo, given 
that they are often tasked with water provision. In essence, the gendered and lived 
vulnerabilities of poor women to climate change are exacerbated by the expand-
ing footprint of urbanisation, decrepit infrastructure, displacement and anti-poor 
urban planning, whereby they are forced to constantly negotiate a terrain of harm.
A good deal of this negotiating occurs at the urban-rural interface. In west-
ern Nepal's Kailali and Bardia districts, unpredictable and uneven rainfall has 
created new challenges, such as increased risks of flooding and lower levels of 
agricultural production. Women feel particularly vulnerable to these impacts, as 
higher levels of food insecurity have created fertile ground for domestic violence 
and greater burdens regarding care. As agriculture has become less reliable due to 
unpredictable and changing rainfall patterns, men are migrating to cities within 
57 We understand gender as the social (rather than biological) attributes, norms, roles and atti-
tudes that are considered appropriate for groups of men and women by a given society and 
learnt through socialisation.
58 Sultana, F. (2014), «Gendering Climate Change: Geographical Insights», The Professional Geog-
rapher 66(3), 372–81.
59 Anwar, N.H., Sawas, A., and Mustafa, D. (2020), «Without Water, There Is No Life: Negotiating 
Everyday Risks and Gendered Insecurities in Karachi's Informal Settlements», Urban Studies    
57(6), 1320–37; Sawas, A., Anwar, N.H., and Anjum, G. (2020), «Climate Change and Security 
in Urban Pakistan: A Gender Perspective», in Gender, Climate & Security: Sustaining Inclusive 














































Nepal, to India and to Gulf countries to seek alternative income sources.60 Under 
these constrained circumstances, women have reported shouldering higher levels 
of insecurity as the sole providers for their families in ever more challenging envi-
ronments. However, as a UN Environment Programme study notes, «[d]espite the 
gender-related risks associated with climate change and security in Nepal, women 
have remained largely sidelined from decision-making processes. Barriers to inclu-
sion are especially high for female members of the Tharu ethnic minority, who 
face multiple levels of marginalization as women and members of a traditionally 
marginalized caste.»61
In Pakistan, findings from research across two provinces  – Sindh and Pun-
jab  – underscore important trends in urban areas where the impacts of climate 
change are exacerbating levels of precarity and contributing to domestic violence 
and the formation of non-state armed groups. Men and women are increasingly 
unable to live up to their prescribed gender roles, which, in some cases, is resulting 
in domestic or communal violence. For instance, damages incurred from extreme 
flooding have been found to keep men  – who are typically daily wage or contract 
workers  – at home, resulting in loss of income and preventing them from fulfilling 
their prescribed roles as breadwinners.62 Women and men have reported that the 
anxieties and frustrations associated with this lack of fulfilment of their socialised 
responsibilities could lead to domestic violence. Women have further reported that 
they continue to face increased structural oppression as a result of certain aspects 
of climate change, such as extreme water shortages. 
Many women are expected to continue to manage the household without 
problems, even with droughts affecting household water security in some of Paki-
stan's biggest cities. Women relayed experiences of tending to sick children with 
no resources and of disappointing their husbands or other men in the household. 
Women explained that they experienced physical forms of domestic violence for 
either failing to manage the existing water in the house, or for breaking norms 
around women's mobility by venturing out to secure new sources.63
Women's experiences of climate change make evident the complexities of 
power. Relational privileges and intersectional politics extend to diverse contexts. 
For instance, indigenous communities can also practice unequal and exploitative 
gender power relations.64 This has a bearing on how research and policy agendas 
can be inclusive of, and accountable to, different constituents and epistemological 
framings. Otherwise, various forms of marginality are reproduced and reinforced 
60 UNEP (2020, June 11), Gender, Climate & Security: Sustaining Inclusive Peace on the Frontlines 
of Climate Change , revised edition, available at: http://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20. 
500.11822/32638/GCS.pdf?sequence=1.
61 Ibid., p. 37.
62 Anwar, N.H., Mustafa, D., Sawas, A., and Malik, S. (2016), Gender and Violence in Urban Pakistan , 
IDRC Report (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre).
63 UNEP (2020), p. 36 (see note 60).
64 Sundberg, J. (2014), «Decolonizing Posthumanist Geographies», Cultural Geographies 21(1), 33–47; 
Sultana, F. (2020), «Embodied Intersectionalities of Urban Citizenship: Water, Infrastructure, 





















































at the community  – and especially at the institutional  – level. For instance, patri-
archy extends beyond communities and is cemented in authoritative institutional 
bodies. An assessment of government decentralisation in South Asia found that 
although affirmative action brings women in greater numbers into the local gov-
ernment machinery, their presence does not alter inequities based on gender, caste, 
class and religion. In fact, male family members have leveraged women's participa-
tion in these institutions to their advantage.65
As such, patriarchy has a pivotal impact on the degree of participation in 
designing and implementing effective climate change policy and leads to differ-
ences in levels of opportunity. This is particularly evident in the fact that, despite 
playing a major role in climate change research, most of the policy work originating 
from countries such as Bangladesh and Pakistan has been designed and initiated 
by men. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have provided a comprehensive analysis of what climate change 
and urban development do to dense and heavily congested South Asian cities. We 
have shown how ecological processes have adversely impacted impoverished city 
dwellers, including those displaced from rural areas to cities due to climatic events. 
As we proposed, issues of climate change cannot be viewed in isolation. We have 
shown how weather events relate to the expansion of building and construction in 
South Asian cities, land rights and air pollution, and also how such connected phe-
nomena relate to the electoral and immediate political contexts that shape lives, 
livelihoods and ecosystems. Our illustrations evidence how each aspect of climate 
change  – whether extreme heat, floods, erosion or air pollution  – exacerbates the 
pressures on ordinary city dwellers, denying them their right to the city and under-
mining their claims to basic and essential services such as access to water, housing 
and clean air. 
The complexities of the impacts of a changing climate cannot be understood 
without looking at how gender is articulated in urban ecology. This is especially 
evident in the plights of impoverished men, such as those who rely on construction 
work, and poor women who are disproportionately impacted and systematically 
overlooked in policymaking processes at the global and national levels. If climate 
justice is truly to be achieved, these marginalised voices must be elevated and 
brought to the forefront. Addressing climate change calls for highlighting the ex- 
periences of the most marginalised, including poor women, by including the voices 
of feminist political ecologists and policymakers.
65 Mukhopadhyay, M. (2005), «Decentralisation and Gender Equity in South Asia: An Issues 















































Health and mobility in climate 
change adaptation: The importance 
of well-being in a warming world
Introduction
The impacts of climate change will generate higher rates of human migration and 
displacement within low-income countries, as well as potentially create more 
international migration.1 This climate-related migration and mobility will have 
significant implications for population health. There are both potential health 
benefits and risks for migrants concerning their health and wellbeing, with health 
outcomes shaped by contextual factors within migration processes and conditions 
within sites of settlement. This chapter focuses on potential health outcomes of cli-
mate-related mobility. It discusses empirical case studies from different geographic 
locations with reference to different types of climate-related mobility, including 
forced displacement, migration and planned relocation. In addition, it considers 
other under-recognised dimensions, including: the health of returning mobile popu- 
lations, trapped and/or voluntarily immobile populations and people who move 
(for reasons unrelated to climate change) into sites of climate-related health risk. 
Engaging with prevalent ideas of «adaptation»  – in which migration is increas-
ingly cast as an economic solution to climate change  – the chapter argues that it is 
important to understand and address not only the livelihoods and economic expe-
riences of mobile populations, but also the health of those on the move. Human 
health and wellbeing are increasingly being shaped by the changing global climate 
via threats to food security, exposure to extreme heat and the changing geographic 
distributions of infectious diseases. Left unabated, climate change will define the 
health of current and future generations, strain health systems, and undermine 
progress towards the 17 UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and universal 
health coverage.2 As has been illustrated in stark fashion by the ongoing Covid-19 
pandemic, it is critical to respond better to the potential health impacts on migrant 
1 McLeman, R. (2019), «International Migration and Climate Adaptation in an Era of Hardening 
Borders», Nature Climate Change 9, 911–18.
2 Watts, N. et al. (2019), «The 2019 Report of The Lancet Countdown on Health and Climate 
























































populations and home/host communities in a way that conceives of wellbeing 
beyond economic calculations, and in manner that acknowledges various kinds of 
social and gendered inequality. 
This chapter calls attention to population health as a measure of adaptation 
effectiveness in contexts of climate-related mobility. It begins with the premise 
that the effectiveness of migration, as a form of adaptation to climate risk, can-
not be assessed solely through livelihood diversification, economic opportuni-
ties and remittances; it is crucial to consider the broader dimensions of people's 
lives, including their health and wellbeing. Bearing these imperatives in mind, the 
chapter underscores the need for health systems to prepare for climate-related 
mobility, thereby ensuring that mobile populations can access effective and af- 
fordable health care services.
Migration as adaptation: A cautionary note
Since the 1990s, alarmist concerns emanating from the Global North about climate 
change have centred on anxiety that changing weather patterns would induce mass 
population displacement, produce floods of so-called climate refugees and result 
in geopolitical security threats. In recent years, however, the climate-migration 
nexus has been framed in more positive terms, whereby human migration is under-
stood to offer an important form of climate change adaptation.3 In policy circles, 
governed voluntary migration is increasingly promoted as a proactive adaptation 
strategy that can reduce climate vulnerabilities among at-risk populations. 
Indeed, migration is increasingly widely positioned as a form of «adaptation» 
to climate risk.4 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines 
adaptation in human systems as «the process of adjustment to actual or expected 
climate and its effects, which seeks to moderate harm or exploit beneficial oppor-
tunities».5 Migration, according to this view, can increase adaptive capacity by 
reducing vulnerability to climate-related harms, and by allowing people to better 
respond to climatic hazards and other negative changes.6 The 2018 United Nations 
Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration7  – an international 
3 Gioli, G., Hugo, G., Máñez Costa, M., and Scheffran, J. (2016), «Human Mobility, Climate Adap-
tation, and Development», Migration and Development 5(2), 165–70.
4 Black, R. et al. (2011), «Migration As Adaptation», Nature 478, 447–49; see also Foresight 
(Migration and Global Environmental Change) (2011), Migration and Global Environmental 
Change: Future Challenges and Opportunities (London: The Government Office for Science).
5 IPCC (2014), «Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report», in Pachauri, R.K., and Meyer, L.A. 
(eds.), Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (Geneva: IPCC), 151 pp.
6 IPCC (2012), Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change 
Adaptation: A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change , edited by Field, C.B., Barros, V., Stocker, T.F., Qin, D., Dokken, D.J., Ebi, K.L., 
…Midgley, P.M. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
7 United Nations Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, UN Document 














































agreement that seeks to improve outcomes for migrants and displaced people  – 
explicitly highlights the links between climate change, migration and adaptation. 
The Global Compact calls for strategies to support climate-related migration in 
ways that respect human rights, address humanitarian needs and ensure bene-
fits to migrants, their families as well as the sending and receiving communities. 
Highlighting the need for formal channels of international labour migration to 
build adaptive capacity in low-income countries that are highly exposed to climate 
risks, the Global Compact frames mobility in terms that contrast sharply with 
the pessimism of climate security discourse, challenging its dominance within the 
policy mainstream. 
The «migration as adaptation» thesis highlights the economic opportunities 
of human mobility, and the expectation that resources and remittances will be 
invested by households and communities to build resilience to climate risk. Cer-
tainly, where migrants can access labour markets (both internationally and within 
national borders) and diversify incomes, migration can be a successful form of 
adaptation to climatic hazards. For example, drawing on research focused on rain-
fall variability across eight countries (Ghana, Tanzania, Guatemala, Peru, Bang-
ladesh, India, Thailand and Vietnam) Afifi et al. position human mobility as an 
opportunity for adaptation via livelihood diversification, whereas those who cannot 
move remain «trapped» in situ.8
However, this chapter cautions against a narrow assessment of «migration as 
adaptation», which focuses on livelihood diversification and the management of 
climate-related mobility through labour migration. Livelihood diversification is 
only one measure of adaptation. It is also important to consider the health out-
comes of mobility and migration. In Bangladesh, for example, moving to cities has 
become a common coping strategy in the face of flooding. But although people 
who move to a peri-urban area may take advantage of new livelihood and income 
opportunities, they may also be exposed to health risks via their new living and 
working conditions. People are as likely to migrate to places of environmental and 
climatic vulnerability as away from them, and they may face associated health risks 
in new sites of residence. These points are developed in greater depth below. 
Connecting climate change, human mobility and health
Since 1990, when the IPCC noted that climate change could have a significant im- 
pact on human migration, there have been many (contested) estimates and pro-
jections of the scale of climate-related mobility. There are three widely recognised 
types of mobility in which climatic factors play a pronounced role, either directly 
8 Afifi, T., Milan, A., Etzold, B., Schraven, B., Rademacher-Schulz, C., Sakdapolrak, P., …Warner, 
K. (2016), «Human Mobility in Response to Rainfall Variability: Opportunities for Migration 

























































or by amplifying other drivers of human mobility: climate-induced displacement, 
migration and planned relocation.9
There is also a large body of research that considers the connections between 
climate change and human health. Projected impacts of climate change are ex- 
pected to alter the geographic range and population burden of climate-sensitive 
disease (e.g. dengue) and contribute to heat-related illness and mortality due to 
extreme weather events, undernutrition from food insecurity and the mental 
health consequences resulting from exposure to climate risks.10 The World Health 
Organization (WHO) has estimated that between 2030 and 2050, there could be 
approximately 250,000 deaths annually due to climate change-related increases 
in heat exposure among elderly people, as well as increases in diarrheal disease, 
malaria, dengue, coastal flooding and childhood stunting. This is a conservative 
estimate.11
Despite the existence of extensive research and policy discussions around the 
consequences of climate change for human mobility and human health, the cli-
mate change-mobility-health nexus remains under-examined. Although many 
rightly point out that there will be adverse health outcomes for «climate migrants», 
efforts to understand the complex connections between mobility and health have 
been restricted to generalised remarks. 
The following sub-sections explore how different migratory responses to cli-
mate change may affect population health, with reference to different types of 
mobility, that is, forcibly displaced populations, people involved in planned re- 
location, migrants (including people who move away from, as well to, sites of cli-
matic risk), and trapped and voluntarily immobile populations. They explore the 
opportunities for and threats to the wellbeing of people on the move, as well as host 
and home communities.12
Forced displacement 
The attribution of individual extreme weather events to anthropogenic climate 
change is a complex and often problematic area.13 The public debate often refers 
to climate change as a «cause» of environmental disasters, whereas science views 
anthropogenic climate change as a «contributor» to a particular event or to trends 
in extreme events. For example, there has been an upward trend in flood events 
since 2005, with almost three times the global land area affected in 2019 compared 
9 UNFCCC (2010), Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative 
Action under the Convention , advance unedited version, draft decision -/CP.16, available at: 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf.
10 Haines, A.D., and Ebi, K. (2019), «The Imperative for Climate Action to Protect Health», New 
England Journal of Medicine 380, 263–73.
11 WHO (2014), Quantitative Risk Assessment of the Effects of Climate Change on Selected Causes 
of Death, 2030s and 2050s (Geneva: World Health Organization), available at: www.who.int/
iris/handle/10665/134014.
12 McMichael, C. et al. (2012), «An Ill Wind? Climate Change, Migration and Health», Environmen- 
tal Health Perspectives 120(5), 646–54.














































with the 1986–2005 baseline; the frequency and intensity of these extreme weather 
events , which include wildfires, floods, storms and droughts, is shifting as a result of 
climate change, with associated health consequences for those who are displaced. 
Large numbers of people are displaced annually by the impacts of environ-
mental disasters, with these numbers likely to increase over time with the impacts 
of climate change.14 The currently observable trends include elevated incidences 
and frequencies of environmental disasters, increased intensity of disaster hazards 
contributing to the destruction of built environments and habitats, and greater 
resource losses. Although most forced displacements due to environmental disas-
ters take place within countries, some people will cross international borders.15 
In either case, the populations in question are, for the most part, located in/from 
lower-income countries and regions. 
Extreme weather events tend to lead to adverse population health outcomes, 
particularly in contexts of the large-scale, forced displacement of people and 
populations. In emergencies, public health infrastructure is often limited, such 
that forcibly displaced persons are especially vulnerable. Mortality rates are high-
est in the first six months of displacement, and the provision of adequate services 
and infrastructure is critical in this «emergency phase».16 The health of displaced 
populations is determined by water and sanitation conditions, nutrition, shelter 
conditions, indoor air quality, exposure to disease vectors (e.g. mosquitoes, ro- 
dents), levels of immunity to vaccine-preventable diseases and access to health 
care services.17 
Approximately three-fourths of deaths in displacement contexts are caused by 
infectious diseases. Common infectious diseases include diarrhoeal disease, mea-
sles, acute respiratory infections, vector-borne diseases (malaria, dengue), tuber-
culosis and malaria.18 For example, flooding in Mozambique in 2000 resulted in 
large-scale forced displacement. Among displaced populations, there was a sig-
nificant increase in the incidence of diarrheal disease, with an estimated 8,000 
additional cases and 447 deaths from the disease in the months following the 
floods and a doubling in the number of malaria cases.19 Other health challenges 
14 Black, R., Nigel, W., Arnell, W., Adger, N., Thomas, D., and Geddes, A. (2012), «Migration, Im- 
mobility and Displacement Outcomes Following Extreme Events», Environmental Science and 
Policy 27(S1), S32–S43.
15 McAdam, J. (2016), «From the Nansen Initiative to the Platform on Disaster Displacement: 
Shaping International Approaches to Climate Change, Disasters and Displacement», University 
of New South Wales Law Journal 39(4), 30.
16 Shackelford, B.B. et al. (2020), «Environmental Health in Forced Displacement: A Systematic 
Scoping Review of the Emergency Phase», Science of the Total Environment 714, 136553.
17 Watson, J.M. et al. (2007), «Epidemics after Natural Disasters», Emerging Infectious Disease 13(1), 
1–5.
18 IFRC (2007), The Johns Hopkins and Red Cross and Red Crescent Public Health Guide in Emer-
gencies , (Geneva: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies).
19 Cairncross, S., and Alvarinho, M. (2006), «The Mozambique Foods of 2000: Health Impact and 
Response», in Few, R., and Matthies, F. (eds.), Flood Hazards and Health: Responding to Present 
























































in displacement contexts include the disruption of disease surveillance and health 
programmes (e.g. immunisation), food insecurity and food scarcity, and interrup-
tions in treatment regimens. Following extreme weather events, population health 
measures for forcibly displaced populations should include: surveillance systems 
for early case detection and treatment; adequate site planning; appropriate man-
agement of water and sanitation systems; adequate food supplies and storage; and 
strong vector control and vaccination programmes.20
Where violent conflict is involved, scientific literature linking climate change 
and migration is particularly scarce and contested, making it important to avoid 
assuming simple causal relations between ecological processes and political out-
comes.21 If climate change does not necessarily generate conflict, forced displace-
ment and asylum-seeking, it does likely represent a risk amplifier, particularly 
in places of political unrest and conflict. Such instability could well result from 
discontent of the population about ineffective government responses to climate 
impacts. Where such combinations of environmental and political turmoil occur, 
it could be argued that climate change indirectly contributes to forced migration, 
with all of its associated health risks, including premature death, disability, psycho-
logical trauma, physical injury and malnutrition.
Given the complexity and multiplicity of causal factors, rather than initiatives 
and mechanisms to promote migrant health that are specific to climate-related 
displacement, it remains important to strengthen existing efforts to address popu-
lation health in disaster settings. 
Planned relocation
Planned relocation is a potential response to climate change risks, whereby people 
and communities are systematically relocated away from sites of environmental 
risk or from areas that are no longer inhabitable. The terms «managed retreat», 
«planned retreat» and «managed realignment» are also used to refer to planned 
relocation. Planned relocation may be necessary where areas are exposed to increas-
ingly severe and frequent sudden-onset natural disasters (e.g. flood areas), where 
livelihoods are undermined (e.g. increasing drought) or where land becomes un- 
inhabitable (e.g. due to sea-level rise). Planned relocation is a last resort for when 
other adaptive strategies are unavailable or exhausted.22 It can occur on the 
community, household or individual level and is  – by definition  – carried out under 
the authority of the state. This mobility option has received increasing attention 
in the context of a warming world, particularly for low-lying populations affected 
by sea-level rise. 
20 Kouadio, I. et al. (2012), «Infectious Diseases Following Natural Disasters: Prevention and 
Control Measures», Expert Review of Anti-infective Therapy 10(1), 95–104.
21 Abel, G.J. et al. (2019), «Climate, Conflict and Forced Migration», Global Environmental Change 
54, 239–49.
22 Farbotko, C. et al. (2020), «Relocation Planning Must Address Voluntary Immobility», Nature 














































To date, there are few places in the world where planned climate-related re- 
location has occurred. However, there are emerging cases at different levels of 
planning and implementation, including in Fiji, the Solomon Islands and the 
United States. The health dimensions of planned relocation include mental health, 
food security, water supply, sanitation, infectious diseases, injury and health care 
access. For example, Vunidogoloa is a small, low-lying Indigenous village in Fiji that 
moved inland in 2014, within the boundaries of their customary land, in response 
to coastal flooding and erosion, saltwater intrusion and the failure of seawalls. 
The potential health benefits of the relocation include improved access to health 
services and improved sanitation. Yet, the health risks include the adverse psycho-
social impacts of disrupted place attachment, reduced access to fish and seafoods, 
and increased use of packaged and processed foods now that they are closer to a 
road.23 So, Vunidogoloa's relocation appears to have brought both health benefits 
and risks. Few assessments of these early cases of planned climate-related re- 
location directly address population health issues. Although hundreds of millions 
of people globally have been involved in development-forced displacement and 
resettlement (DFDR) projects, it is not clear that these are analogous to climate- 
related relocation. Further research is needed to understand the health opportuni-
ties and risks of planned climate-related relocation. 
What is clear is that relocating communities themselves must be central to 
decision-making processes: The right to self-determination is a key principle and 
a foundation for enabling good population health outcomes. Indeed, international, 
regional and domestic human rights frameworks, instruments and institutions 
highlight people's right to self-determination, which includes the right to decide 
where to live. Lessons from DFDR suggest that when planned relocation is un- 
avoidable, the scale of population resettlement should be minimised; planning 
should have sufficient lead time; affected communities must be directly involved; 
relocation should provide for appropriate land acquisition and sufficient financ-
ing; and there should be long-term attention to restoring and improving lives and 
livelihoods.24
Migration
People can migrate both away from and into sites of climate risk. In popular dis- 
course, policy, practice as well as research and scholarly literature, there is a 
preoccupation with so-called climate migrants who move away from sites of esca- 
23 McMichael, C. et al. (2019), «Planned Relocation and Everyday Agency in Low-lying Coastal 
Villages in Fiji», The Geographical Journal 185(3), 325–27.
24 Ferris, E. (2012), Protection and Planned Relocations in the Context of Climate Change, UNHCR, 
Legal and Protection Policy Research Services , available at: www.unhcr.org/5024d5169.pdf. See 
also Warner, K.T. et al. (2013), «Changing Climates, Moving People: Framing Migration, Dis-
placement and Planned Relocation», Policy Brief No. 8 (Bonn: United Nations University Insti-
























































lating climate risk. However, it is also important to consider the health of people 
and populations who move to sites of climate risk.25
First, in an era of widespread human mobility, people may move into areas of 
high environmental and climatic risk. For example, people could migrate to low- 
lying urban areas in mega-deltas that are affected by sea-level rise and storm 
surges (e.g. climate-vulnerable peri-urban areas in the Indian Bengal Delta),26 or 
water-insecure areas in the urban peripheries of expanding cities (e.g. urban popu-
lations are likely to double in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa by 2040, with many 
of the fastest-growing cities being located in areas of limited water availability).27 
Source:  Author's own; own chart.
Figure 1:  Migration to and from sites of climate change risk
Migration into 
a site of 
climate-related risk
Migration away from 




Consequently, although climate risks do not drive these migration flows, these 
migrants may face elevated climate-related health threats.28 Emerging research 
has documented health risks for migrants who move to sites of climate vulner- 
ability. In the Pacific Island countries, for example, people moving into urban-poor 
areas may be exposed to climate-related threats to health in sites of settlement, 
including elevated exposure to vector-borne diseases such as dengue, and inade-
quate water supply.29
The agricultural and construction sectors involve increasing numbers of 
migrant workers globally and require better management of heat-related health 
risks. For example, during the 2015 heat wave in Pakistan, which resulted in more 
25 McMichael, C. (2020), «Human Mobility, Climate Change, and Health: Unpacking the Connec-
tions», Lancet Planetary Health 4, e217–18.
26 DECCMA (2019), Climate Change, Migration and Adaptation in Deltas: Key Findings from the 
DECCMA Project (Southampton, UK: University of Southampton).
27 Kookana, R.S., Drechsel, S., Jamwal, P., and Vanderzalm, J. (2020), «Urbanisation and Emerging 
Economies: Issues and Potential Solutions for Water and Food Security», Science of the Total 
Environment 732, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.139057.
28 Foresight (2011), Migration and Global Environmental Change (see note 4)
29 Campbell, J., and Warrick, O. (2014), Climate Change and Migration Issues in the Pacific (Fiji: 














































than 1,000 deaths in Karachi, outdoor migrant workers were identified as being at 
risk of heat stroke and heat-related mortality.30 Similarly, among Nepali migrant 
workers employed in construction in Qatar (2009–2017), migrants working in high 
temperatures (greater than 31° C) experienced morbidity and mortality due to heat 
stroke and cardiovascular disease linked to extreme heat.31 So, climate change can 
amplify risks to health among migrant populations (as well as host communities). 
Second, migration can be an adaptative strategy to reduce vulnerability to 
climate change risks. Many countries and regions are preoccupied with the pos-
sibility that climate change will lead to increases in cross-border migration (and 
these are often the countries that are largely responsible for climate change), yet 
the likelihood and magnitude of such migration remains unclear.32 Most analyses 
of climate-related migration suggest that international migration to high-income 
countries will be minimal compared to mobility within climate-vulnerable coun-
tries and regions in poorer regions and countries.33 It is probable that climate- 
related migration will follow existing migration pathways, particularly internal 
migration within the borders of a country. Where climate change contributes to 
migration, health outcomes among migrating populations will be shaped signifi-
cantly by the nature, location and context of migration. Heath determinants will 
include health services in sites of transit and settlement; policy and legal contexts; 
resources and capacities of migrant populations; and living and working conditions 
in sites of settlement.
In some contexts, the health of populations that migrate away from sites of cli-
matic threats may improve as health benefits accrue  – for example, via increased 
economic and educational opportunities, better nutrition and improved access to 
health services. Studies from Senegal have found that farmers in rain-dependent 
zones move to better irrigated areas to farm during the dry season, and this mobil-
ity enables the continuity of familiar livelihoods and improved food security.34 
However, the conditions surrounding migration processes can contribute to health 
vulnerabilities. In India, drought-affected farmers who migrate to urban areas were 
found to be at increased risk of contracting HIV and other sexually transmitted 
infectious diseases.35 A study in Bangladesh found that people who are displaced 
by climate-related disaster and who move into urban slums experience adverse 
30 Dearden, L. (2015), «Pakistan Heatwave: Death Toll Tops 400 I Karachi As Morgues Overflow 
and Power Cuts Worsen Crisis», The Independent , available at: www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/asia/pakistan-heatwave-death-toll-tops-400-in-karachi-as-morgues-overflow-and-pow-
er-cuts-worsen-crisis-10339798.html.
31 Pradhan, B. et al. (2019), «Heat Stress Impacts on Cardiac Mortality in Nepali Migrant Workers 
in Qatar», Cardiology 143(1), 37–48.
32 Missirian, A., and Schlenker, W. (2017), «Asylum Applications Respond to Temperature Fluctu-
ations», Science 358, 1610–14.
33 Foresight (2011), Migration and Global Environmental Change (see note 4).
34 Zickgraf, C. (2019), «Climate Change and Migration Crisis in Africa», in Menjivar, C. et al (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Migration Crises , pp. 347–66 (New York, NY: Oxford University Press).
35 Anupama, G.V. et al (2016), Seasonal Migration and Moving Out of Poverty in Rural India. In- 
























































health outcomes associated with unhygienic and overcrowded living conditions, 
undernutrition and inadequate water and sanitation.36 So there are concerns that 
migration will lead to substantial risks to population health due to poor living con-
ditions, inadequate water and sanitation, underemployment, income instability 
and increased pressure on infrastructure. There is, as yet, no research that explicitly 
examines the health consequences for people who cross international borders and 
for which climate risks are considered a contributing driver of mobility decisions. 
Trapped populations and voluntary immobility
Despite the concern with climate-related mobility, there is growing acknowledge-
ment of the risks and realities of population immobility, meaning those who are 
unable or unwilling to migrate.37 There are many people and populations who 
remain in sites of climate risk: This includes «trapped» populations who lack the 
resources, assets and networks that enable migration away from sites of climate 
risk; it also includes voluntarily immobile populations who choose to remain in 
their homes and communities for reasons of attachment to a place and socio-cul-
tural continuity. This challenges the widely accepted narrative that, in a warming 
world, the poor and vulnerable are likely to migrate.
There is a limited amount of empirical research that has considered the health 
profiles and experiences of immobile populations. It seems likely that immobile 
populations living in sites of climate vulnerability may experience adverse health 
consequences due to changes in water and food security, disease ecology, flooding 
and saltwater intrusion, and the psychosocial impacts of disrupted livelihoods.
Notably, a recent landmark ruling highlighted the health risks experienced 
by immobile or «trapped» populations in the low-lying Pacific nation of Kiriba-
ti.38 The ruling relates to the case of Ioane Teitiota from Kiribati, who applied for 
protection in New Zealand in 2013, claiming he and his family's lives were at risk 
due to climate change impacts. Teitiota's case referred to his experience of health- 
related climate risks, including lack of fresh water due to loss of rainfall and salt- 
water contamination of freshwater lenses and aquifers, food insecurity, over- 
crowding on Tarawa and flood-risk. New Zealand courts and the UN Human Rights 
Committee rejected Teitiota's protection application on the basis that there was not 
sufficient risk to his or his family's lives at the time in question, and because Kiri-
bati has the capacity to adapt to climate threats. However, the Committee accepted 
that Teitiota and his family are being exposed to hazards related to sea-level rise, 
with associated risks to health and wellbeing. 
36 Rahaman, M.A. et al. (2018), «Health Disorder of Climate Migrants in Khulna City: An Urban 
Slum Perspective», International Migration 56(5), 42–55.
37 Foresight (2011), Migration and Global Environmental Change (see note 4).
38 OHCHR (2020), Views Adopted by the Committee under Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, 
Concerning Communication No. 2728/2016 Communication submitted by: Ioane Teitiota (rep-
















































In north-west Alaska, climate change impacts include delayed freeze-up, 
decreasing levels of sea ice, storm surges, coastal erosion and thawing permafrost. 
The majority of residents in the region are Indigenous Inupiat people. Although 
the health of Indigenous people in the region has improved in the past 50 years, 
they are vulnerable to climate change-related health threats: for example, weather- 
related injuries, respiratory infections and declines in the amounts of traditional 
foods (e.g. caribou, moose).39 The state of Alaska and federal government agen-
cies are working with some communities (e.g. Kivalina, Newtok and Shishmaref) 
to plan organised relocations, yet for now people are unable to move due to lack 
of resources, funding and broader political will. In Shishmaref, Alaska, the lack 
of political will and resources to support their relocation has been found to cause 
significant stress among residents.40 These high-profile cases draw attention to the 
residents of places that are vulnerable to climate impacts, and where people are 
exposed to climate-related health threats. Despite that, migration and relocation 
pathways  – whether national or international  – are not (yet) readily available. 
However, not all immobile populations are «trapped». People have connections 
to a place and often prefer to adjust and adapt their local socio-economic systems 
and ways of living rather than move. Indeed, some studies have highlighted the 
strong preference for in situ adaptation rather than migration. For example, a study 
of four low-lying island communities in the Philippines that experience flooding 
during normal high tides found that island residents generally prefer in situ adap-
tation strategies rather than migration and relocation to the mainland. Adaptive 
strategies include stilted housing and raised floors.41 Where people choose to 
remain in sites of climate risk, it is important to understand and address poten-
tial threats to health and wellbeing, including injury and fatalities related to severe 
weather events, food and water insecurity, changing infectious disease patterns 
and mental health consequences.42 It is also worth recognising the potential ben-
efits to psychosocial wellbeing among those who might choose to remain in sites 
of climate risk. These benefits might be generated through attachment to a place, 
continuity of culture and access to local (even if altered) food sources, including 
produce from subsistence farming and seafood (for those living in coastal areas).
39 Parkinson, A., and Evengård, B. (2015), «Climate Change and Health in the Arctic», in Butler, 
C.D. (ed.), Climate Change and Global Health , pp. 206–16 (Wallingford, UK: CABI Publishing). 
Marino, E. (2012), «The Long History of Environmental Migration: Assessing Vulnerability Con-
struction and Obstacles to Successful Relocation in Shishmaref, Alaska», Global Environmental 
Change 22, 374–81.
40 Wolsko, C., and Marino, E. (2016), «Disasters, Migrations, and the Unintended Consequences of 
Urbanization: What's the Harm in Getting Out of Harm's Way?», Population and Environment  
37(4), 411–28.
41 Laurice Jamero, M., et al. (2017), «Small-island Communities in the Philippines Prefer Local 
Measures to Relocation in Response to Sea-level Rise», Nature Climate Change 7, 581–86.


























































This chapter began by arguing that the human health consequences of climate 
change impacts and adaptive strategies are an important measure of risk and adap-
tation. As such, good population health is an important indicator of the success of 
mobility as an adaptive strategy; conversely, poor health outcomes among people 
on the move indicate an amplification of risk and adverse outcomes.43
As discussed above, human mobility that is related to climate change encom-
passes diverse scenarios. There is a spectrum of human mobility  – from forced dis- 
placement to voluntary mobility. There are clear distinctions between different 
types of climate-related mobility as well as associated risks and opportunities. 
The scale and nature of population health outcomes depend not just on the bio-
physical risks of a changing climate, but also on the sensitivity and capacity of 
people, communities and health systems to prepare for and manage population 
health risks. Indeed, there are also significant differences within different «types» 
of climate-related mobility. Access to mobility is often experienced unequally 
along lines of gender, ethnicity, race, religion, age and social class. Gender, for 
example, influences climate-related migration patterns. Gender can shape who 
migrates, who is left behind, who is able to return and rebuild their lives, as well 
as the nature of mobility experiences. Among those who move, the vulnerabilities 
and priorities of migrants vary according to gender, including due to the different 
levels of responsibility, access to information, resources, education, physical safety 
and job opportunities available to men and women. 
There are concerns that women are disproportionately burdened with risks 
and vulnerabilities in contexts of climate-related mobility.44 A small number of 
empirical studies have examined the linkages between climate change, migra-
tion and gender. Findings diverge substantially, depending on the context. A study 
conducted in rural Mexico where communities are engaged in fruit and vegetable 
processing found that altered precipitation patterns and declines in water avail- 
ability led to the out-migration of many men. This increased the workloads of 
women, as they had both family care responsibilities as well as ongoing work in 
the food processing industry.45 Yet, others posit that male out-migration related 
to climate change can increase autonomy and decision-making power for female 
members of the family.46
43 Schwerdtle et al. (2020), «Health and Migration in the Context of a Changing Climate: A Systematic 
Literature Assessment», Environmental Research Letters , https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ab 
9ece.
44 Demetriades, J., and Esplen, E. (2010), «The Gender Dimensions of Poverty and Climate 
Change Adaptation», in Mearns R., and Norton, A. (eds.), Social Dimensions of Climate Change: 
Equity and Vulnerability in a Warming World (New York, NY: The World Bank).
45 Buechler, S. (2009), «Gender, Water, and Climate Change in Sonora, Mexico: Implications for 
Policies and Programmes on Agricultural Income-generation», Gender Dev. 17, 51–66.
46 Brown, O. (2008), «Climate Change and Forced Migration: Observations, Projections and Im- 















































So, there are substantial differences and inequities in the nature of, access 
to and experience of mobility. Accordingly, health outcomes will diverge within 
mobile populations, including along lines of gender, ethnicity, age, disability and 
other characteristics. Given that the relationships between climate change, human 
mobility and health are highly varied, there is no one-size-fits-all policy response 
that will ensure the health of migrating populations. 
Nonetheless, mitigation would decrease the scale of health risks for mobile and 
trapped populations, particularly in the medium to long term. Of utmost impor-
tance is the international political will and cooperation to reduce the rate of climate 
change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Climate change science predicts a 
range of possible futures that depend on the degree of mitigation action in the face 
of a warming world. Mitigation implemented now will determine these eventuali-
ties. Ultimately, this is a choice between two pathways: «business as usual» or one 
that puts our world on a path to remain well below 2° C.47
Further, health systems have a critical contribution to make in mediating rela-
tionships between climate change, population health and mobility.48 Universal 
health coverage is a critical population health challenge, and there are widespread 
calls for migrant-sensitive health systems. In 2015 the United Nations General 
Assembly adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 SDGs. 
Embedded in the framework are goals and targets promoting action on migrant 
health. An explicit SDG target (10.7) is to facilitate orderly, safe, regular and respon-
sible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of 
planned and well-managed migration policies. In addition, SDG target 3.8 on uni-
versal health coverage calls for the establishment of reliable and accessible health 
services for all, a target that presumably encompasses migrants and mobile peo-
ple.49 Additionally, the UN Global Compacts on migration and refugees are two 
landmark agreements that ensure further commitments by international bodies 
and nations to provide high-quality health care to these population groups. 
It is not clear, however, whether these policy prescriptions adequately en- 
compass the diversity of climate-related mobility, including, for example, short- 
distance relocations in response to sea-level rise or circular rural-urban mobility 
in contexts of drought. Arguably, there is a neoliberal overtone of seeking to man-
age climate-related migration through labour migration. Such policies are oriented 
towards permanent migrants and those travelling longer distances who move from 
one location to another with the aim of settling and improving their social and 
economic status. Better consideration of the ways that health systems can respond 
to short-term, short-distance and circular forms of mobility is required. 
47 Watts, N., et al. (2019), «The 2019 Report of The Lancet Countdown on Health and Climate 
Change», The Lancet , https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(19)32596-6.
48 Ridde, V. et al. (2019), «Climate Change, Migration and Health Systems Resilience: Need for 
Interdisciplinary Research», F1000 Research 8(22).
49 Villa, S., and Raviglione, M.C. (2019), «Migrants' Health: Building Migrant-sensitive Health 



















































Climate policies and initiatives are required that allow adaptation to be done by 
rather than to people, giving them increased control over climate adaptation deci-
sions, including decisions about whether to move or remain. Significant policy 
improvements are required in many related areas that will have benefits for the 
health of mobile populations, including: climate-sensitive policies that build resil-
ience and reduce the need to migrate away from adversely affected areas; funding 
mechanisms that better and more equitably facilitate climate change adaptation; 
and expanded and improved development assistance mechanisms.50
Where there are people who are displaced or have relocated or migrated, it is 
important to support and enhance good health, regardless of the extent to which 
mobility is attributable to climate impacts. Some examples include the need to 
enhance infectious disease surveillance; improve specific vector-control measures 
(such as for dengue and malaria); adapt building codes to address rising tempera-
tures; ensure that urban planning reduces the risk of flooding; improve air quality; 
ensure effective water and sanitation; and increase awareness among health care 
workers about climate-sensitive health risks. Conducting vulnerability assessments 
and identifying adaptation options at the local levels can be the first steps in identi-
fying the challenges and opportunities for addressing climate-related health risks, 
50 Hugo, G., and Bardsley, D. (2014), «Migration and Environmental Change in Asia», in Piguet, E., 
and Laczko, F. (eds.), People on the Move in a Changing Climate: The Regional Impact of Environ- 

































Roughly a quarter of the Pantanal wetland in Brazil has burned in 














































including among mobile populations.51 Because the world will continue to warm 
for years and centuries (even millennia), flexible and responsive population health 
and adaptation approaches are needed to address evolving health risks.
Approaches are needed that enhance the capacities of society and health sys-
tems to address migrant health in general, that protect the rights of migrants, 
and that can deal with the uncertainties and complexities of human mobility in a 
warming world.52 Both migrant-inclusive and climate-resilient health systems will 
support the broader sustainable development agenda that seeks to leave no one 
behind, including populations engaged in or affected by climate-related mobility. 
This is a matter of justice  – climate justice and health justice  – given that the human 
health impacts of climate-related mobility will not be borne equally: populations 
(including mobile populations) in lower-resource settings are often the most vul-
nerable to climate risks, and yet they are the least responsible for climate change.53 
Ultimately, migration and mobility can only be considered an effective adaptive 
response to climate risk where good health is sustained, promoted and achieved. 
Pervasive climate-related threats to human health require decisive actions from 
health professionals and governments to protect the health of current and future 
generations, including the health of mobile populations and those who choose to 
remain or are trapped in sites of climate risk.
51 Haines, A.D., and Ebi, K. (2019), «The Imperative for Climate Action to Protect Health», New 
England Journal of Medicine 380, 263–73.
52 Wardekker, J. et al. (2012), «Health Risks of Climate Change: An Assessment of Uncertainties 
and Its Implications for Adaptation Policies», Environmental Health 11, 67.
53 Patrick, M., Grewal, G., Chelagat, W., and Shannon, G. (2020), «Planetary Health Justice: Femi-







































































Can migration from West Africa 
be prevented by climate-resilient 
agriculture?
LESSONS IN IM /MOBILITY FROM RURAL GAMBIA
Media and policy discourses in and beyond Europe are fraught with warnings that 
climate change will cause mass migration. More often than not, however, these 
warnings feed a self-referential narrative rather than evidence-based analysis. 
They add to a myth of invasion that, especially in the Global North, calls for tighter 
controls and further restrictions on foreign immigration.1 These discourses are 
eventually accompanied by proactive measures to manage actual or potential cli-
mate refugees and migrants before they arrive at their destinations, or even before 
they depart from their places of residence. 
Europe's current approach to migration from Africa provides a case in point. 
Europe has not only heavily restricted legal migratory channels for people from all 
African countries (except Mauritius) wishing to travel to the continent; it has also 
sought to avert unauthorised migration by going to the very roots and routes of 
flows.2 It has sought to recruit the governments in North Africa and sub-Saharan 
Africa to do the dirty work of restricting and controlling African migrants head-
ing towards Europe. In response to the so-called refugee crisis, a more ambitious 
agenda on migration from Africa has gained ground to address the «root causes» 
of unauthorised migration in countries of origin. Development and capacity-build-
ing are being pursued to reinforce «resilience» to desertification, droughts, floods, 
salinisation and other ecological factors that allegedly push Africans to venture 
through deserts and seas to reach Europe. The underlying idea is that these meas-
ures will keep people in their places of origin. 
In this contribution, I focus on The Gambia as an exemplary case of how cli-
mate change feeds into misguided approaches to migration governance. Despite 
its small size and population, The Gambia has been one of the main suppliers of 
1 Trombetta, M.J. (2014), «Linking Climate-induced Migration and Security within the EU: 
Insights from the Securitization Debate», Critical Studies on Security 2(2), 131–47; Boas, I. et al. 
(2019), «Climate Migration Myths», Nature Climate Change 9(12), 901–03.
2 Gaibazzi, P., Bellagamba, A., and Dünnwald, S. (eds.) (2017), Eurafrican Borders and Migration 















































unauthorised migrants to Europe during the so-called refugee crisis (2013–2017).3 
A growing industry of programmes being funded by the European Union (EU) is 
targeting Gambian youths as «potential irregular migrants» to change their minds 
and take advantage of local opportunities instead. Mitigating and adapting to cli-
mate change is an important objective of such programmes, particularly in con-
junction with improving a decaying agricultural sector to stem a purported rural 
exodus. 
I propose to challenge the premises of this development discourse on migration 
and climate change. In the first place, I argue that climate change and environmen-
tal degradation might induce non-migration or «permanence» as much as it might 
fuel emigration. Secondly, those framing development as a means to contain migra-
tion by keeping people in place often profoundly misunderstand how those who 
dwell in degraded environments conceive of sedentariness and mobility. I draw my 
conclusions from ethnographic research in Sabi,4 a village in Eastern Gambia that 
shares with so many rural communities in the Western Sahel a history of erratic, 
worsening ecology and a present that is dominated by agrarian decline and emi-
gration. Although Sabi farmers have adapted to the environmental degradation by 
migrating to all corners of the world, including to Europe, more have stayed on the 
land than the actual conditions of agricultural production might lead one to think. 
These are not conservative peasants who stick to their sedentary tradition. Migra-
tion is part of the agricultural economy and figures prominently in the life-cycles 
of those who stay. Migrating and staying put are intimately related phenomena. 
Just as cultivating crops in a field can be a way to sustain migrants and prepare for 
travel at a later stage, migration (e.g. through remittances) enables people to stay on 
the land and come to terms with environmental and other challenges. Understand-
ing not only the economic and ecological aspects, but also the socio-cultural rela-
tionship that binds migration and permanence leads us away from the discourse on 
development as a means of migration control and containment.5
Climate change
August 2019, Sabi village. I walk into the chief's compound with two friends, and 
I begin shaking hands and exchanging lengthy greetings with old and new ac- 
quaintances. It has been five years since I have last visited the village. We are 
offered a seat under the imposing mango tree dominating the entrance of the house. 
3 Conrad Suso, C.T. (2019), «Backway or Bust: Causes and Consequences of Gambian Irregular 
Migration», The Journal of Modern African Studies 57(1), 111–35.
4 Research for this article was supported by: MEBAO (Ethnological Mission in Benin and West 
Africa); University of Milano-Bicocca; Germany's Federal Ministry for Education and Research 
(funding code 01UG0713); and collaboration (2019) with ActionAid Italy on return migration 
and repatriation programmes to the Gambia. The author is responsible for the content of this 
publication.
5 Landau, L.B. (2019), «A Chronotope of Containment Development: Europe's Migrant Crisis 





































































«It's hot, eh?» Sherif smiles as I wipe sweat from my brow. It is indeed an un- 
usually hot day for the time of year. It is the height of the rainy season, when fre-
quent showers and light rains should keep the air cool. The last rains fell almost 
three weeks ago. «These days the rain is no longer falling normally. If it goes on 
like this,» Sherif warns, «this year's farming is spoiled!» In Sherif's family field, 
the stalks of millet would normally reach hip level; today, they are barely knee high. 
In his wife's field, groundnuts are still fine, but the fear is that the hot sun might 
dry up the soil and burn the germinating plants. Another man sitting together with 
Sherif on the platform reports that, in his fields, crops are beginning to wilt. And 
that's not the worst: The seeds of his neighbour, who planted late, have not even 
managed to sprout and pierce the soil baked by the scorching sun.
Gambian farmers have historically grappled with erratic weather conditions.6 
Mini-droughts in the rainy season have become recurrent since the end of the 
1960s, when major droughts hit the Sahel.7 Yet, rainfalls have on average become 
less abundant and more irregular in what is largely rainfed agriculture in this 
part of the country. Farmers in the lower valley closer to the Gambia River rely on 
swampland and cultivate paddy rice, but they have in turn been coping with the 
intrusion of sea water in the Gambia River and are hit by recurrent flooding. 
As Sherif and others clearly pointed out, Gambians are poignantly aware of 
climate change  – or «weather change»  – and its impact on agriculture. The Upper 
River region, where Sabi is located, has a glorious agricultural past. It had been 
known as one of the main exporting regions of the so-called Peanut Basin. House-
holds such as Musa's and small estates rather than large plantations were behind 
this relative economic success.8 From the late 1960s onwards, just as the newly 
independent Gambia (1965) was savouring the possibility of thriving on an expand-
ing commercial agricultural sector, the climate conditions of cultivation became 
challenging. If the 1970s and 1980s witnessed agricultural experimentation  – with 
farmers adopting new technologies, methods and commercial crops such as cotton 
and horticulture  – the general trend in The Gambia since then has been to grad-
ually reduce involvement in commercial production in favour of subsistence agri-
culture.9 The millets Musa planted were a way to adapt to the more unpredictable 
and less abundant rainfalls in recent years. 
Climate is one of several interrelated factors of environmental and agrarian 
decline over the past half century. Ongoing since the mid to late 19th century, the 
expansion of the agricultural frontier along the Gambia River valley has damaged 
6 Swindell, K., and Jeng, A. (2006), Migrants, Credit and Climate: The Gambian Groundnut Trade, 
1834–1934 (Leiden and Boston: Brill).
7 Webb Jr., J.L.A. (1992), «Ecological and Economic Change Along the Middle Reaches of the 
Gambia River, 1945–1985», African Affairs 91(365), 543–65.
8 Ibid.
9 Gajigo, O., and Saine, A. (2011), «The Effects of Government Policies on Cereal Consumption 
Pattern Change in the Gambia», Review of African Political Economy 38(130), 517–36; Loum, A., 
and Fogarassy, C. (2015), «The Effects of Climate Change on Cereals Yield of Production and 














































the ecology through deforestation, soil erosion and reduced fallow periods, among 
other factors. Although attempts were made to mitigate and adapt to the degrading 
environment, economic and political factors have created further obstacles. In the 
1980s, international donors demanded structural adjustments. As was the case in 
many other countries in the Global South, neoliberal reforms aimed to roll back 
the purportedly inefficient, overgrown public sector and make room for the free 
market. As a consequence, Gambian farmers received less support from the state 
to buy fertilisers and seeds, but they were now competing in a supposedly global 
free market (in which their competition included heavily subsidised agriculture, 
above all US peanut farmers10). The reorganisation and privatisation of parastatal 
companies tasked with collecting peanuts and other produce has been a constant 
source of frustration and uncertainty for Gambians. Next to the weather, a common 
topic of conversation among Sabi farmers in the summer of 2019 was the welcome 
decision by the government to subsidise fertiliser, even if its distribution occurred 
late and was allegedly marred by embezzlement. Although agriculture employs 
around 60 per cent of the population, unsuccessful agrarian policy and bias favour-
ing urban development have led many Gambians living in the countryside to feel 
abandoned.
Migration
Few households in Sabi subsist on agriculture alone. To make up for the meagre 
yields, Sabinko have increasingly relied on off-farm activities. Chief among these 
is intensifying migration to urban areas along the Atlantic coast and abroad. I say 
«intensify» because migration is a long-standing phenomenon in this region, par-
ticularly in Soninke-speaking villages such as Sabi in the stretch from the Upper 
Guinea Coast to the Sahel-Sahara frontier.11 Sabi has expatriate communities in 
almost every continent. Whereas women are mobile, men have dominated eco-
nomic migration. Historically, men have travelled for work or trade during the dry 
months that followed the agricultural season; spending several seasons away from 
home has been common. Seasonal labour migration to the cities, which remains 
an important phenomenon today, has built on the networks and patterns forged by 
these movements. Similarly, recent trends of intra- and inter-continental migration 
have grown out of existing practices.12 Parallel to these seasonal and international 
migrations are flows to West and Central Africa triggered by a boom in commer-
cial opportunities during the mid-1950s. Since then, migration has become deeply 
entrenched in rural livelihoods, with flows to European and North American 
labour markets progressively segmented from regional pathways of mobility.
10 Sallah, T.M. (1990), «Economics and Politics in the Gambia», Journal of Modern African Studies 
28(4), 621–48.
11 Manchuelle, F. (1997), Willing Migrants: Soninke Labor Diasporas, 1848–1960 (Athens and 
London: Ohio University Press and James Currey).
12 Gaibazzi, P. (2015), Bush Bound: Young Men and Rural Permanence in Migrant West Africa 





































































By the 1980s, all socio-economic and ethnic groups of Gambian society were 
engaged in migration, as has occurred in the rest of West Africa. With youth unem-
ployment rampant in the aforementioned wider context of economic and ecolog-
ical decline, having one or more householders working or trading abroad became 
a common strategy to offset uncertain household budgets. The worsening political 
situation during Yahya Jammeh's authoritarian rule between 1994 and 2016 has 
further contributed to the outflow of critics and ordinary citizens deprived of civil 
liberties.13 Europe and North America have been preferred destinations for stu-
dents, workers and refugees, but Africa, the Middle East and Asia remain popular 
among Gambian entrepreneurs and students (particularly those choosing an 
Islamic education). 
As in so many other West African communities, young men in Sabi grow up in 
a milieu in which friends and relatives are dispersed around the world. Their pres-
ence is nonetheless visible in the food supplies they buy, the houses they build, the 
school fees and medical bills they pay, the goods and money they send home, the 
development projects they finance collectively through hometown associations in 
the diaspora, and so on. It has thus become normal that young men cultivate the 
idea that they too must migrate in order to ensure the survival and prosperity of 
their families, and thus qualify as mature, responsible sons and breadwinners.14 
Once away from home, they will earn money to pay bride wealth and marry, to 
raise children, and eventually build houses and buy property in the city. In addition 
to money, travelling means visiting new places and exploring foreign cultures, and 
returning with experience and knowledge. In sum, travelling is an integral part of 
the life course of men, and an avenue through which they can attain and perform 
respectable forms of masculinity. In Sabi, women also migrate, often after their 
husbands send for them. Across the country and the region, there has been none-
theless a growing feminisation of migration flows involving unmarried women.15
Although migration from The Gambia is highly diversified in modalities and 
geographical destinations, the so-called backway has recently hijacked public 
and policy discourse on migration. A popular name for unauthorised migration to 
Europe via North Africa and the Mediterranean, the backway has effectively become 
a significant phenomenon. Between 2013 and 2017, arrivals from The Gambia in 
Italy via Libya increased fivefold, which has made international headlines. Aside 
from the media, the backway has been a concern for families and communities, 
many of which have lost members along the route. By 2019, the backway seemed 
to have faded. Yahya Jammeh's defeat through democratic elections in December 
2016, and his departure into exile in January 2017 after having caused a political 
stalemate, has galvanised the citizenry's hopes and seems to have reduced pressure 
13 Hultin, N. et al. (2017), «Autocracy, Migration, and the Gambia's ‹Unprecedented› 2016 Elec-
tion», African Affairs 116(463), 321–40.
14 Timera, M. (2001), «Les Migrations Des Jeunes Saheliens: Affirmation De Soi Et Emancipation», 
Autrepart 18, 37–49.
15 See, for example, Rosander, E.E. (2015), In Pursuit of Paradise: Senegalese Women, Muridism 














































on people to leave the country.16 Another factor has been disruptions along the 
route that was created more or less directly by Europe's pressure on governments 
in Libya and Niger to stop migrants.17 The dangers of the route have been broad-
cast by the thousands of Gambians who have returned empty-handed from transit 
countries in recent years. Between mid-2017 and mid-2019, more than 4,000 were 
brought back by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) alone through 
a scheme financed by the EU.18 Upon return, they would be channelled to one of 
the many programmes addressing the plight of disenfranchised youths at risk of 
leaving for the backway. Such programmes have increasingly targeted youths from 
impoverished and environmentally degraded rural areas, and eventually reached 
peripheral communities such as Sabi. 
Stemming the rural exodus through climate-resilient agriculture
Rather than the weather and agriculture, I have come to see Sherif to talk about 
migration. But there is no need to change the topic of conversation, as migration 
is directly related to what we have been discussing so far. «This backway problem, 
you know, is all due to hardship,» says Sherif. «If you cannot feed yourself and your 
family, what will you do?» The question is rhetorical; the answer obvious. 
Sherif is brother and proxy to the chief, and he oversees the administration of 
the village.19 I ask him to tell me about recent programmes that are supposed to 
address the hardships he refers to. Less than two months ago, he says, a meeting 
was held in Sabi upon request of representatives of the Youth Centre and the newly 
created Migration Information Centre in Basse Santa Su, the regional capital. Rep-
resentatives of the two institutions brought information about current initiatives 
to counter the backway and discuss future collaborations with the villagers on this 
subject. I gather from Sherif that this entails mobilising village youths to organise 
and participate in events that raise awareness about the dangers of the backway 
and redress distorted images of Eldorado Europe. But it also means supporting and 
recruiting for training programmes to teach youths professional skills and increase 
their employability, and eventually to create their own businesses thanks to other 
schemes providing small grants and micro-credit lines for starting up an enterprise.
These schemes constitute the core of a large project called «Building a future  – 
Make it in The Gambia», which began at around the time of the meeting in Sabi. 
Endowed with €23 million, it is the main project financed through the Emergency 
16 However, in 2019 dissatisfaction with the transitional government was rampant again.
17 Raineri, L. (2018), «Human Smuggling across Niger: State-sponsored Protection Rackets and 
Contradictory Security Imperatives», The Journal of Modern African Studies 56(1), 63–86.
18 Action Aid (2019), Willing to Go Back Home or Forced to Return? The Centrality of Repatriation 
in the Migration Agenda and the Challenges Faced by the Returnees in the Gambia (Milan: Action 
Aid Italy), available at: www.actionaid.it/app/uploads/2019/12/Rimpatri-e-Gambia_ENG2.pdf 
(accessed 10 April 2020); Zanker, F., and Altrogge, J. (2019), «The Political Influence of Return: 
From Diaspora to Libyan Transit Returnees», International Migration 57(4), 167–80.





































































Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), which was launched in 2015 at the EU-Africa Summit 
in Valletta, Malta, in the heat of the 2015 «refugee crisis». The EUTF has become 
a major tool to addressing the «root causes» of irregular migration from Africa 
to Europe. The EUTF funds two other projects in The Gambia. One is the Youth 
Empowerment Project, which has effectively been integrated into the «Build-
ing a future» project to focus on socio-economic opportunities and resilience. 
The other is the previously mentioned EU-IOM partnership pertaining to repatri-
ation, which has a broader goal of strengthening migration management.20 This 
latter aspect included the creation of three Migration Information Centres in The 
Gambia in collaboration with the National Youth Council, which is the govern- 
mental body that runs youth centres in Basse and other cities throughout The 
Gambia. The meeting in Sabi was the result of this development. I would later 
learn from one of the officers that Sabi was selected as one of the 10 villages in the 
Upper River to run pilot projects on community-based migration management. In 
addition to mobilising Sabi authorities and youths to become involved in existing 
programmes for individuals, this would ideally promote socio-economic develop-
ment and resilience at the community level. 
Sherif welcomes the idea of Sabi youths learning a profession, but he also wishes 
for greater support for agriculture. For him, Sabi farmers need better tools and 
fertilisers to cope with an impoverished soil as well as irrigation to offset erratic 
rains. He reckons that «if young people can see that they get something out of 
farming, they will automatically focus their minds on it.» 
Agriculture and climate change feature centrally in EUTF projects in The Gam-
bia. Climate change is a «cross-cutting issue», and it is identified as a main driver 
of migration. Accordingly, «climate change mitigation» and «resilience to climate 
change» are identified as «Important Objectives» within the markers system of 
the Rio Conventions. Climate change is enveloped into a broader plan to boost 
agri-business value chains, which should achieve «increased employment of youth 
and the most vulnerable with an emphasis on the green and climate-resilient econo- 
my».21 This would include the use of renewable energies, climate-resistant crops, 
sustainable production techniques and irrigation schemes. 
If on the surface it appears that the development solutions embedded in 
Europe's externalised migration management in Africa are on target, there are rea-
sons to doubt the rhetoric, objectives and outcomes.22 What I want to highlight 
here is that, behind an apparent convergence between local and transnational 
governance on causes and solutions of «irregular migration» to Europe, there is a 
fundamentally divergent understanding among actors of how youth, migration and 
agriculture relate.
20 Interview with Mohamed Ceesay, Basse Youth Centre, 22 August 2019.
21 EU Trust Fund (2018), «Action Document for ‹Building a future  – Make it in The Gambia›».
22 For a critique from within the development sector, see CONCORD and CINI (2018), Part-
nership or Conditionality? Monitoring the Migration Compacts and EU Trust Fund for Africa 
(Brussels: CONCORD).



























































Agrarian pedagogy vs the culture of migration?
Almost thirty years ago, Lisa Malkki found a «sedentarist metaphysics» in policy, 
public and social scientific discourse, especially on refugees and migrants.23 This 
means that people are thought to be naturally rooted in a place and that movement 
is abnormal, a disruption of their settled lives. Today, international migration gov-
ernance partly accepts migration as a normal condition and a positive resource. 
In The Gambia, the policy discourse values diaspora engagement and the circula-
tion of highly skilled migrants. In contrast, the approach to «irregular migration», 
which is mainly concerned with lower-skilled youths, is largely driven by a seden-
tarist bias.24 It typically sees climate change and other factors as disrupting peo-
ple's local livelihoods, forcing them to move. Development would then keep them 
in their place.25
Yet, mobility has been a normal and routine activity for Sabi men. Undoubt-
edly, times of crisis exacerbate migration. Sherif views hardship and environmental 
challenges as push factors. For him, local employment and agrarian development 
would encourage Sabi youths to stay on the land. His views are widely shared in 
the village, also by many youths wishing to migrate. But in Sabi, migration is not 
necessarily the result of crisis. Let us recall that migration from the Upper River to 
other West African destinations boomed in the 1950s at a time of relative agricul-
tural prosperity. Significantly, Sherif does not say that development will fix people 
in a place. He says that they will focus their minds on agricultural opportunities, 
and away from the hazardous backway  – an option that is in any case considered 
too risky by most youths in the village. This does not remove other migratory paths. 
A return migrant himself, Sherif has several sons abroad who take good care of his 
family.
Migration governance not only struggles to accept the normality of migration 
in places such as Sabi, but also seeks to actively contrast it and inculcate norma-
tive sedentariness. The project «Building a future  – Make it in The Gambia» was 
launched through a campaign that promoted the concept of «tekki fii» («make it 
here» in the Wolof language). The concept was popularised through a country-wide 
campaign of music, song and videos featuring entrepreneurs who «made it» in The 
Gambia and the surrounding region. The scope of the campaign went beyond pub-
licising economic opportunities. It targeted attitudes and orientations in a context 
in which migration is perceived to be the prime model of success and the default 
aspiration of Gambian youths. That Gambian and other West African youths put 
their lives at risk in order to reach Europe is attributed not solely to poverty but 
also to a «culture of migration» that is fed by misrepresentations and peer or family 
23 Malkki, L.H. (1992), «National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of 
National Identity among Scholars and Refugees», Cultural Anthropology 7(1), 24–44.
24 Zanker, F., and Altrogge, J. (2019), «The Political Influence of Return: From Diaspora to Libyan 
Transit Returnees», International Migration 57(4), 167–80.
25 Bakewell, O. (2008), «‹Keeping Them in Their Place›: The Ambivalent Relationship between 





































































pressures to leave. In the media, the illusion of Eldorado Europe is leitmotiv. So is 
the role of migrants in silencing the hardships encountered on the route to  – and 
within  – Europe as well as the circulating success narratives. The excesses of this 
culture of migration, the discourse goes, must therefore be curtailed through 
information and sensitisation campaigns on the realities of backway migration. 
This is where agriculture becomes important  – not simply as a form of employ-
ment, but also as a pedagogical tool to instil a culture of sedentariness. Current 
initiatives are in continuity with an older discourse on agrarian development in 
The Gambia. In the early 2000s, the Gambian government insisted that Gambians 
should return to agriculture. A number of campaigns were created, such as «Back 
to the Land» and «Operation Feed Yourself», which envisioned agricultural mod-
ernisation and the creation of exemplary farms able to attract alienated youth back 
to the rural areas. Yahya Jammeh, then president, liked to portray himself as an 
entrepreneurial farmer who lived by the motto «grow what you eat and eat what you 
grow» on his vast agricultural estates. The initiatives and rhetoric around a return 
to the land soon became wedded to an anti-migration stance. Engaging agriculture 
would help reverse uncontrolled urbanisation, and especially counter migration 
to Europe. This attracted the attention of European policymakers searching for 
African partners to stop emigration to Europe. In 2012, «Operation No Back Way»  – 
the governmental campaign against irregular migration  – received funds from the 
EU via the Gambia Emergency Agricultural Production Project. For the Gambian 
government, it was not only a matter of creating jobs and opportunities, but also of 
transforming what public discourse depicted as lazy, deviant youths daydreaming 
of Europe into hardworking and morally upright farmers earning their bread by 
the sweat of their brow. As noted, the reality of so many Gambian youths affected 
by unemployment, rural decline and political oppression was, and still is, quite 
different.
Elements of this agrarian pedagogy, as I will show, resonate with popular views 
in The Gambia. Yet, I would like to challenge the very premises of past and present 
discourses on migration and agriculture that envision agrarian life as a solution 
and corrective to a culture of migration, which threatens to not only empty the 
countryside, but also wipe out a generation of young men and women venturing 
through deserts and seas in pursuit of their European dreams. My critique targets 
the received view that migration means neglecting agriculture, and that investing 
in agriculture re-roots youths and mitigates their migratory aspirations. 
The agri-culture of migration
Rather than a culture of migration, Sabi villagers have an agri-culture of migration. 
The etymology of the Latin word cultura is linked to agri-culture. I am aware of 
the risks that this etymology entails, in that it may reproduce what Malkki termed 
an «arborescent culture», which ties culture to territory, and identity to roots.26 














































This is not my intention. To the contrary, I want to show that sedentary and mi- 
gratory activities are combined in ways that are not necessarily intuitive and go 
against the canonical dichotomy between agriculture and migration, immobility 
and mobility. 
I first met Demba27 in late 2006. It was the dry season, farming was over and 
there was barely any work to do in the village. Demba was then in his mid-twenties, 
wore nice clothes and was a popular «ghetto» leader. He gathered around him a 
number of young men, treating them to cigarettes, music and green tea late into the 
night. The year 2006 was the peak of boat migration to the Canary Islands, includ-
ing from the Gambian coast. It was a turning point in Europe's attempt to curb un- 
authorised migration from Africa directly on sub-Saharan African soil, and it laid 
the foundation for the initiatives I have described so far.28 It was also the high 
point of Jammeh's anti-migration rhetoric. Observing Demba and his friends at 
this time of the year, one was tempted to view them in stereotypical terms as lazy 
boys wasting away, jobless, in «ghettos», shunning farming and daydreaming of 
Europe. Demba and virtually every other young man in his gathering wanted to 
leave for greener pastures abroad. Even though none of them wanted to board a 
boat to the Canary Islands, Europe and North America topped their lists of desir- 
able destinations. 
But the stereotype proved to be inaccurate upon closer observation. Demba 
had been busy farming the past rainy season, as he had done since childhood. 
Like many men of his generation, he grew up as a farmer and then as a Quranic 
student. He liked to recount the hardships of his childhood when he was studying 
and working at the Quranic master's compound, where he would do hard work in 
the fields, fetching firewood, a little food, sometimes sleeping on mats, all of which 
was subjected to the whims of bullish seniors: «Eh, my friend, we suffered. But it's 
good. Now that my body has become stronger [Soninke: kendo ], I am fit for hus-
tling. I can go and find money. I can work hard, I fear no job.» After that, Demba 
farmed in the rainy season (June–November) and hustled  – that is, finding money 
through work and business  – in the urban areas of the Atlantic coast of The Gam- 
bia in the dry season (December–May). When I met him in 2006, he had just 
returned from the city for a visit. 
Rather than seeing incompatibility between farming and migrating, Demba 
clearly sees agrarian life and work as what prepared him to go and hustle away 
from his village. In contrast to the public discourse on migration, young men like 
him do not expect to find an easy life and easy money abroad. Those focussing on 
Europe know that they will have to endure long hours in menial occupations, face 
discrimination and lead frugal lives. How do they prepare for this? By farming.29 
27 A pseudonym.
28 Andersson, R. (2014), Illegality, Inc.: Clandestine Migration and the Business of Bordering 
Europe (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press).
29 In Sabi, formal education, both secular and religious, has been growing steadily since the 
1990s. Although this partly competes with this agrarian pedagogy, many families in Sabi send 





































































In addition to training the body to do hard work, farming means replenishing 
the granaries of the household, which teaches boys the value of ensuring family 
survival in a collective manner. Once abroad, they will continue to fill the gra-
nary by sending money for bags of rice and other staples. In farms, households or 
Quranic schools, boys gain experiential knowledge of rural hardship, which is said 
to prepare them to cope with crowded rooms, live simple lives and endure sacri-
fices. Knowing hardship at home will further remind them of those they have left 
behind and to do all they can to help.
Certainly, few young men want to remain farmers for the rest of their lives. Even 
if agriculture remains an important activity, one might still find a strong migra-
tion culture luring young men away from farms. Migrating abroad means money 
and experience as well as the possibility of becoming a breadwinner, marrying and 
making a name for oneself. In 2008, Demba was finally able to convince his elder 
brother to sponsor his migration to Angola, where he promptly began hustling as 
a petty trader while navigating the tough migrant life there.30 Yet, agriculture and 
rural life was again to become important when he came back in 2013. He simply 
meant to visit the family and return to Angola, but he was delayed by financial 
problems. Meanwhile, his mother was ailing and the household head had passed 
away. Several other men in the household had migrated and were unable to replace 
him. In the household, there were mostly the wives and children of these migrants. 
Somebody had to stay and take care of the family, tend to the fields and teach the 
children how to farm. Since then Demba has remained in Sabi, farming and doing 
business in the village and administering the remittances sent by members of his 
household who have migrated. His work in the household is more precarious and 
less noted than that of his brothers abroad. It is nevertheless a crucial element of 
the economy and morality of migrant households. He stays put not simply because 
he failed to re-emigrate or prefers a peasant way of life. Rather, his farm work, care 
work within the family and management of the household enable other men to be 
away on a quest for money. The latter, in turn, support his being in the household 
by sending money and commending his role.
Conclusion
In policy and public discourse, agriculture is often depicted as the bedrock of a 
sedentary life and value system, which climate change  – among other human-
made calamities  – disrupts, leading to emigration. In this view, Sahelian countries 
like The Gambia that are affected by fragile ecologies, rural poverty and rising 
emigration rates seem to be omens of the masses of migrants leaving Africa for 
better shores. Europe handles this as a security problem, marrying a discourse 
on climate change to one about controlling migration at the source. The proposed 
30 See Gaibazzi, P. (2018), «West African Strangers and the Politics of Inhumanity in Angola», 














































solution is to develop agricultural sectors that are resilient to climate and sustain-
able so that Africans will stay at home. 
Although this greening of Europe's containment approach to development 
and migration can be criticised at different levels, I have relied on evidence from 
Eastern Gambia to question the false premises of this discourse. In the first place, 
the assumption that environmental degradation spurs migration is not granted. 
A growing body of scholarship shows that climate-related challenges may cause 
immobility.31 It may further impoverish and enclave people, preventing them from 
gathering the necessary resources to go anywhere. As other contributions in this 
collection show, environmental events refract political and economic inequalities 
that dispossess people of the means to adapt to challenging situations, including by 
moving. In this contribution, I have also highlighted the socio-cultural aspects of 
what we might provocatively call «environmental permanence» as a counterpoint 
to the concept of «environmental migration». Notwithstanding the growing sig-
nificance of ecological degradation and emigration along The Gambia, villagers in 
Sabi stick to the land as a resource that creates not just food to eat, but also sociality 
and values, thereby ensuring the future of their agrarian communities. 
Secondly, staying on the land is by no means in opposition to migration. On 
the contrary, there exists in Sabi an agri-culture of migration: a synergy between 
agriculture and migration as well as sedentary and mobile lifestyles. Agriculture 
does not merely feature as a residual or resilient element neglected by youth, but as 
an integral component of their mobility. In the fields, boys learn skills and virtues 
that they then employ as labourers and traders abroad. Those who do not migrate 
or are required to stay do not shun farming either. Migrants depend on their pres-
ence at home, their work in the fields, their care for other households and their 
help with a number of errands and investments. 
There are certainly frictions between mobile and immobile lifestyles. Young 
men aspire to become migrants, not farmers. Migrants acquire wealth and travel 
the world; their efforts are celebrated back home. Toiling in family fields for a mea-
gre yield does not quite bring the same status and knowledge; erratic weather, 
among other uncertainties, might reduce their efforts to zero. Poverty, frustration 
and despair in Sabi and elsewhere in rural West Africa are real enough to make 
young people leave the land and even embark on the backway. 
On the other hand, we should avoid making too close an association between 
rural decline, cultures of migration and unauthorised migration to Europe. Sabi is 
by no means a ghost village that all the able men have left. Villagers have felt the 
backway as a poignant problem and mourned the loss of a handful of their fellow 
villagers on the route. Yet, there is no alarmism in this village, which has endured 
so many seasons of migration  – and continues to do so. Although some leave, some 
always stay and/or return.
31 Zickgraf, C. (2018), «Immobility», in McLeman, R., and Gemenne, F. (eds.), Routledge Handbook 
of Environmental Displacement and Migration (Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge).
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Finally, in this context, pushing for a sedentarist reform of West African youth 
might do more harm than good. Even where it is well-designed and not merely an 
embellishment of repressive measures of migration control, using development 
to emplace would-be migrants often misunderstands the local logics of migration 
management. The people of Sabi welcome rural development that brings job oppor-
tunities for local youths  – development that might improve local livelihoods and 
enable the disenfranchised to stay with dignity. Yet, so far, what has enabled them 
to stay put has been migration, actually, rather than the state, non-governmen-
tal or other development organisations. Migrants' economic, social and cultural 
investment has given purpose and sustenance to sedentary men, despite the vari-
ous imbalances between migrants and non-migrants. Impossible visa conditions, 
perilous routes, suspended lives in camps and the bureaucratic entanglements of 
asylum and migration in Europe and elsewhere delay migrants and hamper their 
ability to remit and invest back home, thereby preventing them from forging per-
manence. In other words, further restrictions and deterrence measures against 
migration from Africa  – even if combined with the carrot of rural development  – 


















































































































ANA NAOMI DE SOUSA
«What makes us resist is the  
 land itself» 
AN INTERVIEW WITH ERILEIDE DOMINGUES, BRAZIL 
Erileide Domingues, 29, is a Guarani-Kaiowá spokesperson who lives in the village 
of Guyraroká on a piece of land that has been retomada [«taken back», referring 
to land that has been occupied as part of land struggles] by the Indigenous 
Guarani-Kaiowá people. Guyraroká is located in the western Brazilian border 
state of Mato Grosso do Sul. The Guarani-Kaiowá people are natives of Brazil, 
Paraguay and Argentina. 
In Brazil, the Guarani-Kaiowá people were first displaced from their lands 
and enslaved by colonial invaders who arrived in the 16th century. Over time, 
much of that land was deforested and used for cattle grazing or farmed intensively. 
During the military dictatorship of 1964–1985, the Guarani-Kaiowá were among 
the Indigenous people forced onto reservations. Since the end of the dictatorship, 
many Guarani-Kaiowá have ended up working on the sugarcane plantations that 
cover the state, while many others live on small tracts of roadside land where they 
await legal decisions on the possible reattribution of their traditional lands. There 
has been an epidemic of suicides among young Guarani-Kaiowá men living in 
this limbo. 
Over the past three decades, the Guarani-Kaiowá people in Brazil have inten-
sified their struggle to take back their ancestral lands through a combination of 
territorial occupations and court petitions for demarcations. This struggle has led 
to hundreds of deaths of Indigenous people, often at the hands of armed farmers 
and their militias. More than 40 per cent of the Guarani-Kaiowá people in Brazil 
suffer from malnutrition, and there have been dozens of reported cases of mass 
poisonings from the aggressive use of agricultural chemicals. 
Meanwhile, the election of Jair Bolsonaro in 2018 has resulted in the dramatic 
defunding and dismantling of State Indigenous institutions (including FUNAI, the 
National Indian Foundation, an official State institution in Brazil) and, at the same 
time, the emboldening of the agricultural lobby, known in Brazil as the Bancada 
Ruralista.1
1 The Bancada Ruralista is Brazil's agricultural lobby, associated with the political right-wing and 
























































Ana: To begin with, can you tell me a little about the community you are from and 
its history? And about your history in relation to the land you're currently occupying? 
Erileide: I have been involved in this struggle since I was eight years old, alongside 
my grandfather. He's very old now but he's still active  – we Indigenous people can't 
stay still, even when we're ill we have to keep working! 
I will tell you in my grandfather's words, what he says about how the Guarani- 
Kaiowá people lost their territories: It's been more than 100 years since people were 
pushed out of Guyraroká. Many were killed when the [Portuguese] colonels and 
generals arrived and lied to the Indigenous people  – by telling them that they had 
purchased the land, and that because it had been purchased, they were obliged to 
leave. Having been expelled, many died; some fled and some tried to stay around 
here and eventually went looking for other reserves. Those who stayed ended up 
becoming a pião [serf, or casual  – usually landless  – farm labourer] working in 
exchange for food, and surviving like that.
What led to the retomada of the Guyraroká traditional lands more recently was 
the same reason that the Guarani-Kaiowá have taken back many other lands: The 
[reservation] the government had allocated to us, where they had penned us in, 
was overcrowded  – they had made a pigsty for us Indigenous people, basically. We 
Indigenous people need to have our space, we need the forest, we need expanses of 
land  – and when we feel like we're in a cage, in a pigsty, penned in on all sides, we 
can't have our freedom: freedom to cultivate and plant, hunt, and that's hard. For 
years our parentes [referring to another Indigenous person] were just going round 
and round inside that pigsty. When they went beyond its boundaries, they were 
chased, shot at, killed, women were raped  – many things happened, and there was 
no peace for us. So in 1999 my grandfather brought together 600 people who had 
been kicked off our land and they decided to return here, to take back the land. 
I'm saying «they» because at the time I was only 8 years old, and I didn't fully 
understand what was going on. 
So, from 1999 on, they persevered with their attempt to re-occupy the land  – 
they were kicked off three more times, under the landowner Zé Teixeira, the federal 
congressman for Mato Grosso do Sul. A lot of people were injured and much blood 
was spilled so that we could be here today, 20 years on. It's a source of great anger 
for the landowners around here that we have stayed. Many of our parentes have 
died in Guyraroká, but we have persevered. We hope to gain back 11,401 hectares 
in total, including the 55 hectares that this village, Guyraroká, lies on  – if we can 
win the demarcation case. Last year, my grandfather celebrated his 100th birthday 
in Brasília, right opposite the presidential palace. The petition had been recognised 
initially, but then Judge Gilmar Mendes annulled it. He said the territory is not 
recognised as traditional lands, so everything has ground to a halt at the Supreme 
Court. But still, we have stayed here in this struggle for our lands. It's my grand-















































Ana: So when did you become involved as an activist yourself? 
Erileide: The Guarani-Kaiowá people are treated as children until they reach ado-
lescence, and then they are taught about the situation and gradually move further 
towards the frontline of the struggle. In my case, that began when I was 12 years 
old. At that age, we're not aware of everything, but by being there we bear witness 
to events, we see what happens, we see people being targeted with weapons, people 
being shot, and so on. 
When I was 8 years old, I heard they were going to re-occupy the land that had 
always been theirs. As a child you don't get involved much  – but I would always 
hear my grandfather and grandmother and the other elders saying that «the land 
cries out for its keepers». Then, when I was 12, I started to take part alongside them. 
As a teenager it was good, yet at the same time it was… frightening, to see weapons 
being pointed at your family, for example  – you start to experience a more adult 
reality. And you see how difficult it really is to take back the land. We would receive 
verbal and physical threats, and we were often shot at with rubber bullets. And 
those experiences are not easy to get over. My late uncle who was a leader here was 
killed, shot in front of his people by a gunman like a wild animal. It is very sadden-
ing, but over time this has become easier to deal with. 
So, until I was 16 I still wasn't deeply involved  – what I was doing was simply 
watching and living, the way we grow and live together, in unity, which is tied to 
how important the land is to Indigenous people. Then I left and spent 10 years in the 
capital  – I went seeking knowledge and information, and to finish my studies, too. 
I never thought I would end up working with the Guarani-Kaiowá people, or being 
a spokesperson for Indigenous peoples, whose rights are still being violated today. 
I don't know how to explain exactly what happened… But I came back in 2017, when 
my uncle had died on this 55 hectares gained partly through his own struggle, for 
which he spilled his blood. That's here, the land where we are today. So with that 
comes, I don't know how to explain the form of it exactly but… it's like I have a role 
to play, it's in my hands now. From then on I started to accompany my grandfather, 
following his dream and the dream of the Guarani-Kaiowá people that we would 
someday get back the land that was always ours. He is one of only four people here 
still alive who was actually born here, so we have our ancestors' stories, which we 
have inherited from them. And I'm here by his side, in this struggle, helping with 
communications and the phones and paperwork, in guiding the community and 
so on. He can't do so much now because of his age, but he is always listening to his 
community to hear what they have to say. Today I am one of the spokespeople and 
activists for both the community and my grandfather as well as for the Guarani- 
Kaiowá people. Regaining this land is our great challenge. But it's what we have to 
do, what we will do in the name of our parentes who have already left us. 
Helping my grandfather is a very big responsibility  – he can speak of many 
things, orally, but there has to be someone to help with the written word, because 
without the written word today, we can't prove anything. It's not easy to work with 
























































hatred of the Guarani-Kaiowá. With the little experience I have  – I say that because 
I feel I am still on a path of learning  – we, as activists and spokespeople, carry a 
sad burden about what has happened to the Guarani-Kaiowá people. Many of our 
people are still living along the roadside, in the hope, the dream of recovering their 
own lands so that one day they can have a base and the freedom to rest there in 
peace again. 
Ana: You said that the land is calling for its keepers. I wanted to ask you about this 
relationship with the land and nature, and the wider issue of the environment, too. 
Lately, people are realising the importance of learning from Indigenous communities 
about the relationship to nature and with the land. What do you think about that? 
Erileide: There is just so much to say. For Indigenous people, traditional people, 
everything is linked; each thing is connected to the other. I will speak a little more 
generally about Indigenous people now. I am going to speak on our behalf about 
what led us to take back the land. The land had been devastated ever since the 
arrival of non-Indigenous people, that is, since what I would call the invasion of 
Brazil. They came and exploited medicinal herbs, exploited the animals, exploited 
Indigenous peoples, exploited the land and exploited Mother Earth. And over time 
they ended up obliterating, killing, suffocating nature, and then there came a point 
where the non-Indigenous people  – the anti-Indigenous people as I am going to call 
them  – surrounded this land where [our] people have always lived. We Indigenous 
people always observe the laws of nature, we fulfil and we obey them. That's part of 
the Indigenous mindset, because we know that everything we depend on  – for our 
lives and for our bodies  – is the land. It is the root of everything, and everything we 
give to the Earth, to Mother Nature, is given back to us, to our bodies, to our heath, 
including as food and as medicine. 
So, when we think about the Bancada Ruralista today, you know what they do? 
They destroy. If you could see the scene here in the village, I could show you what 
Brazil is like these days. The land we've been occupying for the last 20 years is not 
forested, there are no trees left  – there used to be cattle grazing here and the land 
was badly damaged. As a result, it's hard to grow food for our community, to get 
food from the land to feed our families. This is taking time… We are practically 
starting from zero. Over these 20 years, some plants have been sown, and time has 
done its work. Even some birds have started to return, and for each child that is 
born we replant trees. But our river here has been drying out due to the spreading 
of poisons, because we are surrounded by plantations of crops like sugarcane and 
corn. When it rains, the poisons that they spray by tractor and plane penetrate the 
water table and pollute the environment and the air we breathe. Last year, I had 
to lodge a national and international legal case because the community here was 
poisoned. Since it first began, the children complain constantly of stomach aches, 
headaches and weakness, particularly here in Guyraroká, but also in other areas 
where the Guarani-Kaiowá live in Mato Grosso do Sul  – because in this state we are 














































in the way we Indigenous people would like in order to feed ourselves, because for 
us nutrition is a kind of medicine. Here, for example, we plant pumpkins or po- 
tatoes, because the drying agents they use on their crops dry everything else out  –  
the only things that can survive are things like that or cassava, which survives 
underground. Other things like bananas, papayas and other fruits, they all dry out. 
This scarcity, this shortage, has a huge impact on our health. We can already tell 
that we will be more susceptible to coronavirus and its spread because of that. 
Ana: The poisoning  – can you tell me a little bit about what happened there?
Erileide: Ah yes, so the lands around us were used for cattle rearing until around 
2014, then they started growing crops. In May 2019 they took away all the cattle and 
they sprayed a product on the soil  – I don't know exactly what it is, but it's similar 
to an agricultural lime. Those lands come right up to just 15 metres away from our 
schoolhouse, and it ended up being sprayed on the community. Some people who 
were there filmed it. We didn't really get medical help; medical attention here any-
way is scarce. They might come by every couple of weeks, and they don't do tests or 
keep track. My own mother got poisoned too, and for a week she couldn't keep any 
food down at all. She had stomach cramps, diarrhoea  – but the doctor just gave her 
a pill and didn't follow up. There were children, including a newborn baby, whose 
mothers had to go running to the roadside for help because the children had been 
sprayed with it, it was on their skin, and they were crying and vomiting. Almost the 
whole community was affected, so we made an official complaint. I made a peti-
tion in the Human Rights court, but absolutely nothing else has been done about 
it  – nothing, nothing at all. All that the Public Prosecutor's Office did was to tell the 
farmers to respect a 250-metre boundary  – but it's not being observed. Since May 
2009 until now, lots of dogs and chickens and cattle here have died  – often animals 
are much more fragile than us. We can take much more, we keep going through it, 
although we do get weakened too. The children still say they have stomach pains, 
diarrhea, vomiting. We don't have much help from SESAI [the Indigenous health 
service of Brazil's Ministry of Health]. 
Ana: In terms of migration and mobility, how are you and the communities being 
affected by climate change? Is this making people leave the land?
Erileide: There have been changes to the climate for a long time. These changes 
are really due to the lack of wild nature and the lack of forests. Now summer comes 
instead of winter and winter comes instead of summer. Everything is back to front… 
We are in the month of May, which is not supposed to be cold, it is not supposed 
to be raining, yet now it is raining. Our health deteriorates and our plantations are 
really no longer viable, but we also have to try and keep up with these times. 
People have not left due to the problems caused by climate change, simply 
























































To ensure our place on this land, as we are currently occupying it, we have to 
remain here irrespective of the weather, or the climate, or the situation. 
And so instead, we try to take advantage of the rainy weather, for example 
planting fruit trees and bearing in mind that next year we can take advantage of the 
heat. We make the most of the cold, of each season. Even though it is very strange 
for us, we have to keep up and stay put in this place we have taken back. If we were 
to migrate because of changes to the climate, we would end up losing, and the gov-
ernment would get its way and take the land back again. They have already sprayed 
poison on us, dried our crops, killed our plants. They warn the community not to 
hunt, not to fish, not to get firewood, all so that we might be discouraged from stay-
ing and move away to a reserve or to another village. But we have been here for 20 
years, surviving all these hardships, and always staying. So we have been through 
what we had to, but we are staying here, keeping up with the weather, making the 
most of it. Indigenous people are in tune with the weather, for example my grand-
father, Tito Vilhalva, prays for the rain to stop, or if he wants it to warm up. He is 
a leader, and he is also what the non-Indigenous call a Pajé , a prayer. He may be 
100 years old, but he still plants and harvests, he loves to fish  – his thing is fishing. 
Ana: Speaking now more generally about the various Indigenous communities in 
Brazil, can you talk about the challenges in relation to the Bolsonaro government, 
and the environmental and land issues under this government? 
 
Erileide: The government of… it's shameful even to say his name. Hearing it has a 
powerful effect somehow  – I will say «that man», ok? Him and that [Environment 
Minister] Ricardo Salles are part of an anti -Indigenous lobby. It is very worrying 
for those of us who are involved in these territorial claims, in this struggle for our 
lands. There are 50,000 Guarani-Kaiowá people, which is the second-largest Indig-
enous population in Brazil, and there are currently between 42 and 46 land occu-
pations with land rights cases now in progress. The new government has brought 
everything to a standstill, and we are very worried because they have already made 
it very clear to us that they will not draw a demarcation line for one single centime-
tre of Indigenous land. When we Indigenous people are threatened, Mother Earth 
herself is threatened, because our lives speak for the Earth, the Earth speaks for 
our lives. 
The lives of the Guarani-Kaiowá of Mato Grosso do Sul are greatly affected by 
being landless, and in turn by the lack of land demarcation. Many Guarani-Kaiowá 
leaders have already shed their blood in this struggle. Now they are being reborn 
again because, as the saying goes, «they cut our trunks but forgot to pull out the 
roots». The new leadership have grown from these roots, and we are occupying 
these spaces as young people, learning to move forward along the path of the 
struggle. 
Many other Indigenous people throughout Brazil already have their lands, 














































wood that could be cut, the ore that could be mined  – they want to do to other 
Indigenous people what they have done here in Mato Grosso do Sul, by withdraw-
ing their land rights, expelling them and sending them packing to the roadside. 
But look at the Guarani-Kaiowá: We were living at the roadside yet after everything 
they have done to us, we have come back and are still hoping for our return.
Ana: I didn't ask about FUNAI. What's the situation right now? 
 
Erileide: FUNAI is currently in a difficult moment. It's being decimated, financially, 
and FUNAI today has actually become an anti-Indigenous organisation. So we 
don't look to FUNAI anymore. I mean, I don't even know what's become of them 
lately because, even in the middle of this pandemic, they haven't been present at 
all for the Guarani-Kaiowá in Mato Grosso do Sul. They seem not to care. Last year 
they passed a decree banning FUNAI staff from using FUNAI vehicles to visit any 
occupied villages that are not fully legalised, so from then on they stopped coming 
and we've seen nothing of them since. If a FUNAI staff member wants to go to 
a village, then the national president of FUNAI has to approve it… and he's a 
Bolsonarista [a supporter of the right-wing government of Jair Bolsonaro]. 
Ana: What would you say is the biggest threat in terms of the fight for the land, 
at this moment? 
 
Erileide: Look, we are facing a very big challenge with this government. Our lives 
are being challenged by this government. We are attacked from left, right and 
centre, and the attacks are not small, you know, it's like… a bomb going off every 
day. There are many Indigenous people who have been bought off by the Bancada 
Ruralista and the anti-Indigenous lobbies. What the government is doing is causing 
genocide. 
I think, actually, I would leave a message for them: that they respect their broth-
ers and sisters, because before God all of us are brothers and sisters. And really, the 
government we are facing today sees us Indigenous people as less than human  –  
I think they see us as worse than animals. But we are really going to fight what-
ever comes our way. We will insist for our rights as they exist in the Constitution, 
because ultimately the government is temporary, but our rights are enshrined in 
law. So the message I want to leave them is that they respect what is in the Consti-
tution and not only put into practice what it says, but also consult with Indigenous 
peoples before making their decisions. We are human like everyone else. 
Ana: I don't know if you would like to say anything more about something we talked 
about  – the environment, the struggle for land, the community, or as an activist and 
spokesperson?
Erileide: What I feel today, as a young person, is that it is not easy to be Indige-
nous and to face anti-Indigenous people. Part of our struggle as young people is to 
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endure prejudice and racism. We Indigenous people have gone through a lot, and 
I myself have  – but I hold my head high. I am always ready as much for my com-
munity, for the Guarani-Kaiowá people as for anyone who is in need. The challenge 
is huge. As a young woman, I always remember that the most important thing is 
that Indigenous rights must be upheld. Today I am on this journey of becoming a 
leader  – I don't really like that word but that's what they call me  – and accompany- 
ing my grandfather, still learning. Sometimes it is not easy, there are many chal-
lenges and it's a huge responsibility to bear. As activists and spokespersons, we run 
a very big risk from anti-Indigenous people, but we always have the guidance of the 
elders, because our elders are teachers for all us activists. 
Ana: How do you think about your resistance? In terms of the way that you think 
about creating your resistance and responding to these challenges? 
 
Erileide: Well, this resistance comes from within us, and from working in unity: 
What makes us resist is the land itself. The land is everything  – there is not much 
more I can say than this. We Indigenous people are resilient because of Mother 
Earth, because of nature, because of our elders. We resist and we insist because of 
the past, in order to be able to exist  – because without resistance, and without the 
land, we could not. 
«Resistance» is a very beautiful word, very powerful. I see this word «resistance» 
used a lot in posters all over the place. But if you stop to think about it, resistance 
has brought, and still brings us, death. Sometimes I reflect on everything that has 
happened during our existence, our resistance. It is very painful for us to think 
about. Something that sometimes upsets the people who come here to confront us 
is that this resistance is within us, it adorns our soul, it adorns us. We resist with our 




































































































TRISTEN TAYLOR AND DELME CUPIDO
Drought in the Northern Cape, 
South Africa: How climate 
change turned a small town into  
a permanent refugee camp*
Commercial agriculture is collapsing in South Africa's Karoo region, a semi-arid 
desert covering more than 400,000 km². The Karoo's economy is dependent upon 
dry-land agriculture, primarily sheep farming. Since at least 2015 it has been 
severely affected by a prolonged drought that has blighted South Africa, Namibia 
and Botswana. 
Karoo's fate exemplifies the stern reality described by experts such as Andrew 
Marquard, a professor at the Energy Research centre, University of Cape Town: «I 
would say that for any drought in Southern Africa now, there is a climate factor. 
It seems the latest science is that we are now not anticipating climate change, we 
are now in it.»
The current drought is bigger than any the country has known, according to 
Dr Imtiaz Sooliman, director of South Africa's largest disaster relief NGO, Gift of 
the Givers. At least 63 towns are in need of immediate and substantial drought 
assistance. «The scale is far bigger than anyone in this country understands,» says 
Sooliman, who describes commercial agriculture in the Karoo as being in a state 
of «total collapse». 
Gift of the Givers has provided US $12 million in drought relief since 2017. 
Sooliman estimates that a further US $17 million is needed in 2020 for the North-
ern Cape province alone. According to Stats South Africa, the Northern Cape 
experienced a 16.3 per cent year-on-year reduction in farm employment in 2018/19.1 
Eight thousand agricultural jobs were lost.
  * This text is based on field research that started in 2016 and culminated with in-depth field 
research during May 2019. The field research, which focused on three towns, consisted of 
gathering photographic evidence and face-to-face interviews across social class and race. For 
example, farmers, politicians, business people, farmworkers and residents. In additional to 
these interviews, desktop quantitative research and interviews with experts were conducted. 
The research was funded by the Heinrich Boll Foundation.












































































With a population of about 3,000 people, Strydenburg is a small Karoo town 
180 km south-west of Kimberley, the provincial capital of the Northern Cape, where 
matters are well past desperation. The main road that runs through it starts at a 
petrol station with a liquor store, runs past a variety of closed shops, and ends at an 
abandoned community centre. 
In 2019 Hopetown, which is 50 km from Strydenburg and part of the same win-
ter-rainfall region, only received 6 mm (16 per cent) of its 37 mm average in January, 
a critical month for rainfall.2
Strydenburg's community centre is abandoned. Beyond its empty swimming 
pool and rotting diving board, the desert stretches out to the horizon, covering 
farmland that was productive before the drought.
Hennie Zwiegers owns a sheep farm a few kilometres outside Strydenburg. His 
family has been farming there since 1837, but he will probably be the last person 
in his family to do so. He says «there's no future in farming» and doesn't expect to 
make it through the next winter (2019/20). Even if the rains were to return in the 
winter months (November to February), Zwiegers thinks it would take another five 
years for the land and livestock to recover. His few remaining sheep have stopped 
reproducing, and his game (primarily springbok) are dying from the lack of edible 
vegetation.
The disintegration of the livestock industry is leaving Karoo towns like Stryden-
burg with an economy revolving around social grants and a few state jobs. Hardly 
sufficient to deal with unemployment, expanding townships are experiencing 
deepening social ills. The average annual income in the Thembelihle municipality, 
which incorporates Strydenburg, is US $1,650. Thirty-five per cent of Thembelihle's 
population is under the age of 19, and only 27 per cent of the total population has 
finished secondary school.3
Brenda Mphamba, the African National Congress mayor of Thembelihle, says 
that since 2016, the community has seen a substantial increase in the use of meth-
amphetamine, locally known as «tik». This is on top of a serious problem with 
alcohol. The Northern Cape province has one of the world's highest rates of fetal 
alcohol syndrome. De Aar, a large town 100 km from Strydenburg, has a foetal alco-
hol syndrome rate of 119.4 per 1,000.4 The HIV/Aids prevalence rate in the Pixley ka 
Seme District (which covers Strydenburg) is 16.7 per cent.5
2 Diamond Fields Advertiser (2019, February 4), «Gloomy Rainfall Figures for NC», available at: 
www.dfa.co.za/news/gloomy-rainfall-figures-for-nc-19121325.
3 Statistics South Africa (2016), South African Community Survey 2016, available at: https://wazi- 
map.co.za/profiles/municipality-NC076-themb.
4 Olivier, L. et al. (2016), «Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorders: Prevalence Rates in South Africa», 
S Afr Med J 6, S103–S106, available at: https://core.ac.uk/reader/194295564.
5 Woldesenbet, S.A., et al. (2019), The 2017 National Antenatal Sentinel HIV Survey, South Africa 















































Steven Paulus, principal of the Strydenburg Combined School, describes the 
town's social problems as «a horror state of affairs», adding that: «We have a spike 
in drug abuse, we have a spike in teen pregnancy, we have a spike in lawlessness.»
Almost all of Strydenburg is now dependent upon social grants for survival. 
The grants range from old-age pensions, which are US $106 a month, to child sup-
port grants of US $25 a month per child. According to official statistics, the mini-
mum per person income required to meet the most basic of food needs is US $32 
a month; 18 million South Africans (30 per cent of the total population) rely upon 
social grants.6
In 2018, South Africa's second-largest city, Cape Town, almost reached Day 
Zero, the day when the city would have run out of water. The primary cause was the 
drought, and that drought was almost certainly induced by climate change. A 2018 
analysis of the drought led by Friederike E. L. Otto of the Environmental Change 
Institute concluded that, «The likelihood of an event like the observed 2015–2017 
drought has increased by a factor of 3.3 (1.4–6.4). Unlike for other drought analy-
ses in other parts of Africa, this is a very clear result with anthropogenic climate 
change having significantly increased the likelihood of such a drought to occur.»7
Day Zero arrived for Strydenburg in 2016. Leon Jantjies, head of the local branch 
of the African National Congress, is familiar with the challenges faced by policy-
makers as a result. He sits on the board of the local clinic and of Future Leaders, an 
NGO that tries to give the town's youth a pathway out of drug abuse, despair and 
hopelessness.
Since the start of the drought, Jantjies has seen a dramatic increase in house 
break-ins, youth unemployment and drug abuse. He says, «Water is at the heart of 
everything. Without water you can't have development.»
Strydenburg has been under severe water restrictions for the past three years: 
supply is limited to six hours per day at the most. However, the Mandela Square 
township has such low water pressure that residents have to rely on four vertical 
storage tanks. The water for the tanks gets trucked in from Hopetown.
Hester Obermeyer is the spokesperson for Save the Sheep, an NGO working out 
of Sutherland, which is 470 km from Strydenburg. Statistics collected by Save the 
Sheep show that Sutherland used to have a carrying capacity of 400,000 sheep in 
2015, but now can support only 63,000 sheep.
To unlock US $142 million in disaster relief, Save the Sheep has called on the 
provincial government to declare the whole of the Northern Cape a disaster area. 
Without urgent assistance from the state, Obermeyer predicts that, «Farms are 
going to close down, their gates are going to be locked and the keys handed over to 
the banks. People are going to lose their jobs. A year ago the job losses in Suther-
land, directly due to the drought, were 224 people. For a small town like Sutherland 
that is disastrous.»
6 See www.groundup.org.za/article/everything-you-need-know-about-social-grants_820.
7 Otto, F. et al. (2018), «Anthropogenic Influence on the Drivers of the Western Cape Drought 











































































South Africa's agricultural sector declined by 13.2 per cent in the first quarter 
of 2019.8 The drought is undermining the South African government's land re- 
distribution efforts. Both emerging black and established white farmers are aban- 
doning their farms, leaving them for the banks to reprocess. According to a local 
coordinator for drought relief, farms that used to sell on auction for US $170,00.00 
are now worthless, with the land resembling a gravel parking lot.
Strydenburg had 75 emerging farmers three years ago; emerging black farmers 
are the intended beneficiaries of the government's land redistribution programme, 
which is an attempt to redress the inequalities of apartheid and colonialism. About 
80 per cent of the emerging farmers have now left farming altogether. Those who 
still farm do so on the sparse municipal land in and around Strydenburg, according 
to Andries Maries, chair of the Emerging Farmers Association.
Maries, a former farm worker, has been farming in the area for more than 30 
years. If the drought continues for another year or two, he says, «It will be very diffi-
cult for me as an emerging farmer. I will have to sell my animals and stop farming.»
The expectation has been that, as climate change causes drought in this region, 
people would move from the rural areas to South Africa's main cities: for example, 
Johannesburg, Kimberly and Cape Town. Despite endemic poverty, a catalogue of 
social ills and a complete lack of employment, the people of Strydenburg are stay-
ing put. With an official national unemployment rate of 27.6 per cent, prospects 
of finding work in cities such as Kimberly and Cape Town are few.9 Additionally, 
moving would mean leaving the community's informal support system and living 
in an urban slum.
With South Africa's social grants system now functioning as a disaster relief 
scheme in Strydenburg  – individuals most basic needs are just about met  – the 
town has become a permanent but unintended humanitarian camp: The people of 
Strydenburg are seeking refuge from climate change in their own homes. However, 
the drought itself is not the only cause.
South Africa's economy last saw any kind of meaningful economic growth in 
2007, and corruption has become endemic. The national debt continues to grow, the 
electricity supply has become erratic, the unemployment rate continues to rise and 
the water infrastructure is decaying: Some towns have seen the re-emergence of 
cholera. Although there has been the creation of a black middle class, the majority 
of the population has yet to receive redress from historic injustices, especially in 
rural areas. 
These economic and social problems can only hamper efforts to mitigate the 
impacts of South Africa's first climate-induced drought. Towns such as Stryden-
burg are particularly affected due to these problems existing before the drought. 
Negative social, political and economic factors have amplified  – and in turn been 
reinforced by  – the impacts of the drought. 
8 Department of Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries (2019), Quarterly Economic Overview of the 
Agriculture Sector: First Quarter 2019 (DAFF), p. 6, available at: www.daff.gov.za.




























































On a broader scale, this case study suggests that the problem of climate 
change and its impact on human mobility will be more complex than commonly 
assumed. Because of social safety nets and little opportunity elsewhere, some 
climate change-affected persons may be less likely to migrate elsewhere. Addi- 
tional research into this phenomenon is needed to understand the deep and 
far-reaching impacts of climate change upon these populations, whose circum-
stances rarely figure in debates about policymaking in response to climate change 























































Questioning the «poster child» 
cliché: Mobility and attachment 
in the Pacific island of Palau
It takes three to four years for 69-year-old Isabella Yano to grow a lush taro. The 
tall green plant, which can reach 1.8 metres, is the main staple of the Micronesian 
islands of Palau. Such is the importance of the crop in local culture that a Palauan 
proverb claims it to be «the mother of our breath» («A mesei a delal a telid» ). Elderly 
women, known as mechas , have nursed it for centuries, drawing pride in the neat-
ness, productivity and health of their taro patches.
Every now and again, Yano's breath is cut short by the high tide. Seawater 
creeps into her patch, painting the green leaves a morbid yellow and then brown. 
«It makes me feel sad and discouraged because when it happens all of the younger 
taro die,» Yano says. 
Although much ink has been poured over the fate of low-lying islands such as 
the Marshall Islands and Kiribati, the higher islands of Palau are also vulnerable 
to climate change, with important implications for mobility. Located in the West 
Pacific between the Philippines and Guam, the small island state of the Republic 
of Palau consists of more than 300 atoll and high islands, of which only nine are 
inhabited.
At first glance, Palau's 18,008 inhabitants1 appear safe from sea-level rise, with 
much of the country standing 9 metres above sea level on average. However, most 
of the higher ground is not well-suited for habitation, agricultural and economic 
activity due to its hilly and forested topography. As a result, Palauans like Yano live 
and work in the exposed coastal regions. 
According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the main 
environmental factors relating to anthropogenic climate change that will become 
significant in the coming years are the increased strength of storms, droughts and 
sea-level rise.2 Palau suffers from all three. 
Not that these challenges are unfamiliar to the islanders. Lying just outside the 
Northern Pacific typhoon belt, Palau saw 68 tropical storms or tropical depressions 
1 United Nations Population Division (2019), World Population Prospects: 2019 Revision , available 
at: https://population.un.org/wpp.
2 IOM (2014), IOM Outlook on Migration, Environment and Climate Change (Geneva: Interna-














































come within 200 nautical miles of its islands or reefs between 1945 and 2013.3 
On occasion, these have spurred exodus. In 1904, a huge typhoon pummelled the 
Sonsoral islands, which are located more than 300 km away to the south-west of 
Koror. The German administration relocated the people of Merir and Pulo Anna to 
the main islands.4
But residents and scientists alike say storms have taken on a new force. «In 
generalised Palau talk, storms have got more severe,» says Peter Black, an ethnol-
ogist who lived in Tobi Island in the 1960s and 1970s. He has dedicated his life to 
documenting the island's culture. «I got to Palau in 1968 and they had a typhoon 
right away. There were very few people there who had experience of that. The big 
typhoons in that part of the world were always passing north of Palau.» 
«Now it's become semi-routine,» he says, adding: «You'll see these Facebook 
posts: ‹Watch out everyone, a storm is coming.›» In December 2012, weather reports 
announced a «one in a million typhoon». Super Typhoon Bopha, as it was to become 
known, ripped into the coral reefs east of Koror state, unleashing storm waves of 
35 feet or more. Super Typhoon Haiyan  – one of the most powerful Pacific tropical 
cyclones on record  – followed almost on its heels in December 2013, its eye moving 
close to the island of Kayangel. 
Palauans can no longer take fresh water for granted. In March 2016, cumu-
lative rainfall for Koror was the lowest recorded in 65 years,5 prompting Presi-
dent Tommy Remengesau to declare a state of emergency. Water was rationed and 
emergency assistance was delivered by the IOM. The harmless golden jellyfish from 
Palau's popular Jellyfish Lake died by the hundreds of thousands. 
The ocean, on which Palauans depend upon for food and tourism, has become 
a menacing figure. Rising by about 9 mm annually since 1993, it chews into the 
island's taro patches incrementally, as stilts and raised foundations appear under 
houses. «Old people say: When we were young, we knew the wet season and the 
dry season and now it's all over the place,» says Margo Vitarelli, a Hawaii-based 
Palauan artist. When drafting Palau's climate law in 2015, President Remengesau 
voiced similar concerns, describing the «biggest predictability» for his country as 
«unpredictability».6
Has such unpredictability led people to leave their islands and Palau? The fol-
lowing sections of this report respond to this question by considering past and cur-
rent migratory trends, surveying the academic debate on climate migration in Palau 
before turning to stories of unsustainable urban development on the mainland. 
3 Coral Reef Research Foundation (2014), A Summary of Palau's Typhoon History 1945–2013 , 
available at: https://coralreefpalau.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/CRRF-Palau-Typhoon- 
History-2014-1.pdf (accessed 15 July 2020).
4 Ibid.
5 Republic of Palau (2016), Drought Report , available at: www.palaugov.pw/wp-content/uploads/ 
2017/06/2016-Drought-Report.pdf (accessed 15 July 2020).
6 SPC (2015), Palau's Climate Change Policy to Prepare the Island Nation for «Unpredictability» , 
available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/palau/palau-s-climate-change-policy-prepare-is-






















































I then consider the Kayangel people displaced by Typhoon Haiyan and the threat-
ened repopulation efforts of Tobi Island. I conclude with a note on the question of 
adaptation.
Climate migration in Palau: A few figures and references
As this volume makes clear, the term «climate migration» has courted much con-
troversy over the past decades, with critics arguing that it is almost impossible to 
disentangle environmental factors from socio-economic factors driving people to 
move. The task of linking migration to climate change gets even trickier in the case 
of Pacific Islanders, who, thanks to their rich transnational migration traditions, 
often see themselves first and foremost as sea voyagers.
«Pacific Islanders have always been migrating,» says Yimnang Golbuu, head of 
the Palau International Coral Reef Center. «The original people who came to these 
islands migrated here. We've been migrating to different places for different rea-
sons: education, jobs. So it's not like we never migrated and all of a sudden we are 
forced to move.»
This tradition of mobility exists alongside a firm attachment to place, accord-
ing to chief of staff for the governor of Koror, Joleen Ngoriakl. Palauans' identities, 
she explains, are intimately bound up with the islands themselves. In its 2017–2020 
country profile for Palau, the IOM sides with her, evoking the «deeply rooted rela-
tionship that communities have with the land».7
Current emigration
Palau, which in 2019 counted 18,008 inhabitants, has recently seen an increase in 
migration towards developed countries. Coupled with a decreasing fertility rate, 
this development has resulted in a declining population growth rate, estimated 
in 2020 to be 0.39 per cent.8 Internal migration from outer-island communities 
towards the urban centre of Koror also continues to proceed apace. However, the 
rate is less significant than departures overseas. 
Political-economic alliances stemming from Palau's colonial history strongly 
influence where Palauans choose to migrate. The great majority head for the 
United States and its insular areas of Guam and the Commonwealth of the Mari-
ana Islands, as a result of the Compact of Free Association with the United States. 
Passed in 1994, the agreement allows Palauans to travel to the United States as 
non-immigrants without a visa and enjoy an indefinite stay. More than 15 per cent 
of the population does this.9 Others migrate to Japan, Taiwan, New Zealand and 
the Philippines. 
7 IOM (2018), The Republic of Palau IOM Strategy 2017–2020, available at: https://publications.iom. 
int/books/republic-palau-iom-country-strategy-2017-2020.
8 Ibid., p. 6.














































Migration patterns are thus overwhelmingly circular, with most Palauans 
choosing to migrate with the aim of returning home after studying abroad, enlist-
ing in the American military or doing various other jobs.
It is important to note, however, that just as Palauans increasingly seek opportu-
nities overseas, the country itself has developed a sizeable immigrant community. 
Around a third (28.1 per cent) of Palau's population is foreign born, with migrants 
primarily hailing from Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, China, the Philippines, Japan 
and the United States. This strikingly high figure underlines what many social 
scientists of climate change and mobility have been at pains to emphasise for some 
years now: A significant proportion of human migration under climate stress will 
involve movement into zones of higher risk from climate change. 
The lure of the coast
The density of population in the urban centre of Koror renders Palau particularly 
vulnerable to climate-related displacement. As the country's touristic powerhouse, 
Koror hosts the vast majority of Palau's businesses, restaurants and offices. Criti-
cally, Koror is home to the country's only hospital and college: Palau Community 
College. It comes as little surprise, therefore, that more than 80 per cent of Palau's 
population lives in Koror.10
«When people think of low-lying islands, they think of the Marshall Islands 
and Kiribati,» Golbuu says. «But along the coast of Koror, on the eastern coast of 
Babeldaob, where people live, it's very much around sea level.»
Designed to attract foreign investment, a controversial policy to extend the land 
lease from 50 to 99 years has worsened an already precarious situation consider-
ably.11 In a 2015 blog post,12 Ngoriakl slammed the «influx of foreign developers 
building hotels left and right, only to fill it up with their own imported labour, 
services and goods». The resulting surge in prices has priced many ordinary Palau-
ans out of the centre.
«It's a combination of people getting displaced from sea level and economic 
growth,» says Xavier Matsutaro, Palau's focal point for the UN Framework Con- 
vention on Climate Change. «People competing for the same space… has produced 
tension. There have been landlords kicking out folks for economic reasons and 
people are offering higher rent for the same place.»
Speaking over the phone, Ngoriakl remarks that she never knew Palauans 
living in apartments when she was growing up. 
10 UNDP (2016), Human Development Report 2016: Human Development for Everyone (New York, 
NY: UNDP).
11 Vogt, I. (2019), Tourism and Land in Palau , available at: https://youngphilanthropist.blog/2019/ 
10/03/tourism-and-land-in-palau (accessed 15 July 2020).
12 Ngoriakl, J. (2015), The Unattractive Side of Paradise , available at: https://medium.com/@joleen- 






















































Vitarelli agrees. «Before everybody had a piece of land, it was pretty egalitar-
ian, pretty equal, you couldn't see a rich-poor difference. Now there is a rich-poor 
delineation in Palau,» she says. 
In the face of rising seas and prices, relocating away from the coast  – if not to 
Palau's higher inlands  – would seem to be in order. But the area away from the 
coast within Koror is in even higher demand than the centre, placing it out of reach 
to ordinary families. The absence of essential infrastructure, including transport, 
in Babeldaob's higher regions means that those relocating would have to commute 
by car daily to the centre  – an expense that is unimaginable in a country where the 
national minimum wage is US $3.50. 
Relocation as an adaptation strategy is further complicated by a notoriously 
complex land law system. Conflicting surveying systems developed during the 
German and Japanese periods of colonisation, followed by the destruction of land 
records during the Second World War,13 have produced countless land disputes. 
Palauans, Matsutaro says, «cannot just pick up and go to traditional lands outside 
of Koror because they're still in the middle of figuring out whether they can legally 
move there. Until that is settled, they're kind of stuck.» 
«Even though [it is customary] for Pacific Islanders to adapt [to circumstances] 
moving around, but then there are also times when you cannot move to a different 
place,» Golbuu adds. «It takes a lot of resources to make that happen. It's not an 
easy thing to say ‹Move there or don't move to these coastal islands, because you're 
susceptible to storms and sea-level rise.›»
Trapped
Unable to flee to safety in town or to the hills, poorer households spill into Koror's 
mangrove areas. These are among the most exposed lands to climate impacts. 
Highly susceptible to high temperatures, they also get flooded during high tides.
«The poor families that are living in the mangroves are usually stuck in inter-
generational poverty,» an official who wishes to stay anonymous, says. «I've visited 
families living in those areas and they're basically squatting.» 
But even that bolthole is not safe from housing speculation. Over the past years, 
an increasing number of middle-class families have attempted to purchase man-
grove areas to reclaim and live on. The official describes the market as «prime real 
estate». «It can be very difficult between rich and the poor,» the official adds. 
If not the mangroves, marginalised Palauans may illegally occupy buildings 
under litigation  – a common occurrence in a country grappling with land owner-
ship delineation following colonialism.
13 Asian Development Bank (2017), Palau: Policies for Sustainable Growth, a Private-sector Assess-
ment , available at: www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/230131/palau-psa- 















































On 7 November 2013, Super Typhoon Haiyan unfurled across the north of Palau. 
Of the republic's 16 states, the island of Kayangel, located 50 miles to the north of 
Koror, was worst affected. Resident Ungilreng Takawo,14 who had initially consid-
ered the authorities' offer to shelter in Koror, eventually chose to stay on the island 
along with most Kayangel people. With fourteen others, she sat tightly before one 
of the largest Category 5 typhoons on record made landfall. Around 11 pm, win-
dows shattered, and a shard of glass flew across the room, embedding itself into 
one of the men's foreheads. 
«After the windows broke, there was chaos everywhere,» Ungilreng says. 
«One heavy bench that was at the front porch of the house flew inside through one 
of the windows. The double door burst open and everything was flying around. 
Even the inside walls were ripped off.» 
The group eventually took shelter in the concrete restrooms in the garden. 
Takawo thought she would die. «I never prayed so much like that night and I'm 
forever grateful to God to be alive.» 
Out of 39 Palauan houses destroyed by winds of more than 260 km per hour 
near the storm's centre, 22 were in Kayangel. All infrastructure and agricultural 
crops were flattened.15 According to a report by the National Emergency Com-
mittee, 30  people stayed at the Palau Cultural Centre in Koror City, a govern- 
ment-funded facility, while 21 others went to live with relatives in Palau. In 
addition to their desire for secure accommodation, the possibility of giving their 
children continuous access to education was key in the Kayangel people's decision 
to relocate to Koror as they waited for their island to be rebuilt.
Other Kayangel residents returned to the island to assist with the reconstruc-
tion efforts. The government of Taiwan donated 20 temporary houses to assist 
Kayangel people while they rebuilt their homes. Japan funded and carried out the 
reconstruction of a typhoon-proof school, which could double up as a typhoon 
and tsunami shelter. Overall, the Kayangel community stayed in Koror for around 
one year, Matsutaro said, which is the time threshold between short-term (3 to 12 
months of mobility) and long-term displacement (over a year away from home), 
according to UN terminology. 
«While waiting for homes to be rebuilt, some Kayangel residents found jobs 
while in Koror,» Matsutaro says. «They earned enough income to make a living so 
they have since settled in Koror, although they travel to Kayangel to visit from time 
to time.»
14 The story of Ungilreng Takawo is based on a private interview supplied to the author by Palau's 
Ministry of Natural Resources, Environment & Tourism and the documentary After the Storm 
(2013) by Witham, L., and Wentworth, K. for Film Truth Productions.
15 Thomson, P. (2013, November 14), «In Palau, a Glancing Blow from Typhoon Haiyan Prompts a 
Glance toward Climate Change», The World , available at: www.pri.org/stories/2013-11-14/palau- 






















































In 2020, Kayangel is still recovering. Water access has particularly been 
affected, after the storm caused saltwater to intrude into the island's main well. 
Reverse osmosis is required. Taro patches are also still recovering. Freak storms 
are far from the only problem Kayangel faces on a warming planet. As an atoll 
island, it is among Palau's most vulnerable islands to sea-level rise. In 2009, Palau's 
president, Johnson Toribiong, warned that the state could cease to exist by 2100 
if the sea-level rise advances one metre from its current level. Save for such an 
extreme scenario, the prospects for relocation appear to be out of the question to 
most.
After asking her what she would do if the sea rose, The World journalist Ari 
Daniel later reported that a woman said she would set up shop in a boat «because 
she's Palauan and she plans to stay here.»
Ngoriakl raises a more profound question. «If they relocate from Kayangel to 
another state, would they still be Kayangel people? What happens to their identity 
and history?»
Repopulating Tobi Island: A dream sunk by rising sea levels
Former Tobian governor Thomas Patris has a dream: Play a part in repopulating 
Tobi. Located more than 600 km from Koror, the island is part of a group of five 
oceanic islands and one coral atoll, Helen Reef, known as the Southwest Islands. 
At 0.85 km2, it is but a minuscule dot in the Pacific. At an administrative level, Tobi 
and Helen Reef form Hatohobei state  – the southernmost state of the Republic of 
Palau. Travelling there from Babeldaob requires a two-day journey by boat. Its 
current population stands at 29 people, rising to around 40 people during the 
school term. 
It wasn't always like this. Back in the early 20th century, a German ethno-
graphic expedition16 marked the population at slightly under 1,000 inhabitants. 
The island was self-sufficient, surviving on a gardening and fishing base. But 
population density and remoteness put it at the mercy of storms and disease. In 
the 1930s, there was a slow trickle of people to the Echang hamlet on the out- 
skirts of Koror  – currently known as the Southwest Island settlement. Tobians 
took part in the nascent cash economy, interacted with the Catholic mission and 
enjoyed government-funded access to education and health. 
Meanwhile, back on Tobi, by the 1950s people had incorporated several fea-
tures of life in Koror with their traditions. A church brought everyone together 
twice a day, children attended school and a clinic dispensed medical care. Produc-
ing a small amount of copra  – the dried meat or kernel of the coconut  – brought 
in enough cash so that the necessities and even some luxuries that could not be 
produced locally could be purchased from the ship. There was still no electricity, 
16 Eilers, A. (1936), Tobi In Ergebnisse der Südsee Expedition 1908–1910. II. Ethnographie: B. 
Mikronesien Band 9. Westkarolinen 2. Halband: Tobi und Ngulu. Georg Thilenius ed. , Vol. 9 
(Hamburg: Friederichsen, De Gruyter & Co. m.b.H.), p. 44.
Koror, the most populous island and commercial centre of Palau,  

























































running water or any communication with the outside world apart from the occa-
sional government ship or the even more seldom seen fishing boat from Taiwan or 
Japan. But Tobian society increasingly oscillated between the two islands.
That fragile equilibrium came to a halt with the closure of the nursery and 
school in the 1980s, prompting Tobians to move back to Koror. In 1994, Palau's inde-
pendence brought an end to regular publicly funded shipping, precipitating the 
exodus further. These days, more than 150 Tobians currently live in Koror, whereas 
Tobi's population can jump from 20 to a high of 60 people during the island's school 
term, according to Patris.
However, the cohabitation with other Palauans is far from idyllic. Like many 
Palauans, Tobians' land in Echang was handed to them under colonial rule and is 
vulnerable to repossession under the country's complex land titles system. Tobians 
can also suffer from discrimination from the main islanders. As a result, although 
only 70 per cent of the population lived in Tobi or Helen Reef as children, a 2009 
report17 found 81 per cent of Tobians wanted to move back to Tobi or Helen Reef.
«It is important to understand that this dream [of repopulation] acquires its 
force not merely from nostalgia for a lost Eden, or romantic discontent with mun-
dane reality,» ethnologist Black writes. «It also arises from the tenuous position 
Tobians occupy in Palau.» 
«Where would they go?» Black asks as he considers a repossession of the South-
west Island settlement in Koror. «Some have Palauan relatives, from whom they 
might acquire land upon which to relocate, many do not.» 
Tobians have attempted to revive the island in the past years. When Patris was 
elected governor in 2009, fewer than 10 people lived there. He and other Tobians 
reopened Tobi's elementary school with support from the Department of Educa-
tion. In 2012–2013, a fortuitous drop in transport costs lured more people back.
«When they opened the school, I was really surprised to have so many stu-
dents,» Patris says. «There were 10 students,» he tells me via video link. Tobian 
elders, he adds, have run a series of workshops to teach traditional skills, such as 
how to weave fishing lines from tree bark and baskets from coconut leaves.
«At the moment, Tobians [in Koror] see that island, and they're controlling 
Helen Reef  – which is very rich in resources,» says Black. «That is their future, if 
they can somehow manage to hang out in Palau and establish themselves better 
there, have this Southern place, where they can go spend time, go there and raise 
kids.» 
«What's working against them is climate change,» Black says. «This is like a 
reverse migration, which is politically, culturally and even economically promising, 
but the island itself  – the physical place  – has been badly hit by warming.» 
Tobi is eroding away. Rising tides wrench coconut trees off the southern tip of 
the island and tease dangerously close to the island's only taro patch. The island's 
17 Oldiais, N., Ngiraiwet, A., Patris, P., Ngirkuteling, B., Polloi, C., Rekemsiik, D., …Andrew, W. 
(2009), Helen Reef and the Hatohobei Community: SEM-Pasifika Socioeconomic Assessment 
Report (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Coral Reef Conservation Program, 






















































current governor, Huana Nestor, predicts houses close to the beach in the south 
will need to be relocated in 10 to 15 years, and he worries about the vulnerability of 
Second World War historical sites to rising tides. 
«They were people who surveyed their land and put a marker on it,» Patris 
says. «But last year when we went down, their land had already washed again. The 
cement marker they had put was in the reef. That's how bad it is.» 
Located 70 km east of Tobi, Helen Reef is the most threatened land location 
in the Republic of Palau, according to Palau's Coral Reef Research Foundation.18 
Situated on a sandbar, the island has moved and eroded considerably over the past 
decades. It is uninhabited, save for a marine ranger station with a staff of three.
Rising sea levels also put pressure on the island's only freshwater lens, resulting 
in salinated water. «At this time, it is not drinkable, whereas it used to be before,» 
Nestor says. «When we use the wells to do laundry, the soap doesn't get suds as it 
used to because of the high salinity.» 
Fish, which are another key element for Tobians, are also growing scarce. «It's 
not like it was before, when you just dropped a line and could catch a fish,» Patris 
says. «Nowadays you have to wait for the fish to bite your hook.» Tuna, the sta-
ple fish, is also becoming rarer. «Last week there was no tuna, only barracuda and 
wahoo.» 
Patris worries about the impact of global warming on the local corals. «Once 
the coral is gone, then the small fish are gone and then the big fish will be too.»
Potential adaptive solutions for Hatohobei include an airstrip and seawall, 
though here too funds and technical expertise are lacking. «We keep singing about 
the need for planning for climate change and the future of Tobi, but without fund-
ing it's incredibly difficult,» she says.
«Personally, I see little chance of that [repopulation] dream becoming reality, 
but you never know,» Black writes. «Talk of an airstrip comes and goes but, along 
with the perennial notion of creating some kind of tourist operation, remains in 
the category of ‹ideas to help the island›  – plans which function to show that those 
promoting them are public-spirited but are not within the realm of practicability.»
«The people who are staying there just hang on to what they have now,» Patris 
says. «But they know that someday the island will disappear, will be washed away 
unless there is a big change in climate change.»
Discussion
This report has demonstrated that climate change has started to shape migration in 
Palau  – at least at an internal level. Of the three stories mentioned above, the most 
tangible example has been that of medium-term mobility in the case of the reloca-
tion of the Kayangel people in Koror in the wake of Typhoon Haiyan. An unspecified 
18 Patris, S., and Colin, P. (n.d.), «Island Erosion and Migration in Tobi (Hatohobei) State, Palau», 
Coral Reef Research Foundation, available at: https://coralreefpalau.org/education/posters 














































number of them, according to the government, have settled on the mainland for the 
long term after taking up jobs.
Other cases are less quantifiable. In Koror, one can only speculate as to how 
many would have moved from the coast to the higher inlands in the presence of, 
among other factors, higher incomes, sound infrastructure and land ownership 
laws. And how to count the number of Tobians who would have shared Patris' 
dream and settled on Tobi Island in a world free of warming? The one certainty we 
can cling to is that Palauans are unwilling to leave their land.
Thus, even though the sea occasionally spoils her taro, relocation towards 
the higher ground appears unthinkable to Yano. «I have seven taro patches,» she 
explains. «Most of them are higher up, but that one closer to the ocean has a nicer 
colour than the other ones.» The patch is also close to her house, where she wishes 
to spend her late years, she adds. Both people and country continue to favour in situ 
adaptation over migration as a response to the climate crisis. 
«My remedy is to use the Giant Swamp Taro leaves to help block the salt water 
from entering,» Yano continues. «It's not perfect and sometimes the saltwater still 
gets in, but I've learned that if I wait for rain for three to four months, the saltiness 
of the soil will eventually go away and then I am able to plant again,» she says, 
adding that she would be interested in learning about salt-resistant varieties of 
taro crops.
Yano's rooted resilience extends to national policy. Palau is internationally 
renowned for its sustainable leadership. In 2016, it became the second country in 
the world, after Fiji, to ratify the Paris Agreement to limit global temperature rise 
to well below 2° C following a 2015 framework climate law.19
In January 2020, it closed 80 per cent of its waters to commercial fishing  – an 
area roughly the size of France  – in a flagship Marine Sanctuary policy in order to 
allow coral reefs to recover and protect coastal areas against the impacts of climate 
change. The government has launched a national housing programme for displaced 
families, with the aim to actively include the affected population in the adaptation 
planning process. Among the programme's aims is the relocation of households 
affected by inundation in nine states. Contemporary construction permit require-
ments also call for more housing to be elevated. 
However, top-down directives popular with international NGOs do not always 
fit with local realities, as evidenced when Ngoriakl makes a call to «balance con-
servation and the lives of the people». The chief of staff points out that a 2003 con-
servation policy that sought to protect 30 per cent of Palau's near-shore marine 
environment by 2020 has driven people that used to fish «to move to buying frozen 
chicken, or fish illegally». 
Tarita Holme, an environmental consultant who has advised on climate pol-
icy for the Palau National Marine Sanctuary and the United States Agency for 
19 Government of Palau (2015), Palau Climate Change Policy for Climate and Disaster Resilient Low 
Emissions Development , available at: https://chm.cbd.int/api/v2013/documents/6A6546C6- 
0283-0455-5974-30F4B8A2F29E/attachments/Climate%20Change%20-%20PalauCCPolicy_
LowResolution.pdf (accessed 15 July 2020).
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International Development, also calls for climate funding to broaden its eligibility 
criteria in a bid to ease adaptation. Holme points to an invasive macaque in the 
south-western island of Anguar that has caused 12 bird species to desert the island.
«People from island conservation who deal with invasives have said: ‹While it's 
just on this island we have a chance to address it. But if it gets out and goes to 
Babeldaob, then there's no way to get rid of it.›» She adds that the macaque could 
damage crops and ultimately food security. According to Holme: «It's so hard to 
find funding to address that issue, because all of the funding is in climate change 
and the… donors don't realise that this is [part of] our adaptation deficit.»
Although the sea may be rising, Ngoriakl wants to believe that the tide is turn-
ing at home. «I spend a lot of time with younger people  – the Generation Z,» she 
says. «It's interesting because they're not like us, the millennials… We left. Now 
there's demand to make the only community college into a university so that they 



































































































Mobility and climate justice  
in the Mashriq
Today, we have a better understanding than ever of the social phenomena associ-
ated with anthropogenic climate change, especially climate-related human mobil-
ity. Research has confirmed that climate change mostly engenders South-South 
movements,1 internal displacement within the so-called Global South2 and 
immobility,3 thus essentially debunking the ongoing securitisation of so-called 
climate migration to the Global North.4 Studies have also underlined that the 
effects of climate change play out differently for already disenfranchised or margin-
alised groups and elites, and that this discrimination is rarely sufficiently addressed 
in negotiation processes linked to the issue of climate change.5
This raises questions of both climate and mobility justice. The concept of mobil-
ity justice underlines that access to mobility is experienced unequally, along inter-
sectional categories such as gender, race, religion, age or socio-economic status.6 
The concept of climate justice highlights the fact that although climate change 
is caused mainly by industrialised states, developing states bear the brunt of its 
1 Weber, E. (2015), «Envisioning South-South Relations in the Fields of Environmental Change 
and Migration in the Pacific Islands  – Past, Present and Futures», Journal of the Global South 2(1).
2 Foresight (2011), Migration and Global Environmental Change (London: The Government Of- 
fice for Science).
3 Black et al. (2013), «Migration, Immobility and Displacement», Environmental Science and 
Policy 27(S1), S32–S43; Zickgraf, C., and Perrin, N. (2017), «Immobile and Trapped Popula-
tions», in Gemenne, F., Ionesco, D., and Mokhnacheva, D. (eds.), Atlas Der Umweltmigration , 
pp. 44–46 (München: oekom).
4 For a recent rendering, see Lustgarten, A. (2020, July 23), «The Great Climate Migration Has 
Begun», The New York Times , available at: www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/23/magazine/ 
climate-migration.html (accessed 29 July 2020).
5 Kaijser, A., and Kronsell, A. (2014), «Climate Change through the Lens of Intersectionality», 
Environmental Politics 23(3), 417–33.

































impacts,7 without adequate resource transfers, development assistance or equi- 
table donor-recipient relationships.8
This contribution explores how different aspects of mobility and climate jus-
tice play out in the Mashriq,9 a geographic region that Encyclopaedia Britannica 
defines as comprising the modern states of Egypt, Sudan, the Gulf states, Israel, 
Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.10 The region is a prime example of the 
effects of anthropogenic climate change. It illustrates that how a society, state or 
individual is impacted by climate change depends on socio-economic and political 
conditions, and/or individual positionality. Studying the Mashriq thus provides an 
avenue to better understanding the interplay between climatic and non-climatic 
pressures, thereby offering a more comprehensive approach to questions of justice 
in the context of a changing climate.11
Climate change in the Mashriq
Like many other regions of the world, the Mashriq has been suffering from a ris-
ing average temperature, increasingly erratic precipitation patterns, sea-level rise, 
and an increase in both severity and frequency of extreme weather events such 
as heat waves, droughts and floods.12 Climatic pressures are expected to increase 
further in the coming years and decades13 and will likely impact water supply, crop 
production, health and economic growth.14 For instance, the densely populated 
coastlines along the Red, Arabian and Mediterranean seas with their fertile coastal 
lands, shallow lagoons and fisheries are increasingly vulnerable to sea-level rise and 
7 Sowers, J. (2019), «Understanding Climate Vulnerability in the Middle East and North Africa», 
International Journal of Middle East Studies (October), 1–5.
8 Klepp, S., and Herbeck, J. (2016), «The Politics of Environmental Migration and Climate Justice 
in the Pacific Region», Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 7(1), 54–73; Tanner, T., and 
Allouche, J. (2011), «Towards a New Political Economy of Climate Change and Development», 
IDS Bulletin 42(3).
9 Using «Mashriq» rather than «Near East» or «Middle East» helps to avoid the Eurocentric and 
orientalist connotations of the latter terms. For a discussion, see Culcasi, K. (2010), «Construct-
ing and Naturalizing the Middle East», Geographical Review 100(4), 583–97.
10 The editors of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (n.d.), «Mashriq | geographical region, Middle East», 
Encyclopaedia Britannica , available at: www.britannica.com/place/Mashriq (accessed 30 July 
2020).
11 Mason, M., Zeitoun, M., and Mimi, Z. (2012), «Compounding Vulnerability: Impacts of Climate 
Change on Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank», Journal of Palestine Studies XLI(3), 38–53.
12 IPCC (2014), «Asia», in Barros, V.R. (ed.), Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulner- 
ability. Part B: Regional Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change available at: www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/up- 
loads/2018/02/WGIIAR5-Chap24_FINAL.pdf, p. 1333.
13 Al-Saidi, M. (2020), «Contribution of Water Scarcity and Sustainability Failures to Disintegra-
tion and Conflict in the Arab Region  – the Case of Syria and Yemen», in Amour, P.O. (ed.), 
The Regional Order in the Gulf Region and the Middle East: Regional Rivalries and Security 
Alliances , pp. 375–405 (Cham: Springer International Publishing).
14 IPCC (2014), «Livelihoods and Poverty», chapter 17 in IPCC Report 2014, Part A: Global and 














































salinisation (Egypt, Gaza, Israel and Lebanon are cases in point).15 Also, changing 
and inconsistent rain patterns will likely affect water availability and, thus, water 
utilisation  – a development that led to a decrease in agricultural productivity, and 
even agricultural collapse, in parts of the region in the past.16 
Although the peoples of the Mashriq have been adapting to changing climates 
for centuries, the speed and severity of anthropogenic climate change is creating 
new and unprecedented challenges.17 This situation is exacerbated by the relative 
ability (and willingness) of regional governments to adapt to and mitigate climate 
change impacts. The World Bank's World Development Report 2007 attests that 
countries in the Mashriq (and the Maghreb) not only suffer from physical resource 
scarcity, for instance of water, but that they are also characterised by a lack of both 
organisational capacity and accountability, which points to a breaking or broken 
social contract between the regional populations and their governing institutions 
and actors. Specifically, researchers diagnose regional public agencies with «over-
lapping and unclear functions or difficulties in coordinating», as well as a «lack of 
a sound institutional environment».18 Although it is important to reflect on what 
is considered a «sound institutional environment» by whom, this diagnosis illus-
trates that while climate change effects are real in the Mashriq, the incapability or 
unwillingness of regional states to adapt to and mitigate the changing conditions 
is just as big of a problem.19
In addition, if and when efforts to mitigate climate change are made, pre- 
existing power structures within a state  – together with the state's position within 
the international system  – moderate who benefits from these efforts. Consequently, 
the responses of states in the Mashriq to climate change need to be understood 
as being embedded in specific North-South relations, pre-established patterns 
of international cooperation, as well as pre-existing sub- and international con-
flicts. For instance, a state's capacity to adapt to climate change often hinges on 
economic power: Economically weaker states, which are often less integrated into 
the global economy, have fewer options than rich(er) states. Post- and decolonial 
approaches help us to ask critically why states outside of the Global North often 
have less economic (and political) power, pointing to historically grown disbal-
ances and inequalities in the international system. The effects of climate change 
can be outweighed by such power structures, for instance in the cases of Israel 
and Palestine, where Palestinian livelihoods are impacted far more severely by 
the effects of the Israeli occupation than by climate change (without wanting 
15 Sowers, J. (2019), «Understanding Climate Vulnerability» (see note 7).
16 Wodon, Q. et al. (2014), «Climate Change, Migration, and Adaptation in the MENA Region», 
in Wodon, Q. et al. (eds.), Climate Change and Migration. Evidence from the Middle East and 
North Africa , World Bank Studies, pp. 3–35 (Washington, DC: World Bank).
17 Verner, D. (ed.) (2012), Adaptation to a Changing Climate in the Arab Countries: A Case for 
Adaptation Governance and Leadership in Building Climate Resilience , MENA Development 
Report (Washington, DC: World Bank), p. 9.
18 Al-Saidi, M. (2020), «Contribution of Water Scarcity» (see note 13).
19 Sowers, J., Vengosh, A., and Weinthal, E. (2011), «Climate Change, Water Resources, and the 
































to negate climate change impacts in the Jordan River basin).20 Importantly, the 
unprecedented severity of global warming can be used to «greenwash» such pre- 
existing power structures, effectively blaming climate change for worsening living 
conditions without acknowledging the role of political decision-making for those 
very conditions.21
It is therefore crucial to look at environmental change and responses to it not 
as separate from, but as integral to politics, both on the domestic and interna-
tional levels. For instance, international climate change politics increasingly utilise 
climate policies as a new tool of governance,22 for example by investing in climate- 
related interventions such as adaptation and mitigation measures, or by condi-
tioning aid on climate policy reform. One example is the Paris Agreement of 2015, 
which was signed by all states of the Mashriq except war-ravaged Syria. The treaty 
promises new sources of financing and incentives for low-carbon development 
decisions to developing states and states that depend on fossil fuel exports.23
What is more, both national and international climate change policies can re- 
sult in second-order effects of climate change, which are often neither recog-
nised nor transparent. For instance, the (re-)nationalisation of natural resources 
or economic sectors can affect control of  – and access to  – resources and liveli-
hoods for parts of a population or society.24 Also, with a rise in awareness about 
climate change, the voices of international and non-governmental organisations 
grow stronger and can start to influence the power-knowledge nexus that is cen-
tral for climate and adaptation politics.25 Problematically for both trends, however, 
power relations on the ground and local, indigenous knowledge are rarely consid-
ered; in the worst case further weakening already marginalised and vulnerable 
populations.26
20 Mason, M., Zeitoun, M., and Mimi, Z. (2012), «Compounding Vulnerability: Impacts of Climate 
Change on Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank», Journal of Palestine Studies XLI(3), 38–53.
21 This has happened in Syria, for instance: Fröhlich, C. (2016), «Climate Migrants as Protestors? 
Dispelling Misconceptions about Global Environmental Change in Pre-revolutionary Syria», 
Contemporary Levant 1(1), 38–50.
22 Klepp, S., and Chavez-Rodriguez, L. (eds.) (2018), A Critical Approach to Climate Change Adap-
tation: Discourses, Policies, and Practices (London and New York, NY: Routledge/Taylor & Francis 
Group).
23 Sowers, J. (2019), «Understanding Climate Vulnerability» (see note 7).
24 Hein, J. (2020), Political Ecology of REDD+ in Indonesia: Agrarian Conflicts and Forest Carbon 
(n.p.: Taylor and Francis).
25 Morchain, D. (2018), «Rethinking the Framing of Climate Change Adaptation : Knowledge, 
Power, and Politics», in Klepp, S., and Chavez-Rodriguez, L. (eds.), A Critical Approach to Cli-
mate Change Adaptation: Discourses, Policies, and Practices (London and New York, NY: Rout-
ledge/Taylor & Francis Group); Eriksen, S.H., Nightingale, A.J., and Eakin, H. (2015), «Reframing 
Adaptation: The Political Nature of Climate Change Adaptation», Global Environmental Change 
35, 523–33; Cameron, E.S. (2012), «Securing Indigenous Politics: A Critique of the Vulnerability 
and Adaptation Approach to the Human Dimensions of Climate Change in the Canadian Arctic», 
Global Environmental Change 22(1), 103–14.
26 Klepp, S., and Fröhlich, C. (2020), «Migration and Conflict in a Global Warming Era: A Political 















































Climate change and human mobility in the Mashriq
Mobility, that is, the ability to change one's place of residence if needed (or wanted), 
is one of many ways of adapting to the effects of climate change. Environmen-
tally induced mobility is not new. In the history of mankind, people have always 
responded to changing climatic conditions by moving out of one region and to 
another.27 This option is not available for everyone, however; under some circum-
stances, climate change can also constrain mobility, raising questions of mobility 
justice. It is therefore crucial to ask who can move, and who cannot, in any given 
context.
Despite its deep entwinement with human society, a unified theoretical 
approach to environmentally-induced human mobility is still lacking. For instance, 
differences between a) climate variability and climate change, and b) responses 
to the two phenomena are often not adequately represented. Similarly, the differ-
ences and similarities between mobility in the context of slow- (rising tempera-
ture, droughts, land degradation) or fast-onset events (floods, storms, hurricanes) 
are still unclear.28
Impacts of fast-onset events such as hurricanes, torrential rains, floods and 
landslides on human movement are comparatively easy to determine. Research 
shows that, in most such cases, displacement tends to be temporary and over short 
distances.29 This is often due to the fact that, in poor(er) countries, victims of such 
events do not have the resources to migrate over long distances, again pointing 
to issues of mobility justice.30 Mobility following a fast-onset event is often short-
term, as the majority of people return as soon as possible to rebuild their properties. 
In fact, this is one of the few points that research is in relative agreement on,31 so 
that judging from past fast-onset events, they can be considered unlikely to cause 
significant long-term and long-distance movement, especially across international 
borders.32
Slow-onset events such as drought, desertification and a rise in temperature are 
generally associated with more gradually progressing movements. Here, research 
findings are less consistent. Although there are many well-documented cases of 
mass departures (predominantly internal displacement) in response to drought, 
27 Romm, J. (2011), «The Next Dust Bowl», Nature 478(7370), 450–51; Marris, E. (2014), «Two- 
Hundred-Year Drought Doomed Indus Valley Civilisation», Nature (March).
28 Cattaneo, C., Beine, M., Fröhlich, C., Kniveton, D., Martinez-Zarzoso, I., Mastrorillo, M., …
Schraven, B. (2019), «Human Migration in the Era of Climate Change», Review of Environmental 
Economics and Policy (June).
29 McLeman, R. A., and Gemenne, F. (2018), Routledge Handbook of Environmental Displacement 
and Migration (New York, NY: Routledge).
30 Lonergan, S. (1998), «The Role of Environmental Degradation in Population Displacement», 
Environmental Change and Security Project Report (4), 5–15; Zickgraf and Perrin (2017), «Im- 
mobile and Trapped» (see note 3).
31 McLeman and Gemenne (2018), Routledge Handbook (see note 29).
































also in the Mashriq,33 other researchers have argued that the migration numbers 
are small compared to the number of people impacted by drought, pointing out that 
environmental change is just one of many factors influencing migration decisions.34 
In some cases in the Mashriq  – pre-revolutionary Syria specifically  – migration has 
even been shown to be more a function of political issues than associated with 
environmental issues, despite contrary claims in prominent discourses.35 What is 
more, droughts and other slow-onset events can also reduce movement, especially 
in poor countries with liquidity constraints.36
The picture is further complicated by the many forms human mobility can 
take, ranging from internal to international, and from seasonal and short-term 
to permanent. Migration is also influenced by different factors that are highly 
context-dependent, including migration history and the interaction between 
economic, political, demographic, social and environmental factors in origin as 
well as destination countries.37
One way of approaching these complex relationships and assumed linkages 
is to look at how climate change interacts with phenomena that research has 
identified as influencing human mobility. Economic conditions are among them, 
especially income differentials (differences in the return to labour between origin 
and destination) and income variability (fluctuations in income over time).38 For 
instance, economic growth has been found to be negatively impacted by worsening 
climatic conditions.39 Although most studies do not focus on the Mashriq  – as the 
data situation is often less than ideal  – some of these research findings can likely be 
extrapolated to this region. For instance, one study finds that in sub-Saharan states, 
rainfall was a significant negative influence for economic growth,40 meaning that 
less rain equals less income, resulting in a) a widening income gap between origin 
33 Miyan, M.A. (2015), «Droughts in Asian Least Developed Countries: Vulnerability and Sustain-
ability», Weather and Climate Extremes 7, 8–23; Piguet, E., and Laczko, F. (eds.) (2014), People 
on the Move in a Changing Climate: The Regional Impact of Environmental Change on Migra-
tion  (Dordrecht: Springer).
34 Smith, K. (2013), Environmental Hazards: Assessing Risk and Reducing Disaster (Routledge); 
Black, R. et al. (2011), «The Effect of Environmental Change on Human Migration», Global En- 
vironmental Change 21, S3–S11; Martin, M. et al. (2014), «Climate-related Migration in Rural 
Bangladesh: A Behavioural Model», Population and Environment 36(1), 85–110.
35 Fröhlich, C. (2016), «Climate Migrants» (see note 352); Selby, J. et al. (2017), «Climate Change 
and the Syrian Civil War Revisited», Political Geography 60, 232–44.
36 Cattaneo, C., and Peri, G. (2016), «The Migration Response to Increasing Temperatures», 
Journal of Development Economics 122, 127–46; Gröschl, J., and Steinwachs, T. (2017), «Do Natural 
Hazards Cause International Migration?», CESifo Economic Studies 63(4), 445–80.
37 Cattaneo et al. (2019) «Human Migration» (see note 28); Black (2011), «The Effect» (see note 34); 
Martin (2014), «Climate-related Migration» (see note 34).
38 Lilleør, H.B., and Van den Broeck, K. (2011), «Economic Drivers of Migration and Climate 
Change in LDCs», Global Environmental Change 21, S70–S81.
39 Dell, M., Jones, B.F., and Olken, B.A. (2009), «Temperature and Income: Reconciling New 
Cross-sectional and Panel Estimates», American Economic Review 99,198–204.
40 Barrios, S., Bertinelli, L., and Strobl, E. (2010), «Trends in Rainfall and Economic Growth in 















































and destination countries, and b) an increase in mobility of those who depend on 
consistent precipitation, that is, especially farmers and herders.41
However, as mentioned above, liquidity constraints can also limit mobility 
options, pointing to mobility injustices related to socio-economic status.42 Poor 
people have higher incentives to migrate, as they are often highly vulnerable to the 
impacts of climate change, but they have little to no capacity to adapt. At the same 
time, they lack the resources to cover the cost of moving in a planned, more long-
term way. They are thus doubly at risk, not being able to move away from environ-
mental crises while also having few resources to mitigate their impact.43 Although 
this often results in precarious immobility,44 it can also result in «crisis» or «sur-
vival migration».45
That increasing migration can be a result of decreasing agricultural productiv-
ity has been shown, for instance, for international mobility towards states belong-
ing to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).46 
Also, a decrease in income caused by natural disasters (connected to both climate 
change and other anthropogenic activity) can lead to higher numbers of inter-
nally displaced people, as well as greater levels of international mobility.47 In fact, 
the prospect of losing income, or of lasting income variability, can already lead to 
higher levels of mobility, again especially for households depending on agricultural 
activity, as has been shown for Syria as well as other states in the Mashriq.48 This is 
often internal and seasonal movement. 
If income losses are most likely to happen in families and households that 
depend on agriculture  – with the likelihood of migration increasing proportion-
ate to the decrease in land profitability and crop yields  – then less-developed 
states are more likely to suffer from this kind of adverse climate impact, pointing 
41 Cattaneo et al. (2019) «Human Migration» (see note 28).
42 Kniveton, D., Schmidt-Verkerk, K., Smith, C., Black, R. (2008), «Climate Change and Migration: 
Improving Methodologies to Estimate Flows», pp. 29–36, available at: www.iom.cz/files/Climate_ 
Change_and_Migration_MRS_331.pdf; Bryan, G., Chowdhury, S., and Mobarak, A.M. (2014), 
«Underinvestment in a Profitable Technology: The Case of Seasonal Migration in Bangladesh», 
Econometrica 82(5), 1671–1748; Cattaneo, C., and Peri, G. (2015), «The Migration Response to 
Increasing Temperatures», Working Paper 21622 (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research).
43 Foresight (2011), Migration and Global Environmental Change (see note 2); Black (2011), «The 
Effect», Global Environmental Change 21, S3–S11.
44 Black et al. (2013), «Migration, Immobility and Displacement» (see note 3).
45 Martin, S., Weerasinghe, S., and Taylor, A. (2014), «What Is Crisis Migration?», Forced Migration 
Review 45, available at: www.fmreview.org/crisis/martin-weerasinghe-taylor%20.html; Betts, 
A. (2013), Survival Migration. Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press)
46 Cai, R., Feng, S., Pytlikova, M., and Oppenheimer, M. (2016), «Climate Variability and Inter-
national Migration: The Importance of the Agricultural Linkage», Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 79,135–51.
47 Beine, M., and Parsons, C. (2015), «Climatic Factors As Determinants of International Migra-
tion», Scandinavian Journal of Economics 117, 723–67.
































to aforementioned issues of climate justice. Such states often depend much more 
on agriculture than industrialised states and  – due to colonial exploitation and its 
economic, political and social consequences  – are often less capable of adapting to 
changing climatic circumstances. 
The relationship between climate change and human mobility may also be 
affected by socio-political factors. Here, the linkages between violent conflict and 
climate change have received a lot of scholarly attention in past years.49 Stud-
ies are inconclusive, and the often taken-for-granted causality between climate 
change, conflict and migration/mobility is contested.50 In Syria, for instance, 
some researchers suggest that a «century drought» thought to have been connected 
to global warming contributed to the 2011 uprising and war by causing massive 
increases in internal mobility.51 Such simple and linear causalities have been rig-
orously questioned, however, highlighting the complex and contextual character 
of climate, migration and conflict connections.52 For other regions, it has also 
been shown that climate-related conflict not only causes migration, but may also 
restrict it.53
Social and economic factors also play a role in determining whether climate 
change translates into mobility in the Mashriq. For instance, climate change 
affects income differentials between origin and destination countries, and it can 
increase economic uncertainty, fostering conditions conducive to emigration.54 At 
the micro-level, the individual decision and ability to move away from environ-
mental crisis is influenced by the positionality of the potential migrant, that is, 
by the socio-economic and political characteristics of the individual, household 
and community exposed to the climatic events.55 This means that intersectional 
49 Koubi, V. (2019), «Climate Change and Conflict», Annual Review of Political Science 22(1), p. null.
50 Abel, G.J. et al. (2019), «Climate, Conflict and Forced Migration» (see note 238); Brzoska, M., 
and Fröhlich, C. (2016), «Climate Change, Migration and Violent Conflict: Vulnerabilities, 
Pathways and Adaptation Strategies», Migration and Development 5(2), 190–210; Hermans, K., 
and Ide, T. (2019), «Advancing Research on Climate Change, Conflict and Migration», Die Erde  – 
Journal of the Geographical Society of Berlin 150(1), 40–44.
51 Femia, F., and Werrell, C. (2012, March 3), «Syria: Climate Change, Drought and Social Unrest», 
Think Progress , available at: https://thinkprogress.org/syria-climate-change-drought-and-so-
cial-unrest-3db624b8dd76; Gleick, P.H. (2014), «Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict 
in Syria», Weather, Climate, and Society , 6(3), 331–40; Kelley, C.P. et al. (2015), «Climate Change 
in the Fertile Crescent and Implications of the Recent Syrian Drought», Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences 112(11), 3241–46; Werrell, C., Femia, F., and Sternberg, T. (2015), 
«Did We See It Coming? State Fragility, Climate Vulnerability, and the Uprisings in Syria and 
Egypt», SAIS Review of International Affairs 35(1), 29–46.
52 Ide, T. (2018), «Climate War in the Middle East? Drought, the Syrian Civil War and the State of 
Climate-Conflict Research», Current Climate Change Reports 4, 347–54; Selby (2017), «Climate 
Change» (see note 366); Selby, J. (2018), «Climate Change and the Syrian Civil War, Part II: 
The Jazira's Agrarian Crisis», https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2018.06.010.
53 Simpkins, P. (2005), Regional Livestock Study in the Greater Horn of Africa (Geneva: International 
Committee of the Red Cross).
54 Cattaneo et al. (2019) «Human Migration» (see note 28).














































characteristics such as individual wealth, gender, age, health, pre-existing migra-
tion networks, etc., play a key role.56
Gender seems to play a particularly important role for mobility and climate 
justice in the Mashriq. Unequal gender relations as well as gender-differentiated 
access to resources and the labour market can render women more vulnerable to 
climate change impacts, thus increasing the number of reasons for moving. One 
study reports how female interviewees in the Mashriq recalled how prolonged 
droughts led to economic difficulties, which made hiring cheap agricultural labour 
impossible, so that the female (or female-read) members of the household had to 
start working on the fields in addition to their common chores.57 This was cited 
as a reason for moving away from the countryside. But patriarchal structures may 
already exclude them from (parts of) the labour market, impairing their ability to 
move. For instance, if the male (or male-read) members of the household move 
away before the rest of the family, women are often left to deal with the increased 
workload at home. For the women who do migrate from the Mashriq, job opportu-
nities are often less attractive than for other members of the household.58 Although 
there is no agreement as to the impact that gender has on human mobility, studies 
showing that women are migrating less due to climate change59 as well as studies 
showing the opposite60 indicate that gender is a key factor for both mobility and 
climate justice. 
Furthermore, whether and how state and non-state actors in a given country 
address climate change impacts also influences migration decision-making. It is 
therefore relevant to look at state or government approaches to climate change in 
the Mashriq. As shown by Sowers, national communications from states in Mashriq 
«provide little insight into climate inequality or the political and economic factors 
that structure them».61 Structural drivers of vulnerability towards climate change 
are commonly presented as «natural» conditions rather than as effects of policy 
choices, historical processes, or socio-cultural norms and conventions, thus effec-
tively «greenwashing» vulnerabilities and avoiding responsibility. But rapid popu-
lation growth, urbanisation trends, migration to urban centres and gender relations 
56 Sowers, J. (2019), «Understanding Climate Vulnerability» (see note 7).
57 Wodon, Q. et al. (2014), «Climate Change» (see note 16).
58 Ibid.
59 Dillon, A., Mueller, V., and Salau, S. (2011), «Migratory Responses to Agricultural Risk in 
Northern Nigeria», American Journal of Agricultural Economics 93(4), 1048–61; Gray, C., and 
Mueller, V. (2012), «Drought and Population Mobility in Rural Ethiopia», World Development 
40(1), 134–45; Mueller, V., Gray, C., and Kosec, K. (2014), «Heat Stress Increases Long-Term 
Human Migration in Rural Pakistan», Nature Climate Change 4(3), 182–85.
60 With regard to labour migration, see Gray, C., and Mueller, V. (2012), «Natural Disasters and 
Population Mobility in Bangladesh», National Academy of Sciences 109(16), 6000–05; Thiede, 
B., Gray, C., and Mueller, V. (2016), «Climate Variability and Inter-Provincial Migration in South 
America, 1970–2011», Global Environmental Change 41, 228–40; Baez, J. et al. (2017), «Heat 
Exposure and Youth Migration in Central America and the Caribbean», American Economic 
Review 107(5), 446–50.
































affect how climate risks are distributed and are a direct result of political decisions. 
For instance, decisions not to fund family planning and social support systems 
can increase climate vulnerability for certain societal groups.62 Similarly, societal 
movements that focus on issues related to climate change  – for instance the envi-
ronment, pollution or health  – are mostly silenced at the national level in the Mid-
dle East.63 It is particularly interesting, in light of the upheavals of 2011/12, that 
the relationship between the various revolutionary movements across the region 
and climate governance is not identified in national communiqués about climate 
change from Mashriq states, for instance the individual climate action plans fol- 
lowing the Paris Agreement.64 Overall, programmes targeting households and 
communities that are particularly vulnerable and exposed to climate change 
impacts seem to be the exception rather than the rule throughout the region.65 
The focus most commonly is on the national and international (meso and macro) 
levels, often perpetuating existing power structures and risking already dire and 
worsening living conditions in marginalised and vulnerable communities. 
Conclusion
The main limitation for a study discussing climate and mobility justice in the 
Mashriq is that there is little systematic evidence available to analyse the relation-
ship between climate change and human mobility in the region, as many states 
do not conduct regular surveys or collect and share other relevant data. This is 
at least in part due to the fact that such data is considered political, for instance 
when discussing water availability, utilisation and distribution in the Jordan River 
basin.66 But nonetheless, the mechanisms discussed above have been shown for 
the Mashriq, too. The relationship between climate and mobility in the region 
is shaped by whether climate events are slow- or fast-onset, and climate-related 
mobility differs in terms of duration, space covered and level of voluntariness. In 
particular, there seems to be a link between slow-onset events such as droughts 
and increased mobility, as chronic droughts lead to decreasing crop yields, making 
agricultural activity increasingly less viable.67
62 Sowers, J. (2019), «Understanding Climate Vulnerability» (see note 7).
63 Sowers, J. (2018), «Environmental Activism in the Middle East and North Africa», in Verhoeven, 
H. (ed.), Environmental Politics in the Middle East , pp. 27–52 (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
64 Sowers, J. (2019), «Understanding Climate Vulnerability» (see note 7). See this webpage for all 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions: www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissions/indc/ 
Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx.
65 Wodon, Q. et al. (2014), «Climate Change» (see note 16).
66 Fröhlich, C. (2012), «Water : Reason for Conflict or Catalyst for Peace? The Case of the Middle 
East», L'Europe en Formation 365(3), 139.














































Socio-economic factors are found to be at least as important as changes in cli-
mate, however.68 As has been shown above, understanding aspects of mobility and 
climate justice in the Mashriq requires a thorough understanding of the political, 
economic and social factors that structure climate vulnerability and adaptation 
or mitigation capacities. Importantly, when discussing these issues in the Mashriq 
(or any region, for that matter), we need to reflect on two key questions. 
The first of these concerns the focus on mobility in the media and policy debates: 
What does it reveal, and what does it hide? In addressing this issue, when discussing 
mobility and climate justice, we need to remember that movement away from envi-
ronmental risk is just one possible strategy for adapting to climate change  – and 
one that is not available to everyone. Also, although increased mobility in response 
to changing climatic conditions is commonly considered a key adaptive strategy by 
those who undertake it,69 it can also be interpreted as a failure to adapt, occurring 
only when all else has failed. For instance, an increasingly precarious life in the 
countryside, including lack of water, food, income and jobs, has been reported to 
lead to family members working the fields instead of going to school, to the whole 
family eating less, and to selling assets  – before migration was even considered.70 
In both cases, however, it is necessary to reflect on why mobility is deemed positive 
or negative, and by whom. 
Alternatively, increased mobility could be seen as an option to diversify adap-
tive capacities, for instance by giving household members the opportunity to build 
new knowledge on agricultural innovations through education, which can help 
family members at home better adapt to changing environmental conditions. This 
can happen through shared new knowledge, for instance about more climate- 
resilient crops, less water-intensive irrigation methods or new techniques of crop 
and feed preservation. It may also happen through direct money transfers (remit-
tances), which can help alleviate income fluctuations or losses in the place of origin. 
But each of these adaptive measures is limited by the state of mobility and climate 
justice in the respective states. Not everyone can move, even when at extreme risk, 
and not every state can adapt to climate change in an effective and targeted way. 
The second question we must ask relates to changing conceptions of «human» 
affairs in our era, a moment at which the relationship between natural, social and 
political science is being rethought. This last problem can be summarised as fol-
lows: What does the focus, in mainstream political and media debates, on human 
mobility in the context of man-made global warming hide with regard to nature 
and the planet as a whole? As addressing this question is beyond the scope of this 
chapter, I close by raising it to invite reflection upon the fact that vulnerability 
68 Grant, A., Burger, N., and Wodon, Q. (2014), «Climate-Induced Migration in the MENA Region: 
Results from Qualitative Fieldwork», in Wodon, Q., Liverani, A., Joseph, G., and Bougnoux, N. 
(eds.), Climate Change and Migration: Evidence from the Middle East and North Africa (Wash-
ington, DC: World Bank).
69 McNamara, K., Bronen, R., Fernando, N., and Klepp, S. (2018), «The Complex Decision-Making 
of Climate-Induced Relocation: Adaptation and Loss and Damage», Climate Policy 18,111–17.
70 Wodon, Q. et al. (2014), «Climate Change» (see note 16).
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to climate impacts is by no means limited to humans. On the contrary, in the 
Anthropocene, it has become plainly evident that human life cannot be sustained 
without extending equal care to nature in all its facets. Climate change will con-
tinue to affect both human and non-human life on this planet, including increasing 
rates of extinction, new patterns of mobility of flora, fauna, water, fire and so on.71 
Examples from the Mashriq include the effect of invasive species on biodiversity 
in the Jordan River basin,72 and an increase in forest fires across the region, for 
instance in Iran.73 Efforts to achieve climate justice and mobility justice therefore 
need to engage with the movement for non-human life and climate vulnerability, 
too.
71 Baldwin, A., Fröhlich, C., and Rothe, D. (2019), «From Climate Migration to Anthropocene 
Mobilities: Shifting the Debate», Mobilities 14(3), 289–97.
72 See www.biodiv.be/jordan/biodiversity/species-diversity/invasive-and-introduced-species-1/
invasive-and-introduced-species (accessed 20 August 2020).
73 Hadian-Jazy, T. (2020, July 20), «The Forest Fires in Iran That Won't Stop Burning», Atlantic 
Council , available at: www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/the-forest-fires-in-iran-that-












































































Under the climate radar:  
Disaster and displacement in  
the Bengal Delta
For decades, coastal erosion has been rampant in the Bengal Delta, which spans 
much of the Indian state of West Bengal and neighbouring Bangladesh. Deltas like 
this one are highly dynamic landscapes  – the erosion of soft muddy lands at the 
hand of estuarine waters is met, or even outweighed, by the accretion of fresh soil. 
On many of the coastal margins of this vast delta today, erosion outweighs accre-
tion, by far. 
Alongside storms ploughing through this area with increasing velocity, erosion 
is a serious threat to life on the coastal margins. It threatens the much-revered 
tiger population roaming what remains of the mangrove swamps, as is well-known 
internationally thanks to media coverage and high-profile campaigns by the Inter-
national Union for Conservation of Nature. The equally menacing danger it poses 
to resident farmers and fishermen eking out a living in the densely populated, sink-
ing and shrinking parts of the delta inhabited by low-income rural populations is 
rather less publicised. Displacement by increasingly turbulent river and sea water 
is the order of the day. Every year, a number of families lose land to an advancing 
sea. The land is eroding slowly but continuously due to diurnal tides, spring tides, 
the turbulence of the monsoons and recurrent storm surges. Every year, a num-
ber of families lose all their remaining land. Reduced to homeless paupers, they 
seek refuge in makeshift roadside huts or with sympathetic family, or they end up 
migrating to the slums of nearby cities. 
The Bengal Delta is among the poster children of climate change. The unfolding 
tragedies associated with the delta offer a preview  – or so the story goes  – of the 
potentially crisis-ridden plight of many other coasts in the not too distant future. 
Although it certainly is true that anthropogenic sea-level rise is taking its toll, cli-
mate change is just one of a number of dynamics causing the rapid erosion of land 
on these shores. Others relate to the natural growth trajectory of this delta, human 
interventions in the form of embankments and barrages, and the silting of estuaries 
through excess sedimentation caused by intensive agriculture in the plains.1
1 Chakrabarti, D.K. (2001), Archeological Geography of the Ganga Plain: The Lower and the Mid-











































For those who must confront the consequences of eroding shorelines, debates 
on what is making the waters so belligerent and voracious are academic. The con-
cerns of people forced to deal with failing embankments, recurrent floods and 
the disappearance of land remain largely unaddressed by state institutions and 
NGOs charged with delivering humanitarian assistance. Despite its widespread 
impacts  – and the fact that it is experienced as calamity by those affected  – coastal 
erosion goes under the radar of disaster governance. Consequently, little is known 
about the plights of people holding out at the very edge of India's most severely 
eroding coastline. How might consideration of their anxieties and hopes shape an 
agenda for social justice that encompasses some of the less visible manifestations of 
climate-related injury and loss? And how might it compel us to broaden our under-
standing of disaster and disaster preparedness? 
Maiti2 and his family tried to hold out. A few years before we first met, the 
rough brackish waters of the Indian Ocean felt far away. Now the sea stalks them. 
The part of the village in which they live used to be tucked behind rows and rows of 
houses, gardens, ponds and fields. All fell victim to coastal erosion. They have been 
encroached upon by the shore, they say, dragged into its direct reach  – its waves, 
currents and winds. Marooned on an exposed corner of a battered island, there is 
little hope that their home will survive the water's inland march for much longer. 
Like thousands of villages in the delta, theirs depends on a ring embankment. 
Ideally, it is supposed to keep the tides out, preventing the salinisation of fields and 
swamping of homes. But on my last visit, this essential outer embankment lay in 
tatters. Its poor condition, I learnt, was not unusual. It is rebuilt every year, only 
to collapse a few months later. As a consequence, the stretch between the outer 
embankment and the next one to the interior is flooded regularly. Saltwater intru-
sion has eliminated agriculture. The floods and tides continue to level the terrain, 
diligently washing out what is left of this part of the village. All know that the retreat 
of the outer embankment is imminent  – that this stretch will not be saved. Villagers 
fume at the state for the neglect. Local politicians exclaim that their hands are tied 
by empty coffers and the funding priorities of development authorities and minis-
tries. The outer embankment is continually being rebuilt with the cheapest, least 
durable materials, such as mud, wood and bamboo. 
This is not the first time Maiti has had to weather disaster. Everyone in the 
village has sustained severe damage from tropical cyclones and devastating 
surges. But loss from erosion is of a different order. That which breaks in a storm, 
I hear people exclaim, can be mended, replanted or rebuilt from scratch. Erosion, 
however, takes the land for good. The ground under one's feet is washed away, 
homesteads lost and agrarian futures undone. 
The government or humanitarian assistance that is supposed to help locals 
confront this  – the actual disaster that, in their eyes, threatens them  – is almost 
entirely lacking. This is ironic since, in the past, this village has been a beneficiary of 














Coastal erosion is rampant in the Bengal Delta, 
which spans much of the Indian state of West 














































vulnerable rural areas.3 Such programmes target what customarily count as nat-
ural disasters  – enormous events that interrupt normalcy and involve the sudden 
destruction of lives and assets. When surges have struck, official advice has been 
broadcast reminding people to take precautions in the stormy season  – to stock 
potable water, canned food and firewood to ensure their survival. Individual 
organisations have arranged for the construction of cyclone shelters in robust, 
multi-storied buildings. Villagers such as Maiti appreciate these efforts. Yet, they 
regard them as being off the mark. The real disaster, they argue, rests in the 
repeated collapse of embankments, the annual floodings occurring between the 
ruined outer embankment and the minor one in the interior, and in the slow dis-
appearance of their land. 
Staffers and officials offering assistance in the past knew very well what worried 
villagers the most. But the problem was at once too big and too unmanageable, it 
appears, for it to be actionable. The chronic onslaught of waves and currents in 
a shifting waterscape  – taking their toll day after day all along hundreds of kilo-
metres of banked shores in the Indian part of the delta alone  – made it too big.4 
It very rarely involved death or the sudden loss of substantial assets, all the while 
advancing in ways that were hardly visible, affecting substantial populations only 
over the course of years and decades. 
Maiti knows what the future holds in store for him. Together with his wife, he 
has seen two villages that once stood between his own and the sea peeled away by 
waves. They have seen how other villages retreated with the shoreline once homes 
were washed away or buried under a new embankment. And they have witnessed 
roads that once crisscrossed their village being lined by makeshift huts, occupied 
by people seeking refuge after their houses were submerged. 
A familiar pattern emerges from the experiences of these unfortunate people. 
Many of those who now live in huts were displaced by the waters several times. 
After losing their original homes and lands, they sought refuge nearby. But the 
waters drew near again, forcing them to move once more. Many I spoke to during 
my research went through displacement five times or more, living miserably with 
worsening choices and being at the whims of an encroaching sea.5
Now Maiti finds himself at the fringe, where most other huts have long been 
dismantled, their inhabitants having moved on. The road that connected them has 
been washed away. It is hard to keep track of where people move to. Maiti him-
self is unsure. Few leave the delta for good, betting on cities to make a fresh start 
3 Harms, A. (2019), «Adapting to Sea Level Rise in the Indian Ocean: The Cases of India and 
Bangladesh», in Harris, P. (ed.), Climate Change and Ocean Governance: Politics and Policy for 
Threatened Seas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
4 Mukhopadhyay, A. (2016), Living with Disasters: Communities and Development in the Indian 
Sundarbans (Delhi: Cambridge University Press).
5 Harms, A. (2017), «Citizenship at Sea: Environmental Displacement and State Relations in the 











































in urban slums.6 More stay within the delta in volatile conditions. This is home, 
they say. Familiar with the terrain, they bet on shared histories and networks. 
Some manage to buy tiny plots somewhere else with cash pooled from savings and 
remittances sent by family members labouring on construction sites across India 
or in middle-class households in nearby towns. I hear one such individual  – Jana, 
a middle-aged former farmer and father of four  – complain about the difficulties of 
making do on these often meagre sums while living among unfamiliar neighbours. 
Others, such as Sheikh, a painter and fisherman, managed to secure tiny plots of 
public land on which to build permanent homes. (As one of the lucky few, he bene-
fited from the patronage of an influential politician and was not formally resettled 
by the state.) 
All around Maiti, the land and the village is disappearing. The slow and gradual 
changes that swallowed plots and homesteads  – turning farmers into paupers  – has 
continue unabated. In drawing special attention to Maiti, I am not suggesting that 
humanitarian or state interventions to prevent or respond to calamities make no 
sense. They do. But in being underpinned by a conceptualisation of disaster that 
favours eventful disruption as well as the sudden and massive destruction of assets, 
such programmes fail to engage in meaningful ways with the slow and wide-scale 
anthropogenic degradations already unfolding in various parts of this planet, not 
least the Global South, where the toll is the greatest. Shifting shorelines and sub-
merged homes require a re-orientation of disaster policies and institutions. The 
latter must continue to address the many dramatic manifestations of climate- 
related disaster that we are certain to continue seeing across densely populated 
regions of Asia. Equally, however, they must attend to disastrous processes that 
involve gradual changes, such as those experienced by Maiti and others like him: 
slower transformations that bruise land and people continually over the course of 
years, resulting in the disappearance of homes and plots, livelihoods and attach-
ments to place. Such processes, which often lead to more permanent forms of 
loss for those affected than extreme climate-related weather events, are barely 
less cruel in their consequences.
6 Ghosh, A. (2017), Sustainability Conflicts in Coastal India: Hazards, Changing Climate and 
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